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ABSTRACT

Committed to the Fragment: Feminist Literature and the Promise of Wellness

by

Lynne Beckenstein

Advisor: Kandice Chuh
“I have never been able to blind myself” to the cruelty of a world that “destroys its own
young in passing…out of not noticing or caring about the destruction,” Audre Lorde tells us in
her 1980 “mythobiography” Zami: A New Spelling of My Name.1 This quality, Lorde says,
“according to one popular definition of mental health, makes me mentally unhealthy.”2 In
rejecting psychological self-possession as a sign of wellness, this passage also rejects it as one of
sovereignty’s conditions – a version of sovereignty that, at the time of Lorde’s writing, already
dominated the landscape of therapeutic culture in the United States, and would become only
more staggeringly pervasive and profitable in the years to come. In our therapeutic age, to
establish oneself as one of neoliberalism’s winners requires displaying “high levels of emotional
intelligence, autonomy, self-esteem, optimism, resilience, and self-motivation.”3 This is an
iteration of the Enlightenment ideal of the human, articulated in the terms of psychiatric
discourse.
In the United States, this discourse has been feminized since the nineteenth-century

1

Audre Lorde, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1982), 251-2.
Ibid.
3
Edgar Cabanas and Eva Illouz, Manufacturing Happy Citizens: How the Science and Industry of Happiness
Control Our Live (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019), 15.
2
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practice of mental therapeutics, which established middle- and upper-class white women as its
moneyed clientele – a demographic that continues to have privileged access to therapeutic
resources, even as therapeutic culture casts women more broadly as responsible for the social
and emotional health of everyone in their orbit. My own interest lies with how literary genres
and forms reject this version of psychic wellness as both a privilege of bourgeois liberalism and a
panacea for heteronormativity’s discontents. These texts are what I read as “feminist literature.”
They turn to emergent genres and forms to refigure wellness as a generative relation to
difference – a relation that, in Lorde’s Black feminist framework, is always bound up with the
pain of others. Specifically, I read Lorde’s genre-bending memoir The Cancer Journals; the
post-2016 genre of self-care comedy; and autotheory about the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) as reworking what sexist, racist, and ableist ideologies
would call “mental health.”
How has a hegemonic ideal of psychological well-being – one that casts the performance
of self-possession at a condition of the good life, while stigmatizing mental distress and
disability – placed fraught and contradictory demands on the feminist subject? I argue that these
texts represent the writing process itself as crucial for addressing this question: a site for revising
the literary conventions that evince a liberal subject’s mind at work, which reveals how
medicalized norms structure writing cultures, academic and otherwise. Writing appears across a
range of genres – memoir; fiction; cultural criticism; and autotheory – as a practice that identifies
illness, wellness, and aesthetics as pressingly concerned with gender and power. For Lorde, the
state of feeling “always tender in the wrong places,” where “feel[ing] strong and able in
general” exists alongside “that battered place where I am totally inadequate to any thing I most

v

wish to accomplish.” This is where, these texts suggest, the work of thinking, imagining, and
composing in relation to the vulnerability of others begins.
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Introduction

This dissertation began from a place of uncertainty. I spent my first years of graduate
studies poring over books I loved, which often featured experimental prose about anxiety or
depression; the gender-sexed body; and artistic practice as a subversion of patriarchal norms.
Once I began to regard these books as a dissertation’s objects of study, it seemed that my topic
had chosen me and that I would write about psychological pain as a feminist aesthetic, whether I
liked it or not. I wasn’t so sure that I did. I had been an English major at the turn of the 21st
century, when the online publishing industry appeared to run entirely on narratives of women’s
suffering; having done plenty of my own voyeuristic clicking through one horror story after
another, I had internalized the premise that pain was not only “the condition of membership of a
feminist community,” but also the condition of feminist authorship itself.4 Over a decade later, in
an essay on Maggie Nelson’s Bluets, I would cite Jack Halberstam on the performance of selfharm as an enactment of feminist undoing, adding, “I want more than this haunting ambiguity of
the woman’s ravaged flesh. No kidding, you might say; who doesn’t? ‘I don’t want to
know/wreckage, dreck and waste,’ Adrienne Rich says, ‘but these are the materials.’”5 I didn’t
think that feminist literature was always a project of “resubjugation…through the investment of
its own pain,” but when it came to writing about therapeutic culture and the politics of mental
wellness, I wasn’t sure how to evade that trap myself.6

4

Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 172.
Lynne Beckenstein, “Listening to Color: A Set of Propositions on Pain as Feminist Aesthetic,” Women &
Performance: a journal of feminist theory 27, no. 3 (2017), 283-300, doi: 10.1080/0740770X.2017.1365439.
6
Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995), 74.
5
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It would turn out to be the wrong question to ask. Instead, I would need to consider how
literary memoir and fiction could imagine a subject for whom such a trap would be irrelevant –
an obstacle that would fail to block their path to psychic well-being because they were oriented
towards a different horizon altogether. “I have never been able to blind myself” to the cruelty of
a world that “destroys its own young in passing…out of not noticing or caring about the
destruction,” Audre Lorde tells us in her mythobiography Zami: A New Spelling of My Name.7
This trait, Lorde says, “according to one popular definition of mental health, makes me mentally
unhealthy.”8 To write against the grain of mental health as an individualist ideology entails
writing against the grain of liberal autonomy, which, as disability scholars have established,
naturalizes ableist notions of rationality and disallows “ways of knowing fundamentally invested
in dis/order.”9 By rejecting psychological self-possession as a sign of wellness, Lorde also rejects
it as one of sovereignty’s conditions.
This version of sovereignty would grow staggeringly pervasive – and profitable – in the
years to come. Lorde published Zami shortly after the popularization of the term “medicalindustrial complex” and its widespread establishment of patients as consumers; this occurred in
tandem with the popular psychology boom of the 1980s, which sold millions of self-books via
the populist message that “[professionals] offered no special skills, only special degrees” and that
Americans could improve their lives merely by “taking control and individual responsibility.”10
In the twenty-first century United States, where the emergent sciences of happiness and positive
psychology have thrived by exploiting the public’s faith in their empirical validity, the trillion-
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Audre Lorde, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1982), 251-2.
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Margaret Price, Mad at School: Rhetorics of Mental Disability and Academic Life (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2011), 38.
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dollar wellness industries continue to relentlessly capitalize on the homegrown belief that “the
self is something we can work to cultivate and improve.”11 What makes this tenet so useful to
corporate and governmental institutions is that it appears apolitical – though, of course, this
therapeutic orientation has always been stratified by race, gender, class, and disability. In the
twenty-first century United States, the well-off willingly seek out therapists and gurus,” while
“the poor are referred to social workers who vet their mental and moral fitness for government”;
meanwhile, if an individual “violates social norms” anywhere on the spectrum from “committing
violence” to “refusing to work,” then their relative privilege will determine whether they end up
before a mental health counselor or a judge.12 The diversity of these approaches demonstrates
that the activity of caring for one’s own psychological well-being – whether that activity is freely
pursued through therapy and self-care rituals, or enforced by medical and legal institutions;
guided by the individual’s desires, or set by the protocols of psychiatric diagnosis – is always an
index of power. Uniting them, though, is the fact that in our therapeutic age, it is “a matter of
common sense” that we ought to make “the individual psyche the primary object of our
attention,” and attend to its “balance and well-being as the ultimate goal of our strivings on this
earth.”13
This means that, in practice, to establish oneself as a model citizen – one of
neoliberalism’s winners – requires displaying “high levels of emotional intelligence, autonomy,
self-esteem, optimism, resilience, and self-motivation,” which are the psychological features of
the “healthy, successful, and optimally functioning individual.”14 This is an iteration of the

Timothy Aubry and Trysh Travis, “Introduction,” Rethinking Therapeutic Culture, ed. Timothy Aubry and Trysh
Travis (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 5.
12
Ibid., 1.
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Ibid.
14
Cabanas and Illouz, Manufacturing Happy Citizens, 15.
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Enlightenment ideal of the human, articulated in the terms of psychiatric discourse. In the U.S.,
this discourse has been feminized since the nineteenth-century practice of mental therapeutics,
when “medical men emerged…to become the dominant guardians of women’s health,”
particularly the middle- and upper-class white women who were their moneyed clientele.15 As
Dana Becker observes, this demographic has traditionally been the one “most fluent in the
vernacular” of psychotherapy, though therapeutic culture does categorize women more broadly
as responsible for the “work of the psyche” – that is, as the guardians of their own social and
emotional health, who are also responsible for managing the affect and relationships of everyone
in their orbit (especially, unsurprisingly, men).16 Lauren Berlant has characterized popular
therapy and women’s culture as “the archive of love’s posttraumatic institutions,” a masscultural site where “women are taught to ‘seek and find’ a form of therapy that affirms love as
the source of and cure for a psychic disorder and social contradictions whose effects are made to
see inevitable and a small price to pay for optimism or its fading memory.”17 My own interests
lie with the literary genres and forms that reject this version of psychic well-being as both a
privilege of bourgeois liberalism and a panacea for heteronormativity’s discontents. In the
context of this project, these texts are what I read as “feminist literature.” They refigure wellness
as a generative relation to difference – a relation that, in Lorde’s Black feminist framework, is
always bound up with the pain of others.
To pursue these questions, this dissertation engages affect theory and gender and
sexuality studies, both of which offer ways to read genre as a site for the self’s composure, where
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Dana Becker, The Myth of Empowerment: Women and the Therapeutic Culture in America (New York: New
York University Press, 2005), 5.
16
Ibid., 5.
17
Lauren Berlant, The Female Complaint: The Unfinished Business of Sentimentality in American Culture (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2008), 205.
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“the subject’s structuring drama is repeated” and managed through form.18 Berlant’s work, in
particular, has taught me to approach genre as “a loose affectively-invested zone of expectations
about the narrative shape a situation will take,” which opens up feminist literature’s possibilities
for rewriting the link between wellness and sovereignty.19 Affect theory and gender and sexuality
studies have also proved crucial for contextualizing that link, tracing it throughout the
contemporary “reorienting of the liberal feminist field away from notions of freedom, equal
rights, and social justice and toward the importance of well-roundedness and well-being.”20
Because my project focuses on this reorientation in terms of psychological (un)wellness, it also
seeks out the places of confluence between American studies, where one finds cultural criticism
on the liberal-political subject of therapeutic culture; and disability studies, which reveals how
medicalized norms naturalize the category of the human. At these disciplinary intersections, I ask
how a popular ideal of wellness – one that casts the performance of self-possession as a
condition of the good life, while stigmatizing mental distress or disability – has placed fraught
and contradictory demands on the feminist subject.
Tellingly, at these same disciplinary intersections, the writing process itself often comes
under scrutiny. It becomes a contested zone, where the act of composition either conforms to the
“curative imaginary” of traditional prose genres, or else models a method for composing a self
that exceeds their limitations – which, given those imaginaries’ investments in a liberal model of

Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011),148. This phrase is from Berlant’s
reading of the sex in Mary Gaitskill’s Two Girls, Fat and Thin, which, as a mimesis of traumatic repetition, “points
to what it takes…to break the stride of ordinary being’s will to reproduce itself, its patterns.” This unfolds in the
context of Berlant’s framing of all genres as “produc[ing] drama from their moments of potential failure.”
19
Lauren Berlant, “Austerity, Precarity, Awkwardness,” Supervalent Thought, 2011,
https://supervalentthought.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/berlant-aaa-2011final.pdf. Berlant’s work has, of course,
shaped both fields – affect theory and gender and sexuality studies – in ways too far-reaching and profound to
catalogue here.
20
Catherine Rottenberg, “Happiness and the Liberal Imagination: How Superwoman Became Balanced,” Feminist
Studies 40, no. 1 (2012): 147.
18
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rationality, are always already racist, sexist, and, of course, ableist.21 Price, for example,
observes that people diagnosed with mental disabilities are “presumed not to be competent, nor
understandable, nor valuable, nor whole,” and so are “placed in institutions, medicated,
lobotomized, shocked, or simply left to survive without homes.”22 She argues that these abuses
are the effects of being “rhetorically disabled,” where one speaks and writes from a position
deemed subhuman or nonhuman; as such, that person cannot “meet the tests of liberal
subjectivity,” as Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson puts it, which presume that an individual’s use of
language indexes their capacity for self-determination and agency.23
This pathologization of prose, which disallows mental disability or distress as the
grounds for authorship, departs from the Western humanist tradition’s association of madness
with literary genius.24 We can attribute this, in part, to the contemporary medicalization of the
psyche. Between the rampant commodification of psychological well-being and the field of
psychiatry’s decades-long push to establish its own scientific validity, diagnostic logics have so
thoroughly pervaded American social norms that it can be challenging to recognize their
epistemological force – in this case, a force that is brought to bear on the category of the literary
itself. However, this also points to the potentialities of prose genres and forms to denaturalize
“the psychiatric gaze,” while rewriting the literary conventions that are typically read as evidence
of a liberal subject’s mind at work.25 For example, in The Collected Schizophrenias, Esmé

Alison Kafer, Feminist, Queer, Crip (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 27. Kafer uses “curative,”
rather than “cure” in order to communicate her concern with “compulsory able-bodiedness/able-mindness, not with
individual sick and disabled people’s relationships to particular medical interventions.” A “curative imaginary” is
“an understanding of disability that not only expects and assumes intervention but also cannot imagine or
comprehend anything other than intervention.”
22
Price, Mad at School, 26.
23
Ibid.; Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, “Rethinking Rhetoric through Mental Disabilities,” Rhetoric Review 22, no. 2
(2003), 159.
24
James Whitehead, Madness and the Romantic Poet: A Critical History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
25
Elizabeth Donaldson, “The Psychiatric Gaze: Deviance and Disability in Film,” Atenea 25, no. 1 (2005): 32.
21

6

Weijun Wang narrates the essay “Perdition Days” from within the experience of Cotard’s
delusion, a strain of psychosis where one believes oneself to be dead: “What the writer’s
confused state means is not beside the point, because it is the point. I am in here, somewhere:
cogito ergo sum.”26 The delusion always “lifts without fanfare,” Wang tells us, with no clear
transition back to the “land of the living.”27 The essay’s form mirrors this psychic disorientation,
moving between alinear passages that drift in and out of time without narrative resolution. They
delve into the crushing lack of options for treating Wang’s “medically-resistant schizoaffective
disorder,” which Wang processes by turning to Marilynne Robinson’s Home in order to think
through the eternality of perdition, even though reading fiction only furthers destabilizes her
sense of reality (“If I were going to be lost and wandering, I’d rather be lost in Gilead than
anywhere else”).28 These passages also register the absurdity of how the signs of psychosis –
precipitous weight loss and profound agitation, both of which prompt Wang to wear the same
chic, but simple white V-neck and black pants every day – render her an object of sexualized
interest to men on the street.29 “Yes,” Wang thinks, as a young man turns to overtly check her
out, “…you may think I’m hot, but I’m also a rotting corpse. Sucks to be you, sir.”30
Although this tongue-in-cheek moment does poke fun at heteronormative masculinity and
the presumed vapidity of its desiring subject, what brings “Perdition Days” into conversation
with this dissertation’s concerns is its figuration of writing as a feminist practice. The essay’s
fragmentary form foregrounds the ambiguity of writing from within this particular experience of
psychic disorder: one where the narrator examines her own sense of personhood as a set of

Esmé Weijun Wang, “Perdition Days,” in The Collected Schizophrenias (Minneapolis: Graywolf Press, 2019),
145.
27
Wang, Collected Schizophrenias, 159.
28
Ibid., 149, 152.
29
Ibid., 154.
30
Ibid., 154.
26
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contingencies, its objective reality unconfirmed as it reconstitutes itself in the psychiatrist’s
office; her marital bedroom; within and without the text of Home. In so doing, the essay undoes
the patriarchal model of authorship as the exercise of dominance over one’s material. Wang
makes this explicit when she frames creative writing pedagogy as a hermeneutic for the
experience of psychosis: “Pacing, they told me at graduate school, is one of the beginning
writer’s biggest challenges, because a beginning writer wants to tell all the wrong things, or
everything at once,” she says, before tumbling into a series of events that resist any such
imposition of narrative control:
A nurse told us at the hospital in Covington, Louisiana, where I’d been committed during
a Christmas vacation at my in-laws’, that we were there because we did not believe in
Jesus…in October 2013 I was told that I fainted on a plane and went in and out of
consciousness for four hours …I was told that my debut novel was ‘still under
consideration’ at every house it had been sent to.31
Wreckage, dreck, and waste may well be the materials when writing about the psychic detritus of
living through our current therapeutic age. But by turning to emergent genres and forms, literary
fiction and memoir open up the possibilities of writing as a feminist practice that takes up this
detritus as the grounds for creativity, and that makes a space for reworking the parameters of
what sexist, racist, and ableist ideologies would call “mental health.”
In exploring these possibilities, this dissertation takes Lorde’s rejection of psychological
self-possession as its point of departure. As I will detail in the chapter descriptions, I read
Lorde’s 1980 memoir The Cancer Journals as an expansive theorization of wellness that, as she
suggests in the aforementioned passage from Zami, would appear to render her “mentally
unhealthy” to those who subscribe to the “popular definition of mental health.”32 Lorde’s literary
reworking of the psyche shapes my readings of the post-2016 genres of self-care comedy and

31
32

Ibid., 156
Lorde, The Cancer Journals (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1980); Lorde, Zami, 151-2.
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autotheory about the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the subjects of this
dissertation’s second and third chapters. But before I provide an overview of these chapters and
the connections between them, I wish to acknowledge how Lorde’s terminology here differs
from my own, as well as to briefly review the socio-historical context that ties together this
group of formally and substantively diverse texts.
Throughout this dissertation, I bring the insights of disability studies to bear on critical
questions that animate feminist and affect theory. As such, I follow the example of disability
studies scholars who refrain from using “mental health” when referring to a state of well-being
that does not necessarily exclude the experiences of madness or psychic distress, but rather
enables the individual to survive them and to thrive outside a curative temporality. In her essay
“Defining Mental Disability,” Margaret Price points out that the linked terms “mental health”
and “mental illness” reinforce the “well/unwell paradigm” that casts madness as a problem that
needs to be “cured” by any means necessary.33 Materially, this framework allows insurance
companies to cut off mental-health coverage soon as the patient reaches the threshold for
recovery set by their plan, while also foreclosing the possibility of holistic forms of care.
Discursively, the absolutism of “health,” as a category, reinforces ableist norms that makes
“some bodies seem naturally deficient or excessive and others seem superior.”34 To avoid this
potential implication, I use the terms “wellness” or “psychic wellness” to refer to how these
feminist texts imagine a life-affirming relationship to the psyche, beyond the medical model that
pathologizes difference. One exception is when I am actually referring to the concept of “mental
health” that is circulated by medical institutions and/or wellness industries. Another is when I am

33
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Price, Mad at School, 300.
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, “Feminist Disability Studies,” Signs 30, no. 2 (2005): 1559, doi: 10.1086/423352.
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referring to the politics of liberation movements that sought to reclaim that concept, and to
rework it so that it would include marginalized people as subjects who are owed the resources
that woud protect them from suffering and premature death. It is in this latter sense that I
understand Lorde to be using the term in Zami.
In theorizing wellness and, especially, psychic wellness as a generative relation to
difference, Lorde’s writing unfolds in sharp contradistinction to the mainstream turn towards
pop-psychology self-help that, by the time of the The Cancer Journals’ 1980 publication, had
developed into a multi-million-dollar industry in the United States. In Madness Is Civilization:
When the Diagnosis Was Social, 1948-1980, Michael Staub historicizes the rise of pop-psych as
one of several strands of antipsychiatric thinking that were part of the postwar turn towards
social diagnoses for madness. Staub’s project is to chart not only the sweeping scope, but also
the internal contradictions of this international shift, which is largely associated with the USbased countercultural activists of the 1960s and 70s who believed, along with a “significant
portion of the [American] populace,” that madness was a “plausible and sane reaction to insane
social conditions, and that psychiatrists served principally as agents of repression.”35 Members of
the feminist, gay liberation, Black power, and psychiatric survivors movements often accused
mainstream psychiatry of conditioning individuals to accept their social oppression – but, Staub
argues, the precursors to these antipsychiatric ideas actually originated within mainstream
psychiatry itself. Indeed, they had been “absolutely essential to [its] dramatic rise to broad
cultural influence and legitimacy in the first decade of the Cold War,” when the establishment of
the National Institute of Mental Health (1949) and the publication of the first edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1952) signaled the US’s national

35

Staub, Madness Is Civilization, 2.
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investment in studying mental illness as a widespread phenomenon shaped by societal forces.36
This does not, for Staub, necessarily undermine the revolutionary commitments of
antipsychiatric thought and radical therapy, but rather demonstrates how “psychiatry and
antipsychiatry were ideologically all over the map,” often sharing key theoretical or
philosophical assumptions that were mobilized towards oppositional political ends.37
Pop psych self-help presents an exemplary case of these internal contradictions. In the
early 1970s, it emerged as a strand of antipsychiatric thinking that borrowed much of its
conceptual apparatus from the tenets of feminist therapy, but did so by selling a notion of
individual empowerment that “hopelessly perverted” the core of the feminist project.38 Of
course, the history of self-help is longer than that and extends across global reading cultures:
Beth Blum dates its origins to the literature of 19th-century British socialist and anarchist mutual
aid societies, and suggests that its first manifestation as a “handbook of laissez-faire liberalism”
was published in 1859.39 But what Staub’s work reveals is how US-based countercultural
moments intervened in this longer history, especially during the period when self-help was
advertised as a rejection of “the psychiatric status quo” – one that offered a quick, inexpensive
alternative to therapy.40
As Staub observes, it was no coincidence that pop-psych’s ascendance as a democratized
therapeutic resource –accessible to all, at least in theory – followed the rise of the antipsychiatric
“feminist insurgency.”41 If, as I argue in the second chapter of this dissertation, the present-day

36
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commoditization of self-care both relies on a corrupted version of feminist discourse and
expresses an anxious defensiveness about doing so, that tension may well have something to
with this moment in the late 1970s, when pop-psych’s riffs on feminist therapy went mainstream
in the United States. Staub traces this development to the late 1960s, when feminist activists –
among them psychologists, psychiatrists, therapists, and sociologists – began to openly challenge
the misogyny of the psychiatric profession as a field that systemically policed women’s desires,
diagnosing them as mentally ill for failing to properly fulfill their roles as wives and mothers,
while also licensing male therapists to sexually and emotionally abuse their female patients.42
The medical literature published during those years amply demonstrates why feminists began to
rally around the belief that “society was fully responsible for women’s mental disorders.”43 It is
rife with case studies that present schizophrenic women as merely maladjusted to their domestic
responsibilities; with research on feminism as a pathology that subverts women’s essential
biological functions; and with formal proposals for new diagnostic labels like “angry women
syndrome” or “the intractable female patient,” whose resistance to male domination betrays her
repressed longing for it.44
To discipline unruly women by labeling them mad is, of course, a storied technique in the
annals of Western medicine, as well as a subject that has preoccupied and, at times, redefined the
fields of feminist literary studies and feminist disability studies.45 What was specific to this
moment in American therapeutic culture was, first, how diagnosis was not only wielded as an
instrument of patriarchal rule, but also directed towards the behaviors and attitudes associated
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with the women’s liberation movement; and, second, how activists responded: by mobilizing to
develop the practice of feminist therapy and establish feminist self-help groups and clinics.46 It
would be beyond the scope of this dissertation to rehearse the many schools of thought that
comprised feminist therapy, but one key tenet was the adaptation of “self-actualization” towards
the ends of exploring the desires and ambitions that traditional gender roles permitted only men
to possess.47 Another was the radical reworking of “transactional analysis,” Eric Berne’s popular
theory that all relationships were mediated by “role playing” and that people could access more
authentic interactions by actively listening to and providing affirmation for one another.48
Feminist reworkings of these psychotherapeutic approaches paved the way for the flourishing of
women’s consciousness-raising groups, which “borrowed generously from the therapeutic
worldview” that making private emotional experiences into public performances could be an
emancipatory process.49
In that sense, the feminist insurgency bore a disidentificatory relation to mainstream
psychology. I refer here to Jose Muñoz’s notion of disidentification as a process of “recycling
and rethinking encoded meaning” – not only for the purpose of exposing the encoded meaning
and its exclusionary functions, but also for making use of the code itself as “raw material” for
empowering minoritized subjects.50 For Muñoz, disidentification is most exigent as a form of
queer of color critique, a performance that plays on stereotypes in order to subvert them. I would
not venture to suggest that this crucial aspect of his theorization, in which disidentification
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models strategies for surviving a racist and phobic society, applies to the feminist therapy
organizations allied with the women’s movement in the 1970s. But Muñoz’s formulation of
“working on and against” dominant ideology – to the limited degree that it can be cited apart
from his readings of queer of color performance – illuminates not only feminist therapy’s radical
potential as a strategy for “transform[ing] a cultural logic from within,” but also its vulnerability
to being corrupted for the pop-psych industry’s entrepreneurial ends.51 For example, as Eva
Illouz observes, feminist consciousness-raising groups often presumed that the private sphere,
and, in particular, the family, was a crucial site of identity (de)formation, a concept borrowed
from the discourses of psychoanalysis and psychology.52 Of course, while traditional
psychoanalytic and psychological approaches “made the family into an object of knowledge and
into the prime site of self-emancipation,” they also notoriously attributed familial dysfunction to
the mother’s pathological inability to fulfill her domestic role.53 Feminist approaches worked on
and against this framework, such that women’s rebellion against and transformation of gendered
expectations “made the family into an object of knowledge and into the prime site of selfemancipation.”54 At the same time, though, this disidentificatory reworking of psychology’s
sexist codes veers perilously close to reinscribing them, given its dependence on a contested
claim of feminist thought: that gaining individual autonomy can lead to collective liberation.
“Psychotherapy, as a product of an American individualist heritage that emphasizes
personal change in the service of achieving personal goals, cannot furnish women, either
collective or individually, with power,” declares Becker; despite this, leading theorists of
feminist therapy have always been preoccupied with whether individualism could be refigured
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towards a relational model, as a corrective to the “cultural dominance of a male-modeled self”
whose assertions of autonomy foreclosed the possibility of interdependence.55 Other feminist
practitioners and activists believed that there could be no synthesis between individual analysis
and systemic change, such as psychologist Dorothy Tennov, who declared that the terms
“feminist” and “therapy” were “mutually contradictory,” or activist Shulamith Firestone, who
suggested that therapy ought to be entirely replaced “with the only thing that can do any good:
political organization.”56 In Staub’s reading, the pop psych industry of the 1970s capitalized on
these tensions, taking up feminist therapy’s goals of democratizing counseling and offering
personal validation to its participants, while dispatching with its premise that patriarchal
oppression was the source of women’s mental anguish. The bestselling titles of pop psych selfhelp literature tapped into the same yearning for self-actualization that guided feminist
therapeutic practice, but did so by “strip[ping] away the idea that there was a sick society,” the
sexist structures of which made individual empowerment the province of men.57
Instead, self-help manifestos like I’m OK – You’re OK (1969) made the populist promise
that readers could abstain from psychiatry’s expensive and manipulative services and instead
find a “broadly gender neutral” version of self-fulfillment entirely on their own, merely by taking
control of their own lives.58 If this dynamic feels familiar, it is because it foreshadows how the
“intimate publics” that hail women as therapeutic subjects would become fixtures of the
neoliberal marketplace, and would do so by relying on feminist discourse to elide power
differentials – from the therapy talk shows of the 1980s and 90s, among which Oprah is
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routinely critiqued for promoting an individualist “psychological worldview” that elides the need
for collective feminist action; to the current self-care boom that, as I discuss in the second
chapter of this dissertation, has flourished by leveraging the psychic double-binds of (neo)liberal
feminism.59
Across this dissertation, I ask how feminist literature uses form and genre to critique the
contemporary notions of wellness and sovereignty that structure these “intimate publics,” while
also thematizing writing itself as a mode of disidentifying with them. The first chapter, “The
Crack and Composure of Words: Writing Black Feminist Wellness in Audre Lorde’s The Cancer
Journals,” examines how Lorde’s allusive, ruminative journal entries deliberately interrupt the
trajectory of her argumentative essays about the “function of cancer in a profit economy,” in
which members of the “Cancer Establishment” pressure women to buy prostheses and undergo
expensive and risky breast reconstruction procedures.60 Lorde contends that this system exploits
women’s psychic vulnerability not only for profit, but also for the larger purpose of distracting
them from taking collective feminist movement “against all preventable cancers, as well as
against the secret fears that allow those cancers to flourish.”61 The journal entries, meanwhile,
are short, italicized fragments that diverge from these formal styles of composure. They record
the anguish of living with cancer as a “Black Lesbian Feminist Experience,” throughout which
Lorde is profoundly aware of her illness as imbricated with the structural violences of
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environmental toxicity, racism, sexism, and compulsory heterosexuality – but lacks, as she says,
any models for how she ought to go about surviving it.62
In the journal entries, Lorde records a taxonomy of these varieties of anguish, beginning
with the distinction between fear as “an appropriate response to a real situation which I can
accept and learn to work through just as I work through semiblindness” and its antithesis,
anxiety, which “is an immobilizing yield to things that go bump in the night, a surrender to
namelessness, formlessness, voicelessness, and silence.”63 Over and over, the journals describe
variations of this “namelessness, formlessness, voicelessness, and silence,” or what I call
“psychic negation,” the experience of a psychological void that Lorde seeks to name without
imposing medicalized terminology on her own experience.64 Instead, through its multifarious,
hybrid form, The Cancer Journals develops a Black feminist disability framework that, as Moya
Bailey theorizes it, “centers disability, race, and gender, challenging these generally siloed
theories to work together to better understand the realities for those multiply marginalized within
society.” 65 Lorde tells a story of living with cancer that is also a story about the “psychological
toll of being a Black woman,” where silence not only represents the effects of patriarchal
domination, but also of enduring racist, sexist, and homophobic treatment protocols that sever
her from Black feminist sociality. In so doing, she indexes the psychic cost of being racialized as
a “feminist killjoy,” Sara Ahmed’s term for the figure whose alienation from the gendered scripts
of happiness can give rise to a revolutionary consciousness.66 Through her metatextual attention
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to the process of writing The Cancer Journals, Lorde enacts what she calls “language crazure” as
a killjoy aesthetic – one that is oriented away from the pop-psych path to self-actualization, and
that looks to writing as a site for imagining wellness as bound up in the vulnerability of others.
The second chapter, “What’s So Funny about Self-Care? The Comedy of Heroic
Vulnerability,” identifies a comedic archive that, in satirizing the commodification of self-care in
the wake of the 2016 election, also wryly suggests that Lorde’s legacy has become a touchstone
for liberals who wish to pass off their bourgeois lifestyle as a manifestation of their political
radicalism. For me, the exigent question is not whether this actually a widespread social
phenomenon. Rather, I ask why these parodic monologues, cartoon strips, essays, films, and
novels mocking it have emerged as a new genre – one that burst onto the media landscape of the
managerial-professional landscape in order to satirize self-care as a white feminist failure. “I, a
twenty-nine-year-old white woman…follow the example of Lorde and other black feminist
writers, who describe self-care as integral to the struggle for liberation,” says the narrator of
Mara Y. McPartland’s “Why My Skin-Care Routine Makes Me a Radical Activist.” This
affective performance is what I call heroic vulnerability, where the individual feels that their
fragility requires redress; they publicly acknowledge how they have attended to their own needs;
and they imply that this acknowledgment, in itself, makes them an aspirational figure.
“What’s So Funny about Self-Care?” reads texts across multiple genres – from
McSweeney’s monologues; to New Yorker cartoons; to the novel The Pisces; to the film Ingrid
Goes West – that ridicule heroic vulnerability as a dominant affect of social media, a mode of
circulating self-care that both leverages and erases its ties to feminist discourse.67 Often, these
texts do so by citing Lorde’s famous line from A Burst of Light, “Caring for myself is not self-
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indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is an act of political warfare.”68 As in the host of
journalistic articles that covered the post-2016 circulation of #selfcare as a concept, market, and
Instagram aesthetic, these fictional narratives elide the fact that the passage is about Lorde’s
prolonged battle with cancer as a resource for Black feminist world-building work. Of course,
Lorde’s theorization of self-care has never stopped serving as a vital resource for queer, antiracist, feminist, and disability justice movements. However, comedic archive does not
acknowledge the actual status of #selfcare as feminist praxis in the present, but rather indexes
how #selfcare naturalizes cis-heteronormativity and its “generational logics” of what psychic
well-being looks like.69 As such, self-care lends itself to comedy as a collision of “mutually
exclusive realities,” which involves an irreconcilable tension between well-being and feminist
agency, particularly for those subjects who identify with what Berlant calls the “female
complaint” of bourgeois white womanhood.70 This therapeutic double-bind claims psychic wellbeing as the spoils of white liberal feminism, while categorizing cis-het womanhood as
heroically vulnerable, devoted to the pleasurable activity of cultivating one’s own feeling of lack
or insufficiency.
The third chapter, “Autotheorizing the DSM,” continues to pursue the question of how
genre and form might rewrite common sense about the relation between feminist subjectivity and
psychic distress. It does so by reading Eli Clare’s Brilliant Imperfection: Grappling with Cure
and Jackie Orr’s chapter “Panic Xanax” from Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder as
examples of DSM autotheory, a genre defined by its use of what I call “counter-diagnostic
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metaphors” about the creative process.71 This refers directly to Margaret Price’s theorization of
the “counter-diagnostic move,” in which autobiographical narratives “rebel against familiar
scripts of disability as an individualized, medicalized phenomenon and instead engage in acts of
resistance against oppressive discourses.”72 The counter-diagnostic metaphors of DSM
autotheory do this by (1) conjoining life-writing with a “more ‘distanced’ criticality” towards the
experience of psychiatric diagnosis; and (2) directing autotheory’s self-reflexivity towards the
act of writing this experience.
Clare’s hybrid text of memoir, critical analysis, and prose poetry pursues the ideology of
cure’s contradictory promises to “follow the lead of our body-mind yearnings” and its violent
attachments to the eradication of difference.73 Its counter-diagnostic metaphor is a mosaic that
Clare finds on a community center facade in Chicago, which represents how and why he
assembled the textual “fragments and slivers” that comprise Brilliant Imperfection.74 In “Panic
Xanax,” Orr interweaves her personal experience of participating in a clinical trial for Xanax
with her sociological research on the institutional history of psychiatry’s medicalization; the
counter-diagnostic metaphor for this approach is a Joan Miró print in the lobby of Massachusetts
General Hospital, which invokes the turbulent, disorderly process of writing her “panic diary”
entries. I read both metaphors as commenting on the form of the texts in which they appear, texts
that figure subjectivity as a fractal state, inapprehensible by the “predictive power” of the DSM’s
categories, and eluding summary at the moment one tries to write it.75
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These metaphors also resist tropes about academic and creative writing as formalizations
of the liberal subject’s mind at work. In particular, I address two popular tropes about what
constitutes good writing in each discipline, both of which implicitly tether authorship to ableist
notions of mental capacity. “I’m a teacher, not a therapist” is a declaration that is likely familiar
to anyone who has taught college composition; its corollary, “Writing isn’t therapy,” may be
equally familiar to anyone who has taught or studied creative writing in the academy. These
tropes about the writing process marginalize mental disability, distress, and madness along
generic lines: the evidence of disorder must be expelled from the text for it to become
sufficiently rational (academic prose) or else transmuted into a form that qualifies it as art
(creative prose). In this chapter, I suggest that autotheoretical texts about the DSM subvert these
generic conventions – conventions that are always already ableist, sexist, and racist – through
their meta-textual attention to the work of writing itself.
The title of this dissertation, “Committed to the Fragment: Feminist Literature and the
Promise of Wellness,” alludes to Sara Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness, which I cite across
all of the above chapters. Of course, The Promise of Happiness not only “can be situated within
the feminist cultural studies of emotion and affect,” but has become one of the most influential
texts of that field during the last decade; it critiques happiness for “creat[ing] its own horizon,”
one that affectively alienates the “feminist killjoys, unhappy queers, and melancholic migrants”
who are excluded from its promise.76 I see structural similarities between the horizon of
happiness and the horizon of therapeutic culture: the promise of wellness is also part of a
“genealogy of expectation,” leading us towards an always-deferred future of well-being that “lies
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ahead of us, at least if we do the right thing.”77 This future is oriented around the psyche of a
liberal subject, whose performance of an “ideal and healthy self” – rational, self-actualized,
capable of producing good feelings like happiness – foregrounds their capacity to live up to a set
of medicalized norms.78 In this project, I consider how these norms structure writing cultures,
academic and otherwise, that grant narrative authority only to those who can satisfy a hegemonic
ideal of wellness – one driven, in part, by a political economy that assigns a profit motive even to
cancer. I also ask how writing appears across a range of genres – memoir; fiction; cultural
criticism; and autotheory – as a practice that identifies illness, wellness, and aesthetics as
pressingly concerned with gender and power. Through their own self-reflexive forms, these
feminist literatures model what Clare calls “fractured wholeness” as the grounds for creative
work, where the process of composition is untethered to the teleology of therapeutic culture.79 As
Wang writes, “I am in here, somewhere,” and no other act of self-cultivation or self-actualization
is required: these are the materials, the state of feeling, as Lorde puts it, “always tender in the
wrong places,” where “feel[ing] strong and able in general” exists alongside “that battered
place where I am totally inadequate to any thing I most wish to accomplish.”80 This is where,
these texts suggest, the work of thinking, imagining, and composing in relation to the
vulnerability of others begins.
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Chapter 1. The Crack and Composure of Words: Writing Black Feminist Wellness in Audre
Lorde’s The Cancer Journals

“I live with the constant fear of recurrence of another cancer. But fear and anxiety are
not the same at all,” Audre Lorde writes in a journal entry dated 6/20/80, one of the many
diaristic fragments, lush with emotion and resonant with the peculiar imagery of dreams, that
give The Cancer Journals its title. Over the course of the book’s three essays, Lorde offers an
impassioned, analytical account of her personal survival of breast cancer as “A Black Lesbian
Feminist Experience” that, she argues, was profoundly shaped, if not produced, by the
interlocking violences of environmental toxicity, racism, sexism, and compulsory
heterosexuality.
1

On February 5, 1979, she writes, “The terrible thing is that nothing goes past me these

days, nothing. Each horror remains like a steel vise in my flesh,” before linking the “useless
wasteful deaths of young Black people” to the grotesque sexism that she recently witnessed in an
art gallery, which was hung with images of women’s “distorted bodies” offered up to “whatever
fantasy passes in the name of male art.”2 Though Lorde draws no direct connection to the next
entry, dated March 1, their juxtaposition suggests that these “horrors” cannot be disarticulated
from Lorde’s experience within the racist and sexist protocols of a medical institution, where she
must labor to find the resources to “tend to [her] body with at least much care as I tend the
compost, particularly now when it seems so beside the point.”3
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These italicized fragments are woven throughout the essayistic passages of The Cancer
Journals. They appear as brief islands of text, expressions of acute anguish and hope which float
between longer paragraphs that adhere to the narrative conventions of memoir and exposition.
Like snippets of an inner monologue, they occasionally interrupt Lorde’s rigorously composed
arguments about the rise of the “Cancer Establishment” – her term for the growing industry of
national philanthropic organizations, government research institutes, and plastic surgery clinics
that exploit women’s psychic vulnerability for profit – and her calls for a collective feminist
“outcry against all preventable cancers, as well as against the secret fears that allow those
cancers to flourish.”4 It is this liminality that establishes the journal entries as the eponymous
heart of the book. As a set of allusive, ambiguous ruminations on the psychic effects of Lorde’s
ordeal, they break from the trajectory of each essay’s fierce sociopolitical critiques and clarion
calls for action against “Cancer Inc.” and its profit motives.5 Instead, the entries exemplify, as
Lorde says, “the process of integrating this crisis into [her] life,” which requires unearthing the
painful feelings that would be temptingly easy to “obscure…with a blanket of business-asusual.”6 Taken together, they also suggest that this process involves rewriting the prevailing
cultural norms about what it means to be mentally well.
By “rewriting,” I not only mean that The Cancer Journals theorizes wellness outside
hegemonic ideals of mental health – but also that, through its own multilayered form, it proposes
that the creative act of composing a text is one way to imagine wellness as a relational state that
encompasses disorder and distress. This work begins with the journal entries, which catalogue
the varieties of distress that shape Lorde’s approach to breast cancer as a Black lesbian
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experience. Fear, Lorde says, is “an appropriate response to a real situation which I can accept
and learn to work through just as I work through semiblindness”; its antithesis, anxiety, “is an
immobilizing yield to things that go bump in the night, a surrender to namelessness,
formlessness, voicelessness, and silence.”7 This latter description resonates with Kathleen
Woodward’s work on anxiety as an affect that circulates through and around the American
medical-industrial complex, generated by its relentless promulgation of data about mortality and
risk.8 It also resembles formulations of depression as a state of psychic stasis so potentially
severe that its effects of sadness, anhedonia, and apathy exist on a continuum with suicidality.9 I
wish to clarify here that the word “depression” does not appear in The Cancer Journals, as well
as to emphasize that I will not read Lorde’s pain, grief, and trauma as symptoms of psychological
disorder – a move that would pathologize the expression of painful feelings in precisely the way
that Lorde’s text rejects.10 Instead, my aim is to attend to how Lorde renders the depressing or
anxiety-inducing effects of her experience without relying on such medicalized terminology, and
instead writes a version of psychic wellness that goes against the grain of pop-psychology’s
individualist ethos – an ethos that, at the time of The Cancer Journals’ publication, dominated
the mainstream discourses of therapeutic culture.11 Through the multiplicity that characterizes its
form – the shifts in register between reflective memoir and exploratory argument; the
fragmentary journal entries that interrupt and diverge from both – The Cancer Journals imagines
subjectivity as a state of having “myriad selves,” capacious enough to include even the
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experience of psychic negation.12 As such, it creates a Black feminist framework that
disarticulates mental health from the healthist ideologies that presume well-being to be a matter
of personal responsibility, while also redefining it as a mode of being imbricated with the lives of
others.
“Psychic negation” is my phrase for a category of emotion that Lorde repeatedly seeks to
name in the journal entries, whether through listing descriptors for the phenomenon of a void
(“namelessness, formlessness, voicelessness, and silence”), or through extended metaphors that
draw upon similarly bleak images of consciousness as a kind of abyss, emptied of the capacity
for pleasure or even mere engagement. “Sometimes despair sweeps across my consciousness like
lunar winds across a barren moonscape,” Lorde writes on 1/26/79; a few months later, despair
takes on the force of annihilation, “like a pale cloud waiting to consume me.”13 Lorde’s
analytical attention to the textures of mental distress reflects her investment in “resisting the
[mind-body] dualism built into white Western culture,” where the mind is valued “over and
against the devalued body” – a hierarchy that has historically cast disabled, feminized, queer, and
racialized people as excessively corporeal, and therefore less than human.14 In this vein, Lorde
writes fluidly across the division between psychic and physical distress, such that she does not
always need to categorize which kind of pain “fills [her] like a puspocket” and threatens to
“[poison] [her] whole existence.” 15 In either case, she suggests, it is her confidence about what
constitutes selfhood that reels in its wake, and that she seeks to recover through her writing.
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This chapter proposes that the work of recovery is bound up in the creative process itself,
which The Cancer Journals models through its collage-like form – itself a reflection of the
multifarious version of selfhood, “[her] voices, those assorted pieces of herself,” that Lorde
accesses through writing as a feminist praxis.16 To follow Lorde across this complex and
undulating terrain, the chapter itself pursues many routes, all of which take psychic negation as
their point of departure. It begins with Lorde’s taxonomies of psychic distress, in which the
distinction between fear and anxiety also maps the paradox of in/visibility for Black women
living under the conditions of white supremacy. In framing anxiety as a form of psychic
negation, The Cancer Journals offers an example of “the psychological toll of being a Black
woman and the difficulties this presents in political consciousness,” one that is grounded in the
experience of living with breast cancer as a Black lesbian woman.17 The implications of this
“psychological toll” branch into several directions, leading this chapter into an examination of
how Lorde expresses support for the women’s movement’s resistance to linguistic oppression,
while emphasizing the inadequacy of any such approach that fails to center disability and race;
the use of silence as a metaphor for not only the harms of patriarchal domination, but also for
psychic negation as a severance from Black feminist sociality; and the potentially ableist
implications of this metaphor, which speak to how difficult it is for Lorde, occupying the
position of a feminist killjoy who is also racialized, to write outside the medical model of
disability. Lorde’s influential critique of “the travesty of prosthesis” not only indexes the psychic
cost of this position, but also leads her to develop what she calls “language crazure” as a killjoy
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aesthetic – one that, through her metatextual attention to the work of writing The Cancer
Journals itself, locates not happiness, but creativity on the other side of psychic negation.18
“I need to remind myself,” Lorde tells us, of “the joy, the lightness, the laughter so vital
to my living and my health,” because otherwise the despair, “like another cancer,” might
“swallow me into immobility, metabolize me into cells of itself.”19 Although this metaphor
compares despair to metastasis, its purpose is not to flatten the distinctions between the two, or to
even suggest, by elevating the former to a mortal threat, that harm to the psyche is the most dire
consequence of a serious illness. Indeed, Lorde is always careful to render precisely the
disorienting, frightening, or surprising sensations that are specific to the experience of a radical
modified mastectomy – from the surreal detachment she feels when she is initially being unable
to detect the fresh scar under layers of bulky bandages; to the searing, ineluctable phantom pain
that made her absent breast feel “as if it were being squeezed in a vise.”20 By recording the
“course of [her] psychic and physical convalescence,” Lorde acknowledges how, as a postmastectomy woman who is Black and lesbian, her survival requires her to negotiate the specter
of destruction on multiple fronts. She must wrest life-saving treatments from the racist and sexist
protocols of the medical institution, and must do so while contending with the terror of feeling
severed from the social – that is, of feeling that she has been thrust into a space of
undifferentiation where she is “not feeling very hopeful these days, about selfhood or anything
else,” and subjectivity itself ceases to make sense.21
Of course, crucial aspects of this experience cut across identity-based categories – one of
them being the fact that the diagnosis and treatment of cancer often involves prolonged periods
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of physical distress and vulnerability, the psychological dimension of which can be so
challenging that it has produced robust sub-genres of medical literature and popular nonfiction.
Another is that, in the case of breast cancer that requires mastectomy, this psychological duress
is entangled with cissexist norms that equate womanhood with a two-breasted body, which can
intensify the feelings of grief, shame, or undesirability that may resonate with cancer “as a Black
Lesbian Feminist Experience,” but, of course, are not exclusive to it.22 Naming these
commonalities of serious illness is central to Lorde’s purpose, which, as she tells us in her
introduction, is to break the “imposed silence” weaponized against “women of all ages, colors,
and sexual identities.” Her hope, she says, is that they might collectively join her in
acknowledging “the pain of amputation, the function of cancer in a profit economy,” and the
challenges of confronting mortality; this work, Lorde believes, will free them to discover the
“possibilities of self-healing and the richness of living for all women.”23 That said, true to
Lorde’s multivalent theorizations of gender oppression as co-constitutive with all other forms of
oppression, The Cancer Journals is structured by the twofold question of how “[Lorde’s]
experiences with cancer fit into the larger tapestry of my work as a Black woman, into the
history of all women.”24 Even as Lorde’s work resists the sexist taboos that had pressured
women to remain silent about the psychosocial and material realities of breast cancer, it also
acknowledges the uneven distribution of that taboo’s force across the axes of race and sexuality.
As such, The Cancer Journals makes a case for the exigency of reading illness in the Black
feminist intellectual tradition that, though irreducible to summary in its richness and complexity,
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could be broadly characterized as invested in “captur[ing] the complexity of structures of
domination” and “theorizing the ‘interlocking’ nature of power.”25
This dissertation asks how feminist literatures reimagine psychic well-being in the
context of contemporary therapeutic culture. One animating question for this chapter, then, is
how Lorde locates what she calls “anxiety” within this Black feminist framework -- as well as
why she turns to literary form and genre as modes of theorizing it. “Anxiety” is the immanent
sense of dread that stalks Lorde in the months following her mastectomy, threatening to subsume
her capacity for both relationality and action; it is an effect of the existential shock of “becoming
forcibly and essentially aware of [her] mortality” – but not only.26 In the oft-cited “The
Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” originally presented as a speech at the
Lesbian and Literature Panel of the 1977 meeting of the Modern Language Association, Lorde
describes the time between diagnosis and surgery as “a three week period of the agony of an
involuntary reorganization of my entire life.”27 In the “merciless light” of this “harsh and urgent
clarity,” Lorde tells her audience, she had reflected on what she had chosen to prioritize and what
she had not pursued, and found that what she regretted most profoundly were her silences. “Of
what had I ever been afraid?...I was going to die, if not sooner then later, whether or not I had
ever spoken myself. My silences had not protected me. Your silence will not protect you.” As in
her 6/20/80 journal entry, fear, though it induces mental anguish, is not a mode of surrendering
to silence; rather, it continues to exist in contradistinction to what Lorde calls anxiety elsewhere.
Fear has painfully illuminating properties. It reveals a “source of power within oneself,” a
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capacity to “put fear into a perspective” and so garner “great strength.”28 Lorde urges the writers
and teachers in her audience to channel this strength into “scrutiniz[ing] not only the truth of
what we speak, but the truth of that language by which we speak it,” as well as into “shar[ing]
and spread[ing]…those words that are meaningful to us.”29
In her call for her colleagues to “respect…[their] own needs for language and definition,”
Lorde is referring to their shared activist and professional interests in overcoming linguistic
oppression.30 The question of how and why to go about repossessing language was a pressing
one for second wave feminism in the United States, demarcating the ideological divides within
the movement: as Jane Hedley notes, feminists invested in “the struggle to discredit ‘generic he’”
were largely concerned with standard usage as an obstacle to women’s advancement in public
life and the workplace, while the more radical contingents emphasized that “‘the oppressor’s
language’ interfered with women’s ability to communicate and bond with each other.’”31 Lorde
is in the latter camp, of course, and her MLA remarks suggest that the crisis of breast cancer has
only deepened her sense of urgency about language as, in Adrienne Rich’s words, a “material
resource” that can both express and generate a radical politics oriented around women’s bonding
and identification.32 In that sense, “The Transformation of Language” is aligned with the panel as
Julia Stanley, its moderator, introduces it: as an enactment of the feminist agenda of “naming
ourselves, naming our lives, naming our actions,” which presumes that this act will free
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participants to define their sense of self outside the oppressor’s lexicon.33 However, Lorde also
brings the lived experience of disability and illness to bear on the conversation, grounding it in
the materiality of bodily vulnerability: while Stanley speaks evocatively of how the patriarchal
sociality of the MLA “made [her] syntax hemorrhage,” figuring alienation as a linguistic wound,
Lorde is interested in the ramifications of literal injury, explaining that her theorization of
language and action is a response to having been told “that there was a 60 to 80 percent chance
that the tumor was malignant.”34 More precisely, Lorde’s speech is aligned with a Black feminist
disability framework that, as Moya Bailey describes it, “centers disability, race, and gender,
challenging these generally siloed theories to work together to better understand the realities for
those multiply marginalized within society.”35 In the case of her MLA address, Lorde directs the
attendees’ attention towards literary studies as a vital site for this analytical work.
Lorde asserts that women must hold themselves accountable for reading and sharing the
words of other women across the “…mockeries of separations that have been imposed upon us,”
meaning the white supremacist, patriarchal, and heterosexual norms that naturalize difference as
an alienating otherness – when, in fact, as Lorde contends across her oeuvre of poetry and prose,
difference is “a dynamic human force, one which is enriching rather than threatening to the
defined self, when there are shared goals.”36 “For instance, ‘I can’t possibly teach black women’s
writing – their experience is so different from mine,’” she says, quoting an imagined white
interlocutor before issuing the challenge, “…yet how many years have you spent teaching Plato
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and Shakespeare and Proust?”37 In not only displacing the white male author as the exemplar of
canonicity, but also claiming the authority to do through a text that aestheticizes her own
experiences as a disabled, sick Black woman, Lorde writes against the liberal humanist ideal of
literature as a means of accessing the universal – an ideal that is shored up by the elision of
disability and race. In “Work in the Intersections: A Black Feminist Disability Framework,”
Bailey unpacks this elision as an effect of Western white supremacy, where disability and race
are co-constitutive and, in the U.S., structured by the paradoxical logics of anti-Black racism.
The “spectral, demonic force” of racism is the “all-encompassing embodiment on which U.S.
society is built”; it cannot be disarticulated from ableism, which has always already engendered
and justified racism’s uncountable horrors “from colonization to enslavement to lynching.”38 The
racist tropes that categorize people of color as embodying excess or deficiency, excising them
from the category of the human and its protections, depends upon “corporeal assessments that
take the able white male body as the center and ‘norm’” – an ideology that, Bailey argues, is
indelibly shaped by the U.S. racial imaginary that casts Blackness as the antithetical other to
whiteness.39
Bailey sketches a transhistorical overview of how anti-Blackness in the U.S. has
consistently deployed Blackness as a marker of disability, while disability “has inherently
‘Blackened’ those seen as unfit.’”40 One way that this has unfolded is through the trope of Black
people as intellectually disabled “precisely because of race,” from the nineteenth-century
theories of scientific racism that posited Blackness as an ontology of diminished intelligence, to
the contemporary school-to-prison pipeline that uses racist systems of cognitive assessment to
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facilitate the incarceration of Black students.41 Another is through the figuration of Black bodies
as “hyper-abled,” often along gendered lines: Black men, Bailey notes, are often “locked into
narratives…of superhuman athletic ability and lowered academic expectations,” while Black
women are relentlessly stereotyped as sexually delinquent and physically and mentally
indefatigable.42 That these tropes, taken together, are a contradiction in terms – casting Blackness
as a stigmatized disability, while disallowing the existence of Black disabled people – does
nothing to diminish their disciplinary force. Indeed, this likely explains their effectiveness as
tools of white supremacy, given how their illogic resonates with what Lorde calls the “distortion
of vision” that characterizes U.S.-based racism.43
In her address to the MLA panel, Lorde does not use the term “disability,” but, like
Bailey, identifies the logic of Black hypervisibility as placing Black women in an impossible
relation to their experiences of vulnerability and difference. For Bailey, a crucial example of this
double-bind is the myth of Black women as uniquely resilient, with an innate capacity to endure
and transcend suffering, even as “trauma, violence, and pain are too common to actually be
interrogated for very long”; she suggests that this tension bars Black subjects from “weakness,”
and is bolstered by the fact that “disability in Western thought as figured through non-normative
bodies is the ultimate sign of unsuitability.”44 Lorde recognizes that the flip side of this perilous
hypervisibility is an equally threatening invisibility, where racism erases the material realities of
Black women’s lives. “Even within the women’s movement,” she says, “we have had to fight for
that very visibility which also renders us most vulnerable, our blackness.”45 This irresolvable
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tension is at the heart of Lorde’s rendering of fear, as distinct from anxiety: fear, though
undesired and distressing, is a psychological response that clarifies the personal and political
stakes of a situation. It is appropriate, Lorde asserts, to feel afraid that cancer has rendered her
more vulnerable to premature death, and the very familiarity of this fear speaks to its exigency: it
prompts her to act upon her knowledge that “to survive in the mouth of this dragon we call
america,” where illness and disability are co-constitutive with race and gender, “we have had to
learn this first and most vital lesson – that we were never meant to survive. Not as human
beings.”46 Though Lorde adds that “neither were most of you here today, black or not,” her
words double as a critique of the Lesbian and Literature panel’s broad approach to
“reclaiming…that language which has been made to work against us” – given that, as she notes,
this agenda had often neglected to acknowledge the specific relevance of that work to Black
women, for whom the objective may not necessarily be to overcome fear of annihilation, but
rather to find ways of speaking out and thriving despite its pernicious, ongoing relevance.47
The Cancer Journals foregrounds the challenge of doing so in the wake of Lorde’s
radical mastectomy, during which she encounters anxiety as a psychic morass where the names
of things are lost.48 This psychic state, unlike fear, is entirely incompatible with the feminist
repossession of language. In the fragmentary journal entries, anxiety often indexes Lorde’s
ambiguous relation to the medical institutions and women’s organizations that promise a path to
wellness, even as their racist, sexist, and/or homophobic protocols block her from accessing it.
Often, Lorde charts the fluctuations of her emotions without precisely defining them, or sorting
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them according to the binary of fear and anxiety that introduces the book. What I read as an
articulation of what Lorde calls “anxiety” is any reference to psychic negation as a menacing
threat, one that, in its imminence, undermines her understanding of selfhood as a stable or useful
concept. “I want to write of the pain I am feeling right now, of the lukewarm tears that will not
stop coming into my eyes – for what?” Lorde writes on October 10, three months after surgery.
“For my lost breast? For the lost me? And which me was that again anyway?”49 In certain
aspects, the relation between fear and anxiety here resembles Sianne Ngai’s differentiation
between the two in Aristotlean terms: fear has, in the Western philosophical tradition, been
classified among the grander passions that it is art’s purpose to invoke and, through catharsis, to
purge.50 Anxiety, meanwhile, belongs to the realm of what Ngai calls “ugly feelings,” which are
“explicitly amoral and noncathartic, offering no satisfactions of virtue, nor any therapeutic or
purifying release.”51 Though Ngai’s theorization of anxiety follows a very different trajectory
than Lorde’s, what does directly address this chapter’s concerns is Ngai’s characterization of
anxiety’s ongoing, uneventful nature as antitherapeutic.52 Similarly, Lorde casts her anxiety as
entirely irrelevant to any sort of healing process, a blur of undifferentiated sadness and apathy
that offers little purchase on her investments in modeling “encouragement for other women to
speak and to act out of our experiences with cancer and with other threats of death.”53 In this
way, The Cancer Journals participates in women of color feminist discourses that claimed
depression, anxiety, and other noncathartic emotions as not merely “a white thing,” as Barbara
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Smith refers to stereotypes about suicidality, but rather as endemic to minoritarian experience in
ways that the mainstream discourses of U.S.-based therapeutic culture failed to acknowledge.54
The politics of mental health was a matter of pressing concern to the second wave of the
American women’s movement, as well as to the movements for Black Liberation; as Michael
Staub has chronicled, both were influenced by the postwar antipsychiatric turn, during which the
“social theories of mental illness that had been so central to mainstream psychiatry’s ascent”
from the 1940s to the 1960s became “extremely useful for attacking psychiatry.”55 But, as the
Combahee River Collective Statement would observe in its landmark account of Black feminist
genealogies, “no other ostensibly progressive movement has ever considered [Black women’s]
specific oppression as a priority or worked seriously for the ending of that oppression.”56 This
includes a marked lack of attention to the effects of racism, heterosexism, and class elitism on
Black women’s psychological well-being:
The psychological toll of being a Black woman and the difficulties this presents in
political consciousness and doing political work can never be underestimated. There is a
very low value placed upon Black women’s psyches in this society, which is both racist
and sexist. As an early group member once said, ‘We are all damaged people merely by
virtue of being Black women.’ We are dispossessed psychologically and on every other
level, and yet we feel the necessity to struggle to change our condition and the condition
of all Black women.57
What does it mean to be “dispossessed psychologically,” and what would psychological
reparations look like in the context of Black feminist liberation? The Combahee River Collective
Statement suggests that the former includes the “feelings of craziness” that many Black women
experience as a consequence of being cut off from any sort of collective consciousness about the
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interlocking nature of systemic oppression. Racial politics and racism had been such
overwhelmingly “pervasive factors” of these women’s existences that, as they came of age, they
lacked the conceptual apparatus to name sexual oppression as another structuring condition of
their lives – an experience so disorienting that, the Combahee authors contend, it could feel like a
kind of madness, in that one’s version of reality does not seem confluent with that of the people
around them, leaving little hope for recourse or relief from its more harrowing aspects. 58
One of psychological dispossession’s effects, then, is psychic negation, which includes
not only mental anguish, but also the disorientation of being isolated from a communal
understanding of that anguish’s source – that is, from Black feminist sociality, which is
structured around “the political realization that comes from the seemingly personal experiences
of individual Black women’s lives.”59 This resonates with Lorde’s representation of her own
bouts of despair, which grow unbearable when they render her unable to “[do] [her] work” – a
phrase that, throughout Lorde’s oeuvre, connects even the solitary activity of composing poetry
to the feminist world-building that is done with and for others.60 Psychic negation, as a terrifying
rift in the social, also appears in texts that were published alongside The Cancer Journals and
The Combahee River Collective Statement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and that also
sought to codify – or, in literary works, dramatize – core principles of the emergent Black and
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Third World feminist movements.61 Whether it appears as depression, anxiety, other clinical
diagnoses, or, more broadly, as a dangerous state of emotional “formlessness,” psychic negation
recurs throughout this discourse as an elaboration of how the “psychological toll” of living under
patriarchal rule and white supremacy makes it difficult to imagine liberation’s horizon – or,
really, any horizon at all.62 These texts do not frame Black and Third World feminist relationality
as curative, exactly, but rather as a site of potentiality for creating new conditions for living and
thriving, which psychic negation threatens to foreclose.
Lorde, for example, attributes the nurturance and care of women to helping her resist the
annihilating depths of despair, “keeping me afloat upon the surface of that sea”; it is the sound of
their voices “calling my name that gives me volition, helps me remember I want to turn away
from looking down.”63 The Combahee River Collective Statement imagines a subject who
suffers because she has not yet acquired the analytical tools to recognize “the nearly classic
isolation most of us [Black women] face”; Lorde, meanwhile, decades into the work of crafting
such analytical tools as a guiding figure of Black feminist and lesbian activism, still struggles
with the resurgence of feeling “stranded for the moment.”64 She turns to sisterhood as a force
that can break anxiety’s silences, and so “help [her] remember” the desires that ordinarily fuel
her thoughts and actions.65 Silence is regularly invoked as a metaphor for psychic negation,
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where one has lost access to the languages and rhythms of one’s own identity, which communion
with other Black women can potentially restore; see, for example, the exhortation in Ntozake
Shanges’ For Colored Girls Who Have Considered Suicide When the Rainbow is Enuf” to “sing
a black girl’s song…she’s been dead so long/closed in silence so long/she doesn’t know the
sound/of her own voice/her infinite beauty.”66 But silence is also an omnipresent danger that has
the power to resurface at alarmingly unpredictable intervals, and that can never be fully banished
even within the most robust Black feminist circles – perhaps because, as per Wallace’s
“pessimistic but realistic” observation, “there is not yet an environment in this society remotely
congenial to our struggle.”67 For Velma Henry, the protagonist of Toni Cade Bambara’s The Salt
Eaters, the struggle to create and sustain such an environment becomes a psychological hazard in
itself. We meet Velma – musician; computer programmer; and seasoned feminist, Black
liberation, and environmental activist in the Black community of the fictional Claybourne,
personal and political despair have led her to attempt suicide. The novel opens just after Velma
has survived slashing her wrists and putting her head in the oven, but has not truly recovered yet:
psychic negation sinks over her like the small hourglass in her kitchen, “sealed and unavailable
to sounds, voices cries,” an image of subjectivity as a voiding silence that overpowers all other
thoughts and sensations.68
These deployments of silence sometimes participate in what Sami Shalk has identified as
a feminist tendency to rely on ableist rhetoric, which frames patriarchy’s harms as a source of
disability that feminism can “cure.”69 Shalk draws our attention to bell hooks’ claim that men are
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conditioned to engage in acts of “psychic self-mutilation” that turn them into “emotional
cripples,” a state from which they can only recover if they choose a “feminist future.”70 This
figuration of disability stigmatizes it not only as “a negative, anti-relational state of injury and
brokenness that ought to be healed by the appropriate social institutions,” and but also as “a
wounded state that must be resisted by individuals themselves through sheer will.”71 These
contradictory implications, Shalk suggests, undermine the priorities of hooks’ own text, which
calls for an “inclusive, intersectional feminism” that resists domination against all who are
marginalized, which, of course, includes disabled people.72 So does the commonplace use of
“silence” when it is used interchangeably with “muteness,” as an impairment imposed by
patriarchy’s “erasure of women’s ‘voices’ (a metonym for women’s thoughts, opinions, writing,
speech, and so on).”73 This trope appears in “The Transformation of Silence,” when Lorde uses
the mute body within an analogy for feeling hesitant to speak out against injustice: “…I remind
myself all the time now, that if I were to have born mute or had maintained an oath of silence my
whole life long for safety, I still would have suffered, and I would still die.”74 The slippage
between silence, as a state in which structures of power prevent women from addressing a public
audience, and literal muteness is a commonplace in feminist discourse that, as Shalk observes,
“ignores other, non-standard, marginalized forms of communication” and frames the experience
of non-verbal people as antithetical to meaningful feminist action.75 Its appearance in The
Cancer Journals feels especially jarring because Lorde is otherwise working within a Black
feminist disability framework, in which she analyzes how her experiences with cancer are
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imbricated with racism and heterosexism, while also theorizing bodymind difference as the
grounds for imagining Black feminist futures.
It is an isolated moment in the text, not fundamental to Lorde’s argument – but it speaks
to how challenging it can be to move outside the lexicon of the medical model of disability;
perhaps all the more so because Lorde, as a Black woman, must write from within the experience
of being simultaneously hailed into and excluded from the subject position of patient. The field
of disability studies has been consistently oriented around the critique of the medical model,
where “the only appropriate disabled mind/body is one cured or moving towards cure”; in this
temporality that Alison Kafer calls “curative time,” futurity is defined by either the elimination
of impairment, or else by the ongoing process of normativizing treatments that will eventually
lead to the assimilation of the disabled person.76 For Lorde, the prosthesis for her amputated
breast signals such an attempt to place her in a curative relation to her own experience, an
instigation of the “many patterns and networks…started for women after breast surgery that
encourage us to deny the realities of our bodies.”77 Lorde tells two stories about the prosthesis as
a tool for stigmatization and assimilation. In “Breast Cancer: A Black Lesbian Feminist
Experience,” Lorde relates, with some tongue-in-cheek humor, a conversation with a peppy
advocate from Reach for Recovery, who hands Lorde a “pale pink breast-shaped pad” of
lambswool and – after relaying her message that “you are just as good as you were before
because you can look exactly the same” – asks Lorde if she can tell the difference between her
“two considerable breasts,” one flesh and one prosthetic, which she displays in a snug sweater,
with a large gold locket “provocatively nestling” between them.78 “I wonder if there are any
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black lesbian feminists in Reach for Recovery?” Lorde thinks, her wryness mixed with grief; she
confesses that she “ached” to talk with women who could understand that she is mourning her
right breast in itself, along with the forms of queer sexual pleasure that it represented to her.79
“What is it like to be making love to a woman and have only one breast brushing against
her?...Will she still find my body delicious?”80
A decade before Lorde’s hospitalization, there likely would have been no such visit: such
outreach efforts were made possible by the labor of the women’s health movement, which sought
to publicize the stigmatized experience of breast cancer and grant women the authority to choose
among different treatment options.81 Lorde’s narrative of this encounter with the Reach for
Recovery volunteer exposes the limitations of this advocacy work, which reflect the broader
women’s movement’s elisions of race and sexuality; it also implies that these elisions made it
possible for such programs to gain purchase within the burgeoning medical-industrial complex.
As the Reach for Recovery representative hands Lorde a prosthetic tinted to match white skin
and cheerily assures her that it won’t “really interfere with her love life” with men, we witness
the medical model’s stark incompatibility with Lorde’s intersectional feminist ideals. The
“recovery” of one’s womanhood – which, according to the anti-trans and misogynistic logics of
patriarchal norms, has itself been damaged by the physical transformation of mastectomy –
depends on satisfying the terms of “compulsory able-bodiedness,” which produces disability and
is “thoroughly interwoven with the system of compulsory heterosexuality that produces
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queerness.”82 This means that to leave the trauma of breast cancer behind requires feeling legible
as an erotic object for men, which, within white supremacist economies of desire, presumes
whiteness to be the aesthetic ideal; hence the prosthetic that, Lorde says, “was the wrong color,
and looked grotesquely pale through the cloth of my bra.”83
As Lorde asserts in the third and final essay of The Cancer Journals, “Breast Cancer:
Power Vs. Prosthesis,” this “insistence upon prosthesis as a norm for post-mastectomy woman”
is a political and economic strategy that cynically wields sexist discourses of femininity against
vulnerable women in order to turn them into customers of “Cancer Inc.”84 She includes the 1980
price points for breast reconstruction, suggesting that women’s psychic harm has produced a
“lucrative piece of commerce” for the “Cancer Establishment.”85 The greater injury, in Lorde’s
view, was that these expensive, potentially dangerous surgeries would distract women from how
this illness had changed their bodies, and therefore also distract them from their status as
“[casualties] in the cosmic war against radiation, animal fat, air pollution, McDonald’s
hamburgers and Red Dye No. 2.”86 This is an ideological battle for the affective investments of
the cancer patient, where the prosthesis also symbolically covers over the reality of “human
diversity and frailty,” and which operates in tandem with “the superficial farce of ‘looking on the
bright side of things” that encourages individuals to “seek ‘joy’ rather than real food and clean
air and a saner future on a liveable earth!”87 Lorde’s critique not only anticipates later writings
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about how the breast cancer industry capitalizes on the U.S.’s cultish attachments to positive
thinking, among which Barbara Ehrenreich’s work is perhaps the most influential.88 It also, three
decades later, remains “the final word on breast cancer and gender theory,” a point of reference
for feminist critiques of how the medical-industrial complex hails patients into a set of racialized,
gender-sexed norms.89
In other words, despite the social, cultural, and technological evolutions that have altered
many aspects of the lived experience of breast cancer, the Black feminist disability framework of
The Cancer Journals remains exigent for thinking through the impossible position of the patient.
This is not something that feminist theorists take have taken for granted during the intervening
decades, as Amy Branzdel notes. “More often than not, [they] pose the question as to whether
Lorde’s analysis is ‘still relevant’ and/or ‘needs updating,’” Branzdel says, citing as an example
S. Lochlann Jain’s observation that breast cancer patients, contra Lorde’s call to action, might
not necessarily benefit from greater public visibility.90 Jain argues that the breast cancer
movement has made breast cancer so ubiquitous that it has become synonymous with women’s
lived experience – a phenomenon that, through the cheerful imagery of pink ribbons and
optimistic races for the cure, “has covered over the carnage of breast cancer.”91 For Diane Price
Herndl, though, that increased visibility still has important benefits: it has made it possible for
her to pursue breast reconstruction as a means of fashioning a “postmodern feminist body,”
despite feeling that, as a feminist, she was “not living up to Audre Lorde.”92 Branzdel – who is

88

Barbara Ehrenreich, Bright-Sided: How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking Has Undermined America
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).
89
Branzdel, “The Subjects of Survival,” 145.
90
Ibid., 146.
91
Ibid.
92
Diana Price Herndl, “Reconstructing the Posthuman Feminist Body Twenty Years after Audre Lorde’s Cancer
Journals,” in Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities, eds. Sharon L. Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and
Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (New York: The Modern Language Association, 2001), 144.

45

writing from the position of being genderqueer, white, middle-class, and personally embroiled in
the “relentless gendered circuit of breast cancer treatment” – acknowledges the truth of Price
Herndl’s insights, while also suggesting that when Lorde’s work is read “on her terms,” they are,
in fact, entirely confluent with Price Herndl’s arguments.93 In the four decades since The Cancer
Journals’ publication, there has been a huge expansion in post-mastectomy options, whether
choosing between custom-designed prostheses; seeking breast reconstruction, which has become
a technologically advanced procedure available at a variety of “mastectomy boutiques”; or
opting out of these modifications altogether.94 However, these purported choices are still shaped
by the anti-intersectional priorities of business and organizations that steer breast cancer
narratives towards a “particularly neoliberal (i.e. privileged and individualized) white hyperheterofeminity.”95 For Branzdel, who does not identify as a woman or a man, this is made
manifest in how every aspect of treatment “incessantly routes you away from connections to
transgender embodiments,” from the consultations with a surgeon who cannot comprehend
Branzdel’s request for “top surgery-ish mastectomy” to the informational kits that encourage
patients to buy wigs and prostheses at mastectomy boutiques – even though, as Branzdel notes,
shopping at any transgender-oriented retailer is less expensive, and offers the possibility of a
social interaction where one could “see the ways in which this might be an opportunity, as much
as it is a life threatening experience.”96
Branzdel argues that these experiences affirm the continuing relevance of Lorde’s terms
of analysis, which frame the white normativity and heterosexism of breast cancer organizations
as the forces that shaped breast cancer’s evolution into an industry – one that continues to rely on
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the workings of heterofemininity, ableism, and racism to erase its own structural conditions.97
Lorde, of course, passionately resists the industry’s curative approach to her own changed
embodiment, standing resolutely before her mirror to remove her prosthesis and declare that
“either I would love my body one-breasted now, or remain forever alien to myself.”98 At the
same time, she affirms that that she is entitled to access any and all resources that could
safeguard her well-being, a tension that defines the complex position of the medical model
within a Black feminist disability studies approach. Bailey reminds us that, although critique of
the medical field’s methods of pathologization is a crucial component of disability studies, “it
may signal differently to communities that have tried for many decades to receive the most
elementary care only to be refused.”99 Given that the practice of medicine in the U.S. is founded
on the historical exploitation of Black communities, and that, as Bailey notes, Black, female
identified, and gender non-conforming people remain particularly vulnerable to medical neglect
or misdiagnosis, to be recognized as a patient remains a form of privilege, if often a vexed and
vexing one.100
For Lorde, the surgical protocols are terrifying, and not only due to the sensory assault of
the “flashing lights” and “clanging of disemboweled noises” that infiltrate the effects of the
anesthetic.101 They also brutally reduce her to a “dark living sacrifice in the white place,” where
institutionalized racism denies her the protections of being a patient.102 As Lorde screams and
curses with pain in the recovery room, she hears “a voice telling me to be quiet because there
were sick people here,” to which she manages to respond, “well, I have a right, because I’m sick
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too.”103 Lorde had just woken to find bandages and drainage tubes where her right breast use to
be, but the “disgusted nurse” expresses only indifference to her physical and emotional suffering,
in an interaction that is markedly similar to the treatment that Lorde had received weeks earlier,
after the initial biopsy. In that recovery room, Lorde had felt excruciatingly cold, as “icy
sensations…cut through the remnants of anesthesia like a firehose trained on [her] brain” and
made it impossible for her to process her sudden, and correct, conviction that the tumor was
indeed malignant.104 She cries out in pain and “[begs] for extra blankets,” but is ignored; instead,
she says, “The nurses were very put out by my ruckus and sent me back to the floor early.”105
Both scenes invoke how the practice of medicine and, in particular, of surgery in the U.S. were
founded on a racist hierarchy of sensitivity to pain, beginning with the 19th century practice of
allotting little or no anesthesia to Black people.106 The slavery-era myth that Black bodies have
an unusually high tolerance to pain, however disavowed in the contemporary medical literature,
continues to violently harm people of color, shaping the unconscious biases of medical
practitioners who treat them, and thus increasing the likelihood that they will not receive the care
that they need.107 For Lorde, this means that her decisions must account for the fact that lifesaving treatments in this “white place” may be entailed upon such abusive encounters; that even
compassionate gestures of care may be dictated by the terms of white supremacy and cisheterosexism; and that there will be no middle ground between the stringently institutionalized
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protocols of Western medicine and holistic health approaches. As she puts it, “Growing up Fat
Black Female and almost blind in america requires so much surviving that you have to learn
from it or die.”108
Surviving means, of course, literally staying alive; it also means to “live well,” which, for
Lorde, means that she will always seek out the ways of living that sustain the “complexities of
interaction between the love within and love without” – the truth of which, she says, she learned
from the summer that her friend Genevieve died, when they were both sixteen.109 Genevieve,
whose childhood was strafed by sexual and emotional abuse, committed suicide, a horror that
recurs throughout Lorde’s body of work as a touchstone for the psychic vulnerability of Black
girls and women.110 “I carry tattooed upon my heart a list of names of women who did not
survive,” says Lorde, “and there is always a space left for one more, my own.”111 This passage
follows a description of how being in community with beloved women sustains Lorde’s sense of
well-being in the hospital, underscoring how psychological dispossession, with its attendant
effects of anxiety, despair, and suicidality, indexes both the necessity and risks of feminist
consciousness – in particular, the consciousness of the “feminist killjoy” who is racialized.112 In
Sara Ahmed’s theorization, the killjoy is a figure who refuses to participate in patriarchal rites of
happiness, the struggle over which “forms the political horizon in which feminist claims are
made.”113 Feminist genealogies are also the genealogies of women who rejected this horizon as
their inheritance, troublemakers who rebelled against the restriction of their desires to those
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oriented around heterosexual reproduction.114 As a book that engages the feminist cultural
studies of emotion and affect, Ahmed’s The Promise of Happiness is interested in the feminist
killjoy not only as a literary and philosophical trope, but also as an “affect alien,” the individual
who is keenly aware that they do not share the same happy objects as the people around them –
and whose subsequent disappointment or anger can index an emergent revolutionary
consciousness.115
Much resentment about feminists, Ahmed suggests, is founded on the framing of
systemic violence and abuses of power as situations “about the unhappiness of feminists, rather
than being what feminists are unhappy about.”116 This categorical misreading is not only made
by anti-feminists: it can also unfold within feminist contexts, producing a social dynamic where
white feminists blame women of color –and, in particular, Black feminists – for being a source
of social tension, rather than blaming the racism that has instigated their anger or resentment. As
an illustration of this scenario, Ahmed cites bell hooks’ description of a group of white feminist
activists who might feel “bonded on the basis of shared womanhood,” but “will become tense, no
longer relaxed, no longer celebratory” when a woman of color enters the room.117 According to
Ahmed, the passage demonstrates how “histories are condensed in the very intangibility of an
atmosphere,” which often has the effect of forcing a feminist of color to choose between a set of
untenable options: to not enter certain rooms at all; to “let go of her anger” so that white woman
can “move on”; or to refuse to participate in such a disingenuous performance for the sake of
sustaining the comfort and ease of others – a refusal that leads to being read as a discomfiting or

114

Ibid., 59-60, 64.
Ibid., 164.
116
Ibid., 67.
117
bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 56.
115

50

disruptive presence.118 As a result, Black feminist critiques of happiness are typically not focused
on the plight of women who fail to be happy, despite having been endowed with the privileges of
race, class, and sexual orientation that are linked to the promise of happiness. Instead, they are
more often written from the perspective of “those who are already imagined as being unhappy, as
lacking the very qualities and attributes that would make a life good.”119
In this context, psychological dispossession looks like a kind of affective alienation,
which indexes the psychic cost of being a feminist killjoy who is also Black. “There is no room
around me in which to be still, to examine and explore what pain is mine alone,” writes Lorde,
in a journal entry that is dated 9/79, but which she places directly after the 5/1 entry that
figuratively compares psychic negation to metastasis.120 “…The arrogant blindness of
comfortable white woman,” she continues. “The blood of black women sloshes from coast to
coast and Daly says race is of no concern to women. So that means we are immortal or born to
die and no note taken, un-women.”121 Presumably “Daly” is Mary Daly, Lorde’s fellow panelist
at the MLA conference where Lorde read “The Transformation of Language,” and whom Lorde
would publicly take to task for the white centrism of her feminist scholarship.122 In their alinear,
recursive form, the journal entries resist proposing a causal link among these varieties of hurt.
Rather, they present them as co-constitutive of one another, where the labor of surviving illness
and of attempting to build feminist solidarity are bound up in the consciousness of racism as the
“consciousness of ‘being not,’” within an episteme of “self-estrangement.”123
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As with her rendering of despair as a “destruction” that will “engulf” and metabolize
[her] into cells of itself,” Lorde’s journals describe the psychic ramifications of selfestrangement in totalizing terms.124 Each encounter with her own private suffering is
excruciatingly bound up with all her “fury at the outside world’s viciousness” and at the
indifference of white feminists to her work, which prompts her to wonder, “What does it matter
whether I ever speak again or not?”125 For Ahmed, The Cancer Journals is an exemplary text
for imagining a feminist consciousness that resists the politics of happiness, particularly in the
essayistic passages that critique how the cancer industries would delegitimize Lorde’s activism
against “the spread of radiation, racism, woman-slaughter, chemical invasion of our food,
pollution of our environment, the abuse and psychic destruction of our young” as a failed coping
mechanism.126 According to that model of false consciousness, Lorde says wryly, all this work is
merely an avoidance strategy, subverting “[her] first and greatest responsibility” of seeking
happiness.127 But in representing the diaristic fragments as glimpses of her more intimate,
unedited expressions of emotion – where each one, in actuality, was carefully selected from
hundreds of pages of her private journals – Lorde also reveals the psychological stakes of being a
feminist killjoy in her position, where affective alienation becomes so gravely harmful an
experience that the individual struggles to locate any creative potentiality within it.
The inability to even imagine an alternate feminist horizon resembles what Ann
Cvetkovich calls depression. In Depression: A Public Feeling, Cvetkovich takes up depression as
an object of study for affect theory: though “depression” is a diagnostic label for a condition that
medical researchers have sought to link to biochemical and genetic markers, Cvetkovich
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proposes that its relevance extends beyond the individualistic model of pathology.128 That is,
depression is also a “public feeling” that can surface intermittently as an affective register of the
politics of daily life, alongside shame, failure, or melancholy.129 What distinguishes this version
of depression from other varieties of misery is that it is experienced as an emotional or
psychological stasis that mimics the effects of neoliberal capitalism.130 Though, as I stated
earlier, Lorde does not use the word “depression,” her journal entries demonstrate how such
“public feelings” can be paradoxically experienced as a severance from the capacity to
participate in public life. In their staggered, fractured form that mimics the difficulty of breaking
through a depressive torpor, the journal entries also model the exhausting, repetitive difficulty of
breaking with the public discourses around breast cancer, particularly those that encourage
women to slip into the passive role of “victim[s] suffering,” rather than “fighter[s] resisting.”131
This, Lorde suggests, conditions women to be hailed into the role of neoliberal consumer, where
choosing between cosmetic procedures becomes a substitute for political agency.132
At the same time, the bitter turn of phrase “born to die and no note taken, un-women”
ties this form of affective alienation to another: that which emerges from the insufficiency of
“woman” itself as a category of analysis for Black women’s subject formation in the US. In the
landmark essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Hortense
Spillers theorizes this insufficiency as a legacy of the horrific, dehumanizing project of
“ungendering” Black bodies in the New World.133 Spillers famously turns a psychoanalytic lens
onto the infamous Moynihan Report, which claimed that one of chattel slavery’s legacies was to
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warp the gender hierarchy of the African American family – specifically, by forcing the “Negro
community…into a matriarchal structure which, because, it is so far out of line with the rest of
American society, imposes a crushing burden” on Black men, excising them from the patriarchal
order.134 Spillers’ reading of the report offers, as Tavia N’yongo puts it, a “trenchant corrective
to Moynihan’s deployment of the patronymic as ruse.”135 “Mama’s Baby” takes up the Middle
Passage as the originary site of racial capitalism, where African bodies were violently stripped of
gendered-sexed identities and converted to unprotected “flesh”; it traces this symbolic order to
the legal maxim of partus sequitur ventrem, which entailed the enslavement of the mother on her
children.136 This “American grammar” falsely attributes power to the maternal line by
misnaming both the mother’s ability to claim her child and the cultural status of motherhood
itself; within this representational order, “the female…breaks in upon the imagination with a
forcefulness and an ‘illegitimacy.’”137 The pursuit of this shadowy figure, multiply disavowed in
legal and national grammars, “takes us to the center of an inexorable difference in the depths of
American women’s community,” one that points to the radical potential for Black womanhood as
a category that stands outside the traditional symbolics of femaleness.138
“Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe’s” cross-disciplinary influence is too far-ranging to
summarize here.139 Most pertinent to this chapter is how disability studies scholars have taken up
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the essay’s critique of “the language of gender, particularly woman and body, as inadequate
grammars,” which occlude onto-epistemologies of Black womanhood – a move that offers
additional insight on how Lorde’s journal entries map the psychic terrain of illness.140 Milo
Osbourn argues that, by using the term “un-women” within her larger critique of the prosthetic’s
disciplinary function, Lorde, like Spillers, frames violent subjection in terms of disability and
ungendering, while seeking to “[gain] the insurgent ground as female social subject.” 141 Lorde
does this by rejecting what Obourn calls “racialized disgendering,” in which bodies are
distributed along an un/gender binary according to their perceived non-whiteness and/or
disability.142 Instead, Lorde chooses to “[wear] her black, queer, sick, and disgendered female
identity legibly,” much to the discomfiture of the medical professionals who are supervising her
care.143 Within a clinical context, Lorde’s self-presentation disrupts the gendered and nondisabled norms that enable the disempowerment of Black women.
The scene of that self-presentation is Lorde’s first post-op outing: a trip to the doctor’s
office to have her stitches removed. Lorde’s rendering of this event brings these different
theoretical frameworks to bear on the overarching question of what it means to be well,
demonstrating how affective relations have the potential to both stifle and engender an insurgent
feminist consciousness – one that discerns not only the forces of “violence and power that are
concealed under the languages of civility and love,” but also those concealed under the
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languages of healing and care.144 Lorde was looking forward to this appointment, she tells us,
and she relished the ritual of preparing to venture out of the house “with the brave new-born
security of a beautiful woman having come through a very hard time and being very glad to be
alive.”145 Her freshly washed hair shone, with “new gray hairs glistening,” a detail that
underscores Lorde’s disinterest in aesthetics of heteronormative femininity, including those that
associate eroticism with youth.146 She reveled in selecting a kente-cloth tunic and new boots,
then carefully adorned herself with her most opalescent moonstones and, above her absent
breast, “a single floating bird dangling from [her] right ear in the name of grand asymmetry.”147
In its luxuriant rendering of imagery, the scene is stylistically distinct from “Breast Cancer:
Power Vs. Prosthesis,” the research-based essay in which it appears; otherwise, “Power Vs.
Prosthesis” argues vigorously for the prosthesis as a metonym for breast cancer’s
commoditization, which exemplifies how racist, sexist, and ableist ideologies shore up the
medical industrial complex. By contrast, the passage about Lorde’s appointment slows down to
linger over the pleasure that Lorde, still vulnerable from her ordeal, took in her changed
appearance, only to abruptly cut to the cruelty of what happens next: the doctor’s nurse, a woman
whose warm demeanor had earned Lorde’s trust on previous visits, criticizes her for not wearing
a prosthesis. “…[We] really like you to wear something, at least when you come in. Otherwise
it’s bad for the morale of the office.”148
The moment demonstrates, of course, how social norms about the post-mastectomy body
would ruthlessly deny Lorde even this tenuous sense of renewal. It also reveals how Lorde, in
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affirming a Black queer womanhood that exists outside the cultural scripts of female ablebodiedness, reworks the affective experience of psychic wellness. She presents the act of getting
dressed as a vibrant preoccupation “with [her] own flair, [with] her own style,” not to establish
her interest in the project of cultivating happiness, but rather to honor the life-affirming activity
of engaging in a creative process.149 This ethos goes against the grain of pop-psychology selfhelp, the industry that flourished to an unprecedented degree in the 1970s, and that Lorde neatly
glosses with her condemnation of the “blame-the-victim syndrome” that frames happiness as
sufficient protection “from the results of profit-madness.”150 Lorde’s purpose here is not to offer
a critique of therapeutic culture – and certainly not to align herself with whom Timothy Aubry
and Trysh Travis have dubbed the “canonical therapeutic culture critics,” whose anxieties about
the “so-called fall of public man” cannot be entirely separated from their status as members of
the intellectual class.151 But Lorde does condemn the “discourse of individual gratification” that
therapeutic culture promulgates, in accordance with her own belief that liberationist energies are
quashed by what the doctor’s nurse called “morale.”152
It is against the backdrop of the pop psych self-help boom of the 1970s that Lorde
explores what, for her, it means to be well.153 This rise of pop psych self-help was not the
beginning of the therapeutic enterprise as a site for the constitution of women as affective
subjects, but it does mark an important cultural shift, one in which the marketing of mental
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health relied on the “deradicalization” of feminist discourse.154 In Zami: A New Spelling of My
Name, Lorde tells us that she has “never been able to blind [herself]” to the cruelty of a world
that “destroys its own young in passing…out of not noticing or caring about the destruction.”155
This, Lorde says, “according to one popular definition of mental health, makes me mentally
unhealthy.”156 At the time of her writing both Zami and The Cancer Journals, popular narratives
of what constitutes mental health were dominated not only by the self-help boom, but also the
concurrent rise of healthism. In “Healthism and the Medicalization of Everyday Life” –
published, like The Cancer Journals, in 1980, the same year that the term “medical-industrial
complex” first appeared in a peer-reviewed medical journal – Robert Crawford describes
“healthism” as an “ideology of self-improvement” that promotes personal health as a matter of
individual responsibility.157 In accordance with neoliberal logics that link citizenship to
economic sovereignty, healthism casts the patient as a consumer, whose exercise of free choice is
at once moralized and depoliticized. They righteously consume whatever diet is currently
deemed “healthy,” embark on exercise regimens, and devote therapeutic attention to their
emotional health.158 Those who fail to follow suit, Crawford writes, “become deviants in our
everyday lives – when we light up a cigarette, when we consume eggs at breakfast, and when we
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are unable to fully express out emotions.”159 Pop-psych self-help replaced the subject of feminist
therapy with this healthist ideal of the relational self, urging its readership to “maximize the
return on [their] (emotional) investments” and “put all [their] relationships…on the psychic
equivalent of a cash’n’ carry basis.”160
Lorde, of course, is interested in an entirely different notion of the self – one for whom
mental health is a social phenomenon, requiring engagement with the psychological
dispossession of others. In The Cancer Journals, as part of her critique of the pop psych self-help
tenet that “the achievement and maintenance of perfect happiness is the only secret of a
physically healthy life in America,” Lorde briefly sketches the necropolitical landscape of the US
– from the state-sanctioned murders of Black children by police; to the manufactured crisis of
homelessness and hunger; to lethal acts of domestic violence, grown so commonplace that slain
women no longer merited media attention.161 “The only really happy people I have ever met are
those of us who work against these deaths with all the energy of our living,” Lorde says,
“recognizing the deep and fundamental unhappiness with which we are surrounded…”162 In This
Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, the documentation of
unhappiness and, in particular, of psychic negation emerges as one of the ways that women of
color feminism generates its “motive force,” or its “gathering-us-in-ness,” as Bambara puts it in
the foreword to the first edition.163 In order to fulfill the anthology’s purpose of “[laying] down
the planks to cross over onto a new place,” the anthology’s essays, poems, and manifestos attend
to depression and suicidality as part of the affective conditions for feminist world-building work.
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For example, Mitsuye Yamada recalls how her mother, an immigrant, charged with
raising children within the brutal isolation of poverty and an abusive marriage, “often spoke of
suicide as an easy way out of her miseries.”164 Nellie Wong, whose family history is also haunted
by suicide as an escape from the forms of “slow death” linked to poverty and anti-Asian racism,
longs to do the life-affirming work of writing poetry about social injustice, but worries that death
is only genuine freedom available to her.165 In attending to writing as a feminist praxis, one that
is haunted by the specter of suicidality, these texts share key points of convergence with a
genealogy of American literature that extends back to the nineteenth century. It includes
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Emily Dickinson, and Sylvia Plath, for whom, as Sandra Gilbert and
Susan Gubar wrote of Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper,” the “escape from the numb world
behind the patterned walls of the text was a flight from dis-ease to health.”166 By bringing a
women of color feminist perspective to bear on the “flight…to health,” though, This Bridge
addresses race and sexuality as analytics for feminist well-being, as the writings of Gilman and
many other canonical white authors do not. When Barbara Smith and Beverly Smith make the
aforementioned reference to the perception of suicidality as a “white thing” in Black
communities, they compare it to lesbianism: both, they suggest, demonstrate how US anti-Black
racism classifies identities and behaviors according to a fictive dichotomy of Black and white.167

Mitsuye Yamada, “Invisibility Is an Unnatural Disaster: Reflections of an Asian American Woman,” in This
Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, 4th ed., eds. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa,
(New York: Kitchen Table Press, 2015), xxix.
165
Berlant, Cruel Optimism, 95. “The phrase slow death refers to the physical wearing out of a population in a way
that points to its deterioration as a defining condition of its experience and historical existence.” Nellie Wong,
“When I Was Growing Up, in This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color, 4th ed., eds.
Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, (New York: Kitchen Table Press, 2015), 178.
166
Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic, 19. The “patterned walls of the text” refers to the text that is
“defined by patriarchal poetics,” as represented by the stultifying whorls of the yellow wallpaper that drive Gilman’s
narrator to madness.
164

167

Barbara Smith and Beverly Smith, “Across the Kitchen Table: A Sister-to-Sister Dialogue,” 122.

60

Across these texts, psychic (un)wellness emerges as another axis of difference, which can both
attenuate and expand the capacity to thrive – in other words, as a rubric for intersectionality.
To this end, Lorde crafts The Cancer Journals as a hybrid text that not only moves across
the boundaries of memoir, essay, and lyric prose, but also plays freely with temporality,
reworking the narrative of illness and recovery into a non-teleological form – which means that
the fluctuations of her anxiety and despair also exist outside of curative time. Elizabeth
Alexander argues that, in The Cancer Journals as well as the “biomythography” Zami, Lorde’s
hybrid approach to genre “creat[es] space for her myriad selves,” which is foundational to her
Black feminist politics of identity as constituted by difference.168 As Lorde put it in a 1981
interview, “There’s always someone asking you to underline one piece of yourself, whether it’s
Black, woman, mother, dyke, teacher, etc. – because…they want you to dismiss everything
else.”169 But for Lorde, the work of liberation requires keeping the multifarious aspects of
selfhood intact, a process of “learning to live in harmony with your contradictions” and leaving
the “different pieces of ourselves” free to “key into” that work when necessary.170 Alexander
identifies this as “an African-American women’s tradition or mythos” of the self as
simultaneously multiple and integrated, as part a complex negotiation in which the individual
refuses to allow any aspect of her identity to be exploited or diminished.171 Through its collagelike form, The Cancer Journals maps the experience of psychological dispossession as another
source of difference that cannot be disarticulated from those of Black, lesbian, disabled, and
woman.
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Of course, the affective state of the psyche is in a perpetual state of change, and while it
is shaped by the categories of race, gender, sexuality, and ability, it is not formally confluent
with them. Nor do any of Lorde’s identifications consign her to the anguish of psychic negation:
she is, after all, famous as a theorist of the erotic, who argues for its exigency as a joyful
manifestation of minoritized women’s creative energy, which fuels their pursuit of
empowerment.172 What I mean to acknowledge here is how, in The Cancer Journals, the process
of writing through and about psychic negation also serves a generative function for Lorde. At
times, when the journal entries break from an essay’s trajectory, it is to narrate the challenges of
capturing the vitality of this process, where “the space of time for the words to form or be
written is long enough for the situation to totally alter…What seems impossible is made
real/tangible by the physical form of my brown arm moving across the page…”173 As a creative
act, not unlike hanging a bird earring above her absent breast, the text’s composition approaches
psychological dispossession not as an injury to relegate to the past – avoiding, in other words, the
temporality of ableism – but rather as the grounds for imagining subjectivity anew.174 I am
thinking here of Berlant’s use of “composition” as distinct from “composure,” the latter being an
attempt to meet norms of self-regulation amidst crisis, which “gestural economies” register
according to the “kinds of confidence people have enjoyed about the entitlements of their social
location.”175 If The Cancer Journals ever veers close to what could be called a style of
composure, particularly in the argumentative passages where Lorde’s rhetorical chops are on full
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display, the journal entries interrupt it. Instead, they tell the story of the psychic shattering that
generates the self who writes.
These diaristic fragments do not provide much in the way of new information: many of
the same facts about Lorde’s ordeal appear in the more formal passages, which also repeat some
anecdotes from different perspectives. The journals are doing something else, recording the
movements of a mind as it reels under the force of trauma, while foregrounding how these
fluctuations are woven into the structure of the text itself.
I want to write about the pain. The pain of waking up in the recovery room…I want to
write of the pain I am feeling right now, of the lukewarm tears that will not stop coming
into my eyes – for what? for my lost breast? For the lost me? And which me was that
again anyway?176
Lorde’s narrating “I” composes and recomposes itself as it renders the kind of pain that undoes
coherence, while gathering itself together again to gesture towards another world, where
communities of women nurture one another within an erotics of caretaking. Of course, there is
nothing desirable about being diagnosed with cancer or the accompanying effect of psychic
negation; as Lorde says in the last line of the book, “I would never have chosen this path.”177 At
the same time, by writing in a form that sustains the “myriad selves” affected by her ordeal – and
doing so in spite of the disciplinary injunctions that would order her to maintain composure
according to the white supremacist, misogynistic, homophobic, and ableist norms of the medical
institution – Lorde crafts a killjoy aesthetic, which is oriented towards a creative horizon that
even psychic dispossession cannot entirely obscure.
In the 7/10/80 entry, Lorde narrates a dream sequence that can also be read as a
hermeneutic for this killjoy aesthetic, embedded within the text’s own hybrid form:
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I dreamt I had begun training to change my life, with a teacher who is very shadowy. I
was not attending classes, but I was going to learn how to change my whole life, live
differently, do everything in a new and different way. I didn’t really understand, but I
trusted this shadowy teacher. Another young woman who was there told me she was
taking a course in “language crazure,” the opposite of discrazure (the cracking and
wearing of rock). I thought it would be very exciting to study the formation and crack and
composure of words, so I told the teacher I wanted to take that course. My teacher said
okay, but it wasn’t going to help me any because I had to learn something else, and I
wouldn’t get anything new from that class. I replied maybe not, but even though I knew
all about rocks, for instance, I still liked studying their composition, and giving a name to
the different ingredients of which they were made. It’s very exciting to think of me being
all the people in this dream.178
In the ceramic arts, “crazing” occurs when a web of delicate cracks appears across the surface of
pottery, a chemical reaction to heat or humidity. Assailed by environmental pressures, the glaze
is left with a new pattern that radiates according to fractal logics, while also diverging at random.
Crazing records the effects of force, but does not compromise the structural integrity of the
piece. In the “language crazure” that Lorde describes as “the “formation and crack and
composure of words,” breakage is built into the process of creation.179 Though a crack is
negative space where there once was matter, it is as integral to the word’s composition as it is to
its decomposition (“discrazure”), a formal feature that is its own object of study and that invites
an exhilarating, generative relation to language.
In “language crazure,” the crack, the irruption of negativity into the everyday, is
constitutive of it, as it is of The Cancer Journals as a whole. We could read this as a metaphor
for subject formation. That is, as part of the feminist project of repossessing the resource of
language, giving names to what a patriarchal lexicon would occlude and deny, Lorde also
records the specific, interlocking pressures that her own experience with cancer – “as a woman, a
black lesbian feminist mother lover poet all I am” – exerts on selfhood itself.180 The liberal
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fantasy of sovereignty, as the command of “self-ratifying control over a situation or space,” has
no place in Lorde’s theorization of what psychic well-being would look like for someone in her
position, for whom there are no available “models for what [she’s] supposed to be in this
situation.”181 That sovereign subject possesses, or at least steadfastly pursues, an impregnable
wholeness that belongs to the ideal of the human who embodies universal values, among them
the autonomy that is the prerequisite for freedom.182 In self-help literature, the therapeutic
narrative is often “retrospectively emplotted” towards this ideal, where mental health-oriented
goals (“sexual liberation,” “self-realization,” “intimacy”) determine the contours of the
protagonist’s emotional or psychological lack, as well as the trajectory of their path towards
remedying it.183 In other words, self-help’s teleology is, as Illouz puts it, at once “regressive and
progressive,” simultaneously centered on the psychic damage of the past and the prospective
redemption of mental wholeness.184
The Cancer Journals, in centering the double-edged vulnerability of Black women’s
embodiment, reveals this redemptive arc to be a ruse. It can only feel true to those protected by
the accidents of birth, for whom effortful self-management may well produce an unassailable
sense of well-being. “Language crazure,” meanwhile, presents wholeness as a creative activity,
ongoing and improvisatory, that is structured by absence. Because language is also Lorde’s
medium as a poet and memoirist, the metaphor not only invokes selfhood as a process of being
“continually brought back together from disassembled fragments,” but also links it to the work of

181

Lorde, The Cancer Journals, 28
As the work of critical race theorists has thoroughly established, this subject is neither natural nor universal, but
rather a historically specific formation used to justify the expansion of empire under regimes of racialized terror.
See, for example, Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteeth-Century
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Lisa Lowe, The Intimacies of Four Continents (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2015); Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (New York:
New York University Press, 2017).
183
Illouz, “Saving the Modern Soul,” 173.
184
Ibid., 183-4.
182

65

art-making itself.185 This is one reason why, in her dream about the study of crazure, Lorde
thinks of herself as the student already immersed in her object of study; the new student who
thrills to the prospect of “giving a name” to the “ingredients” of her materials; and the teacher
with an evaluative eye, attuned to the pedagogical aim of their work. Each role represents an
aspect of the writer’s practice, whose work is not to merely identify places of breakage, but to
deliberately bring their craft to bear on refiguring those places as sites where knowledge is
generated anew.
I am not suggesting that one can simply commit oneself to an aesthetic practice for
therapeutic purposes, given the difficulty, even impossibility, of creative work from within the
painful isolation of anxiety, fear, or despair. For Lorde, her struggle towards recovery is “a
serious break in my work/living,” as she notes on October 6, 1978.186 But when Lorde does find
her way into the regenerative space of writing, where she is free to craft hybrid forms that
accommodate her “myriad selves,” the work is a“lifeline,” bringing her back to the pursuit of
wellness that does not find happiness on the other side of psychic negation, but rather
creativity.187 This, too, is part of a killjoy aesthetic, as it imagines a feminist horizon that departs
entirely from the pop-psych path to self-actualization. As such, it resonates with Gloria
Anzaldúa’s 1983 foreword to the second edition of This Bridge Called My Back, in which
Anzaldúa acknowledges that her readers may well be fatigued by their immersion in narratives of
suffering.188 “We are beginning to realize,” Anzaldúa writes, “that we are not wholly at the
mercy of circumstance…that hopelessness is suicide, that self-attacks stop us in our tracks. We
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are slowly moving past the resistance within, leaving behind the defeated images.”189 To leave
behind the images that induce despair, Anzaldúa says, depends upon first realizing that “we are
not alone our struggles nor separate nor autonomous.”190 This realization, is, for Lorde, the
condition for writing a new set of images, images that imagine a world where mental health is a
mode of being with the vulnerability of others, which allows her, in turn, to “encourage [her]
own internal sense of power.”191
One such set of images appears in “Breast Cancer: A Black Lesbian Feminist
Experience,” as a way of rendering how, briefly, the bleakly white halls of Beth Israel Hospital
were “wrapped in a web of woman love,” making “self-healing more possible, knowing I was
not alone.”192 They include Blanche and Clare’s “gorgeous French rum and mocha cake with a
marzipan banner that said ‘we love you Audre’”; Bernice’s painstakingly assembled archive of
alternative therapies for breast cancer; and her daughter Beth’s tears of grief and empathy in the
waiting room, which are assuaged by Adrienne’s comforting words.193 To feel capable of
thriving, is, against the heathist ideology of personal responsibility, a “corporate effort”; in this
catalogue of anguished and pleasurable images, the form of The Cancer Journals models an
aesthetic where wellness belongs to an insurgent Black feminist subject, in the multiplicity of her
selfhood and its relations to others.
In attending to the relational work of writing itself, The Cancer Journals also illustrates
what Lorde would later tell her students in her Lesbian Literature class at the Free University of
Berlin (September 1985): that the “execution of writing” could be “an answer to despair” during
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treatment.194 She is referring the manuscript for Zami in that instance, but the lectures quoted
elsewhere in her students’ notebooks resonate with how she describes writing process within The
Cancer Journals itself – that is, an attempt to capture the morphing nature of her own embodied
knowledge from moment to moment, its ephemerality both disorienting and inspiring her.
(“September 25, the fourth day. Things come in and out of focus so quickly it’s as if a flash goes
by; the days are so beautiful now so golden brown and blue…I wanted to be glad I was
alive…But now it hurts. Now it hurts”).195 In their class notes, the Berlin students record Lorde’s
call for a “different way of measuring,” as a way to circumvent the Western Euro concept of the
beautiful that is “centered on the theory it’s not required to change” and is above all, an
“aesthetics of changelessness.”196 To craft an aesthetics of change, against the brutal
conservatism of white supremacist aesthetics, might begin with a literary form that can admit the
gorgeous vitality of the post-mastectomy body – or the robustness of a psyche that shifts between
depression and joy and back again, detached from any curative horizon where these fluctuations
would someday end. In The Cancer Journals, this is part of the work of imagining a Black
feminist ideal of wellness that even the void of anxiety cannot thwart: an ideal that is bound up in
the vulnerabilities of others, which also serve as the grounds for hope.
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Chapter 2. What’s So Funny about Self-Care? The Comedy of Heroic Vulnerability

Self-care is a problem. We know how social media can function as a de-radicalizing
machine, recycling feminist corporeal politics into advertisements for wellness. Search #selfcare
on Instagram, and there is no apparent end to its luscious archive of essential oils and yoga mats
and professionally lit salads, along with the occasional #audrelorde hashtag that frames this
stream of commodities as the iconography of revolution. Social media influencers may not have
invented self-care as a universalizing abstraction, but they know how to monetize its sweet spot:
the place where therapeutic culture sanctions the erasures of liberal feminism, and freedom, as
Laurie Penny says, “looks like a white woman practicing yoga alone on a beach.”1 Penny’s
Baffler article, “Life-Hacks of the Poor and Aimless,” is threaded with acerbic barbs like this.
They range from mockery of the bourgeois frivolity that characterizes certain strains of #selfcare
discourse (“On the one hand, Instagram happiness gurus make me want to drown myself in a
kale smoothie”) to rueful acknowledgement that, despite self-care’s corruption, its radical
feminist potential remains salient for burned-out activists “whose problem is not that they don’t
drink enough asparagus water, but that they don’t drink enough of anything that isn’t day-old
wine from a foil bag.”2 What’s striking is not that this deployment of humor is unusual, but
rather that it is paradigmatic: it situates Penny’s article within the emergent genre of self-care
comedy.
What’s so funny about self-care? In the four years following the 2016 presidential
election, self-care parodies have burst onto the media landscape of the professional-managerial

Laurie Penny, “Life-Hacks of the Poor and Aimless,” The Baffler 41, July 8, 2016, https://thebaffler.com/war-ofnerves/laurie-penny-self-care.
2
Penny, “Life-Hacks.”
1

69

classes. They typically mock a version of self-care that, as Jordan Kisner wryly notes, “rose as
collective social practice in 2016 alongside national stress levels,” and immediately became a
market for boutique wellness products marketed to affluent white women.3 This is a form of
sociality so indelibly marked by the aesthetics of social media that Sarah Sharma dubs it “selfiecare,” where neoliberal feminist narcissism becomes a sign of productivity, which is
exhaustively documented online.4 “The self-care/selfie-care political spectrum is easy to plot,”
Sharma says. “#Selfiecare is a photo of a pair of feet floating in a pool of sudsy water being
worked on by the repetitive motions of the manicurist at the nail factory.”5 On one end of the
spectrum is the worker whose racialized and classed labor makes feminized luxury possible; on
the other, the consumer who eagerly accepts the branding of such labor as a form of feminist
caregiving. Less easy to plot is why this dynamic has so swiftly and persistently become a
running joke in mainstream media publications and platforms, generating a new archive of
parodic monologues, cartoon strips, essays, films, and novels that suggest there is something
irresistibly comic about this latest configuration of health as a condition of sovereignty.
This dissertation’s previous chapter (“The Crack and Composure of Words”) proposes
that Lorde’s work imagines a subject who is unconstrained by this healthist ideology, along with
its conflation of the Enlightenment ideals of autonomy and self-possession with psychological
well-being. Through what I read as a killjoy aesthetic, characterized by its cracked and crazing
form, The Cancer Journals establishes a Black feminist disability framework that imagines
wellness not only as capacious enough to encompass the experience of psychic negation, but also
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as a social phenomenon that engages the psychological dispossession of others. In this chapter
that follows, I suggest self-care comedy acknowledges the exigency of this line of feminist
thought – but from the anxious perspective of a subject who is just self-aware enough to grasp
that they continually fail to enact its praxis, and who comically contorts themselves to deny this
fact, claiming that their acts of “selfiecare” place them in a radical feminist lineage.
Some of these comedic texts explicitly lay claim to Lorde herself as a paradigm of
feminist self-care, citing the famous passage from A Burst of Light and Other Essays in which
Lorde declares that “…Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation, and that is
an act of political warfare.”6 As in the host of journalistic articles that covered the post-2016
commodification of self-care, the sentence is stripped of its original context: the epilogue from
Lorde’s collected journal entries and essays about the profound challenge of seeking vibrant
ways of living with cancer, which, at the time of Lorde’s writing, had metastasized to Lorde’s
liver and appeared resistant to the first rounds of treatment.
I had to examine, in my dreams as well as in my immune function tests, the devastating
effects of overextension. Overextending myself is not stretching myself. I had to accept
how difficult it is to monitor the difference. Necessary for me as cutting down on sugar.7
As in The Cancer Journals, Lorde moves between the psychic and physical components of her
ordeal, rigorously scrutinizing how her anguish might serve as a resource for Black feminist
world-building work. Caring for oneself becomes an “act of political warfare” under these
conditions, in which any notion of the self is bound up in the pain and thriving of others;
cultivating wellness, then, entails securing the wellness of other minoritized subjects who, as
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Lorde says in “The Transformation of Silence into Language and Action,” “were never meant to
survive in the mouth of this dragon we call america.”8
In poking fun at the media’s tendency to deradicalize Lorde’s words, self-care comedy
also flags the canniness required to sell wellness during this stage of neoliberal capitalism that
feels perhaps not so much late, as belated. The social media influencer needs to address the
exhausted, overworked consumer who has long recognized that adapting to the demands of the
flexible workplace will not save them, and that the anaesthetizing pleasures of shopping online
are no substitute for political redress – but for whom the status quo offers just enough protection
that the fantasy of seeking a middle ground still appeals. In this chapter, I gather a representative
collection of self-care comedy from The New Yorker, McSweeney’s Internet Tendency, Vice, and
The Baffler, along with the feature film Ingrid Goes West and Melissa Broder’s novel The
Pisces.9 These texts vary dramatically in form and style, but are consistent in how they represent
the subject who is drawn to self-care as an aesthetic of wellness Instagram. This subject appears
in many guises, but always exists in relation to Penny’s white woman on the beach – the figure
who feels justifiably unsafe under a regime that endorses misogynistic violence and sexual
assault, but is oblivious to her own position of relative privilege during the rise of white
nationalism and economic precarity.10 Almost always a woman, she boasts about her fidelity to
an absurd ethos of self-care – one that frames frivolous indulgences as necessary for psychic
well-being, which, in turn, gets conflated with radical feminist politics. “In the age of Trump,
everyone needs to find ways to stay engaged in the #resistance,” says the narrator of “Why My
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Skin-Care Routine Makes Me a Radical Activist.”11 McPartland’s comic monologue is one of
several texts that cite Audre Lorde as the paradigm of feminist self-care, in order to imply that
the #selfcare of the present is, by contrast, mere narcissism masquerading as activism: “…The
reassurance that I am preventing blemishes and reducing inflammation gives me the strength to
contemplate the ongoing injustices of colonialism, racism, and misogyny.”12 This affective
performance is what I call heroic vulnerability, where the individual feels that their fragility
requires redress; they publicly acknowledge how they have attended to their own needs; and the
implication is that this acknowledgment, in itself, makes them an aspirational figure.
These comic texts satirize heroic vulnerability as a dominant affect of social media, a
mode of selling #selfcare that both leverages and erases its ties to second wave and women of
color feminisms. In my chapter, I put aside the question of whether or not this mockery is
accurate or fair. Instead, I ask why the genre of self-care comedy has emerged in order to make
them, and what this development reflects about current anxieties around therapeutic culture,
liberal feminism, and the interaction of the two on social media, where self-care “has been coopted into something to be sold,” as Melissa Broder writes in her parody of wellness listicles,
“like so much else that begins as a revolutionary act.”13 What makes comedy exigent for
critiquing how self-care has been torn from its black feminist origins, relentlessly commodified,
and circulated as an Instagram aesthetic? What do parodies of heroic vulnerability reveal about
the sovereignty of the therapeutic subject, and its role in the way that feminist ideals of wellness
get imagined now? And under what conditions is this funny?
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The problem of self-care is everywhere, dominating therapeutic discourse in the present,
and everywhere one follows it – into the registers of the historical; the nationalist; the liberalpolitical; the psychological – the meanings of “self” and “care” morph, shifting the horizon of
feminist politics anew.

Self-care is a problem for the therapeutic subject. If one of the definitions of liberal
personhood is the capacity for self-cultivation – that is to say, the exercise of free will that,
informed by the accumulated knowledge of self and other, shapes the individual into the ideal
human – then we can understand the therapeutic subject as one of its iterations, one that is
oriented towards the psyche. “Whether we are ‘in treatment’ or simply know people who are, we
all recognize the jargon,” write Timothy Aubry and Trysh Travis. “Whether with heartfelt zeal or
an ironic shrug, we all acknowledge the importance of ‘attitude adjustment,’ ‘emotional
fulfillment,’ and ‘personal growth.’ Why? Because we have made the individual psyche the
primary object of our attention.”14 The teleology of therapeutic culture leads to mental health,
which is entwined with “the promise of happiness,” Sara Ahmed’s framework for the affective
horizon of liberal society.”15 If happiness is an ideal of the good life that has been shaped by
norms of whiteness, heterosexual romance, and the middle class, then mental health is one of its
conditions: that is, whatever psychic state allows for the preservation of one’s composure
throughout the ongoing crises of the present.16
“Mental health” is a capacious and historically contingent term, ranging from the absence
of psychological disorder to a generalized sense of psychic well-being. From a disability studies
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perspective, it refers to a medicalized norm that, as Margaret Price observes, produces a
“well/unwell paradigm” that elucidates the intersections between illness and disability, while
pathologizing both.17 Because the therapeutic orientation is “now a matter of common sense,”
this paradigm has come to define the liberal-political subject, whose fitness as an “ideal and
healthy self” is measured by how “individuated and happy” they appear to be.18 Put another way:
when liberalism naturalizes autonomy as a privilege of wealth and whiteness, it does so by
disavowing psychiatric illness and disability. The enduring ableism of the therapeutic promise –
that the act of controlling one’s thoughts and emotions is a democratic and universal means of
accessing the good life – produces wellness as both apolitical and the threshold for politics, while
the question of what constitutes unwellness gets constantly deferred. The health and wellness
industries rely upon these contradictions; what self-care comedy suggests is that the
commodification of self-care both epitomizes and exposes them.
In mocking this phenomenon, these comic critiques look back to a postwar genealogy of
anti-therapeutic thought as a secular discourse that crosses ideological divides.19 In the first
decade of the Cold War, psychiatry “enjoyed a dramatic rise to broad cultural influence and
legitimacy,” bolstered by the “social diagnosis” of madness as the only rational response to U.S.
militarism, racism, and patriarchy.20 It was within this broader context that “many otherwise
antagonistic schools of thought” began to express anxiety about whether therapeutic culture
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actually had a depoliticizing effect on individuals.21 On the left was the “canonical critique” of
the liberal public intellectual tradition, which cast the fields of psychology and psychiatry as
forms of social control, followed by the feminist and Foucauldian cohorts of scholars who read
therapeutic techniques as technologies of domination.22 On the right were the socially
conservative discourses that excoriated therapeutic culture for producing a “‘nation of victims,’
bereft of agency and political will.”23 The therapeutic subject is where these opposing ideologies
continue to converge. Despite their conflicting ideas about the function of the political, they all
worry that the subject’s overdetermined psyche is the place where, alarmingly, it is evacuated.
Self-care comedy, as a genre, is animated by a version of this worry, one updated to suit
this late capitalist moment where, as Miya Tokumitsu says, “America’s vast therapeutic brain
trust has steadily eradicated the language of solidarity and class consciousness,” while also
selling wellness as a sedative for the anxiety that is endemic to the “marketization of every
aspect of our lives.”24 The comedy responds by parodying the figure of the liberal subject, who
strains to persuade us that their frivolous pleasures constitute self-care, which, in turn, counts as
political activism. In the dialogue “Self-Care Amongst the Liberal Elite,” Michael and Alexandra
are consumed by the project of assuaging their own anxiety about calling their Congressional
representatives – so much so that they never pick up the phone.25 In the monologue “My SelfCare Includes Several Tons of Refined Sugar,” the narrator, is a life coach whose pet political
cause is “increasing the number of woman-owned waffle trucks in [her] neighborhood”; she
closely resembles the narrator of “Why My Skin-Care Routine Makes Me a Radical Activist,” an
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aspiring revolutionary who declares that “organic clay facemasks are my form of anti-capitalist
protest.”26 The joke is on these individuals, who – especially in the direct address of the comic
monologues – petition the reader to take their self-care rituals proof of their psychic well-being
and, therefore, of their political seriousness. They all operate under the ableist assumption that
wellness is an attribute of the governable subject, whose self-possession determines their
eligibility for participation in public life.
What’s so funny about self-care as a therapeutic orientation? It seems like an ideal
vehicle for the neoliberal framing of choice as an adequate substitute for care, and yet it so
ludicrously fails to keep up its own ruse. When I say that it seems ideal, I mean that the same
orientation inward that makes self-care useful for the perpetually exhausted subjects of late
capitalism is precisely what also makes it effective as an instrument of healthism, the
privatization of health that moralizes well-being as a matter of personal responsibility.27 Because
neoliberal ideology reifies the individual in order to disavow its own deadly operations, self-care
discourse is readily turned towards its ends, where the capacity to be well becomes a marker of
success that distinguishes capitalism’s winners from its losers – a tension that fuels self-care
comedy.28 Buzzfeed’s round-ups of self-care Twitter jokes, for example, routinely mock how the
wellness industries turn survival into a personal brand: “Me: takes a sip of water. Also me: selfcare,” followed by the flower and folded hands emoji, shorthand for happiness and gratitude, that
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typify the tone of #selfcare advertisements.29 The tweets engage comedy’s “technical problem,”
as Lauren Berlant and Sianne Ngai put it, “of figuring out distinctions between things, including
people, whose relation is mutually disruptive of definition”; from this view, comedy becomes an
uncanny scene of “form’s self-violation.”30 Each one inaugurates a therapeutic subject in the
very same moment that it undermines that subject’s sovereignty, in order to critique wellness
culture for its displacement of the political.
This formal self-violation unfolds through different comedic conventions, such as the
scalar shift in @BRANDONWARDELL’s tweet: “self-care is the MOST important thing…wear
a facemask. drink water. take a bath. quit your job…alienate yourself from anyone who disagrees
w u even remotely. wear a hazmat suit. move 2 a bunker underground.”31 The tweet’s call for
wellness as a necessity, a tool for weathering the precarity of late capitalism “or, some argue,
capitalism as usual,” slides into the rhetoric of delusion.32 The humor deflects how rationality
functions as a psychic norm, excising psychiatric illness and mental disability from discourses of
liberal humanism.33 It also suggests that the individual psyche is inadequate to the turbulence of
the 2016 election, which sends the self-care practitioner scurrying to their bunker – a jab, it
would seem, at the widespread rage and condemnation expressed towards the Republican party,
as though discord were the worst possible outcome of a white supremacist regime. Though the
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texts of this archive tend to lean left, few are explicitly radical; many scoff at the trappings of
privilege, without interrogating how the values of liberalism keep hierarchies of power in
place.34 What ties them together is a shared target: the aspirational self-care practitioner and the
contortions they must then perform – ridiculous, petty, abject – to pass off what is actually selfindulgent as laudably political.
This is the performance of heroic vulnerability. It involves a declaration of one’s own
proximity to the affective life of others, without actually taking the risk that makes this position
feel precarious: the risk of losing one’s sense of self as sovereign. See, for example, what Kisner
calls a “counterfactual” #selfcare meme, “‘I can’t give you a cup to drink from if mine is
empty.”35 In sharing it, the Instagram user invites praise for being open enough to acknowledge
that they have needs, while rejecting the possibility that this might prompt them to invest in any
sort of collective. It is a performance of martyrdom so narcissistic that it does not even involve
another person; a fantasy of autonomy that produces wellness as a transcendent state, beyond the
reach of history. “No one can blame you for feeling emotionally overwhelmed during the reign
of Khufu, the second pharaoh of the Fourth Dynasty,” says the narrator of Graham Techler’s
“Self-Care Through the Ages.” “If you’re doing the backbreaking work of building the Great
Pyramid of Giza until you collapse from heat exhaustion, let yourself have an early night!”36
In mocking heroic vulnerability, these texts flag the double-edged way that the wellness
industries mobilize injury: as an opportunity to demonstrate one’s status as the “flexible subject”
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of late capitalism who “can perform wholeness through each recurring crisis” so skillfully that
their adaptability is apparent, but their subjective fragmentation is not.37 The flexible self-care
subject is too sheltered to comprehend the diminutive scale of what they call a crisis. (“Having
your every need met doesn’t allow for much downtime,” declares the very young narrator of
“Self-Care Tips for Toddlers.” “How can you find space to take care of you?”).38 Unlike most
people within the post-Fordist economies of immaterial capitalism, they do not experience
vulnerability as a “bodily ontology” perpetuated by systemic forces.39 But they do subscribe to
the fiction of autonomy that reifies personal feelings above all, which the neoliberal marketplace
affirms by selling self-care as a remedy for minor psychological distress: just palpable enough to
prove one’s competence at managing it, but not acute enough to cost anyone anything. This is a
transaction that presumes the psyche to be a bounded unit of personhood, offering safe refuge
from the pain of others.
Scholars of critical race theory and queer of color critique have written extensively
against this idea of the psyche, which psychoanalytic theory has traditionally deployed in order
to efface the traumas of racism and misogyny.40 Although the self-care comedy archive that is
the focus of this chapter rarely depicts the psychic experience of minoritarian modes of being, it
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does satirize how self-care’s commodification erases them: by circulating wellness as a mode of
whiteness. I borrow José Muñoz’s definition of “whiteness” from “Feeling Brown, Feeling
Down: Latina Affect, the Performativity of Race, and the Depressive Position,” which offers a
model for approaching psychological discourse as a racializing technology of regulation.41
Rather than accept common sense about (political) depression as a “crypto-universal” condition,
Muñoz theorizes it as a position organized around racial formations. Whiteness, then, is “a
cultural logic that prescribes and regulates national feelings and comportment” and therefore
serves as “an affective gauge that helps us understand some modes of emotional countenance and
comportment as good or bad.”42 Heroic vulnerability is one index of the whiteness of therapeutic
culture, which obscures how the administrative violences of the nation-state – the racialized and
gendered processes of categorization that determine the distribution of life chances – extend their
reach into the psyche.
“Declutter! Throw away all the books you don’t read and the paperwork you don’t need.
Just get rid of it all,” advises the narrator of “Self-Care Tips for Immigrants.”43 “Except for the
immigration forms.” The racialized immigrant is an “affect alien” within this strand of self-care
discourse, excluded from nurturing activities, like homemaking, by the constraints of
differentiated citizenship.44 If an “affect alien,” in Ahmed’s formulation, experiences a “gap
between the promise of happiness and how [they] are affected by objects that promise
happiness,” then these particular gaps speak to how the tropes of wellness culture presume a
subject who is unimpeded by the accidents of birth – so much so that their self-care includes
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seeking out aleatory experiences, such as tourism, for their novelty.45 For Medina’s narrator,
meanwhile, travel means trading one form of alienation for another, as “the perfect cure to being
bogged down by the feeling that you will never be fully immersed in the culture of the country
you chose to move to,” and a “spontaneous trip” is still tied to the bureaucratic temporalities of
“visa processing times, biometrics checkups, and passport deliveries.”46 The psyche of the
racialized immigrant is an administrative psyche, where even therapy is regulated by national
feelings and “you’ll probably spend most of your session explaining how the immigration
process works.”47
Under these conditions, heroic vulnerability is an affect of whiteness, available to the
subject who thinks of wellness as a kind of sanctuary. This is not to say, of course, that wellness
is not desirable or necessary for minoritized subjects. Rather, the comedy brings into view that
psychic well-being has a place on “the affective ruler that measures and naturalizes white
feelings as the norm.”48 For the majoritarian subject who is able to live mostly unawares of the
administrative force of the state, the experience of inhabiting a body-mind maps onto the
bourgeois ideal of domesticity: a space that feels protected, private, and safe.
This delusion allows Michael and Alexandra, Lonon’s “liberal elites” consumed with
anxiety about calling their representatives, to imagine themselves as both disempowered victims
and sovereign subjects.49 That is to say, they believe that they suffer the true psychic cost of
modernity’s violences, while also assuming that they possess the power to ameliorate them – and
without recognizing how their efforts are classed. “SELF-CARE, MICHAEL,” shouts
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Alexandra. “…Let’s get these calls done then reward ourselves with a walk to your favorite fairtrade coffee shop for some gluten-free vegan peach crisp with popped quinoa.”50 By parodying
self-care as cover for a solipsistic approach to politics (“These contact forms are so much less
satisfying than getting your voice to break tenderly on the word constituent,” complains
Michael), Lonon’s text skewers the belief that merely noticing the suffering of others has a
burdensome cost: a rift in their psychic well-being that merits repair.51
This belief bears some resemblance to Judith Butler’s theory of precarious life, where
recognition of our common corporeal vulnerability undoes the notion of the autonomous self.52
But Michael and Alexandra mistake the activity of reflecting on their own passion and rage
about the mistreatment of others as an end, rather than as the precursor to examining how those
emotions implicate them in the lives rendered “ungrievable” by liberal humanist frameworks.53
On some level, they are aware that the norms of therapeutic culture erase power differentials: “I
read that op-ed about the wellness industry being just another tool of the patriarchy,” says
Michael, “[but] I’m worried that all the stress eating of the past year means I won’t fit into last
year’s romphims.”54 Nonetheless, they are seduced by the premise that fuels self-care’s
commodification as an affect of whiteness: namely, that you can have an ethical relation with
your own mind, which begins and ends with protecting it from painful realities.
Lonon’s piece typifies how the self-care comedy archive is largely focused on self-care’s
corruption, and disinterested in its potential for creating moments of respite from the harms of
white ableist heteropatriarchy – moments that allow those invested in queer, feminist, antiracist,
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and/or disability justice work to “reassemble ourselves,” and so are joined to the longer
temporality of feminist world-building work.55 Given that parody, as a form, reacts to objects of
disdain or disappointment, it makes sense that these comic texts do not acknowledge self-care as
a tool for “the creation of community…assembled out of the experiences of being shattered.”56
At the same time, when read together, these texts do risk “sweep(ing) up too much” in their
critiques of neoliberalism, such that “all forms of self-care become symptoms” of it.57 This
speaks to both the utility and danger of testing the bounds of therapeutic subjectivity through
comedy, a genre structured around feelings of unsafety, in that it simultaneously dispels and
produces anxiety.58 The humor often depends on the actual ambiguity that exists between what it
defends, and the debasement of that thing: if the politics of self-care could always be cleanly
disarticulated from narcissism, or feminist praxis from feminized self-indulgence, would parody
be the exigent form of critique? Perhaps that is why these comic texts are so preoccupied with
the therapeutic subject who genuinely needs self-care’s moments of respite, and who is also
complicit in perpetuating its exclusionary logics: Penny’s white woman on the beach, practicing
yoga and “doing a few hamstring stretches as the planet burns.”59 She feels anxious about her
own precarity, but fails to appreciate her own position of relative privilege; possesses the
material resources to work out that anxiety in aestheticized seclusion; and documents this
experience on social media, often with a heroically vulnerable caption that celebrates her selfgratification as a feminist act.
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Self-care is a problem for feminism. Contemporary writings on self-care often portray
its genealogy as a linear progression, in which women of color feminists of the 1970s and 80s
redeemed a neutral medical term by turning it political.60 In this context, Lorde’s passage on
“caring for [herself]” from A Burst of Light gets invoked to represent self-care as a holistic ideal
of the past, prior to its co-optation as a “capitalist enterprise” geared towards maximizing
corporate productivity.61 As I discuss in the first chapter of this dissertation, Lorde’s writings on
wellness and self-care cannot be disarticulated from her history as an activist within the Black
liberation and women’s movements that framed health as an effect of biopower, and so
prioritized remediating the physical and psychological harms of white heteropatriarchy.62 But to
imply that self-care was apolitical before Lorde articulated it as such misses the significance of
her intervention. As medical terminology, self-care had already been imbricated with matriarchal
networks of care both within and without the health care system, becoming a “consumer
movement” that resisted medical paternalism in the 1960s.63 Lorde published A Burst of Light in
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1988, well into the ascendancy of the self-help and happiness discourses that this paternalism
authorized, and that she had so scathingly critiqued in The Cancer Journals.64 So Lorde’s work
does more than claim the political exigency of self-care: it resists the therapeutic appropriation of
a feminist ethics of care, an appropriation that would reify psychic well-being as a privilege of
non-disabled whiteness.
Likewise, to represent self-care in the present as a complete abdication of Lorde’s ideals
overlooks the complexity of her legacy. This narrative of failure appears frequently in articles for
the wellness beats of The New York Times, The New Yorker, The Atlantic, Slate, The Baffler,
Bust, Bitch, Vice, and other mainstream journalism outlets, which have documented self-care’s
recent displacement of self-help as the most prominent buzzword of the $4.2 trillion wellness
industries.65 But the fact is that Lorde’s formulation has never stopped serving as a resource for
progressive organizing, generating robust conversations around its necessity for disabled, queer,
and BIPOC communities, where the same conditions that fuel self-care’s commodification also
make the need for anticapitalistic self-care even more pressing. The digital technologies that
allow for self-care’s circulation in online marketplaces both serve as a crucial activist tool and
cause activist burnout, for which, Naomi Ortiz says, the universalizing advice of self-help is
irrelevant; instead, Ortiz’s Sustaining Spirit: Self-Care for Social Justice offers a manual for
spiritual self-care practices that account for the intersectionality of identity.”66 In “Self-Care is
Crunk,” a manifesto published in Debates in the Digital Humanities 2019, the Crunk Feminist
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Collective expresses similar ambivalence towards digital technologies and their utility for “Black
feminist community-building…as one of the necessities of self-care.”67 The Collective’s online
presence, they note, has engendered this kind of network, which amplifies the voices of women
of color; at the same time, doing this work online lends itself to the pitfalls that their women of
color feminist foremothers warned against – “being too much, being too accessible, and
prioritizing others above ourselves.”68
For adrienne maree brown, Lorde’s work is a touchstone for approaching pleasure not
only as a remedy for capitalism’s harms, but also as a way to access the “aliveness and
awakeness” that capitalism interrupts.69 brown’s edited collection Pleasure Activism: The
Politics of Feeling Good takes up Lorde’s notion of the erotic as a source of power, and care
itself as a source of life-giving pleasure. The work of seeking justice and liberation should feel
good because it is a process of “reclaim[ing] our whole, happy, and satisfiable selves from the
impacts, delusions, and limitations of oppression and/or supremacy,” limitations that are always
already steeped in ableism.70 For most people, says Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarsinha, in a
contributed essay from Pleasure Activism, “the words ‘care’ and ‘pleasure’ can’t be in the same
sentence” because the stigmatization of body-minds with needs repudiates the “many joyful
intersections of disability justice, care, and pleasure,” where “wildly intimate, healing
relationships” form.71
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Self-care comedy belies the existence of these affiliations with queerness, anti-racism,
feminism, and disability. If one read only its archive, one would think that self-care were
exclusively practiced by affluent and non-disabled white women who, “apparently feeling a new
vulnerability in the wake of the election,” have stripped it of its last vestiges of radicalism.72
What’s so funny about self-care as a white feminist failure? To mock it as such involves a
temporality of decline so ahistorical that Gwyneth Paltrow –founder of wellness empire Goop,
the exemplar for self-care as luxury branding – and Audre Lorde appear to be natural
antagonists, squaring off over the (in)defensibility of “$3,000 dresses and $95 drinkable skin
care.”73 This conflict is about the horizon of feminist politics, as set by an especially mortifying
display of heroic vulnerability: the white cis-heterosexual liberal woman’s insistence that her
consumerism makes her a black feminist revolutionary.
“I, a twenty-nine-year-old white woman…follow the example of Lorde and other black
feminist writers, who describe self-care as integral to the struggle for liberation,” says the
narrator of “Why My Skin-Care Routine Makes Me a Radical Activist.” “I feel liberated
knowing that I can maintain my youthful complexion well into my thirties through a strict daily
regime of eye creams, retinoids, and moisturizes.”74 Lorde serves as an avatar for “revolutionary
activism,” which is defined so broadly that it includes both agitating in the streets and purchasing
“the latest Sephora hydrocolloid sheet mask.”75 This leads to moral claims almost too
nonsensical to qualify as hypocrisy, such as, “As a straight white woman who often fights a
vague sense of doom while waiting in line at Starbucks, I use Lorde’s words to justify spending
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$8 on a latte.”76 These parodies of heroic vulnerability point to how, in certain liberal circles,
self-care seems like an opportunity to indulge in the excess licensed by whiteness and wealth,
while presenting this indulgence as evidence of one’s feminist credentials. They suggest that
self-care circulates as what Grace Kyungwon Hong calls a “defanged version” of
intersectionality, which contains and marginalizes women of color feminism.77
The co-optation of intersectionality does not merely sideline self-care’s ties to women of
color feminism, but rather leverages those ties by mobilizing the same misreading of it that, as
Hong argues, enabled the rise of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 90s.78 Specifically, this is a
misreading of women of color feminism “as espousing a celebratory definition of ‘difference,’”
which obfuscates its challenges to the politics of respectability and the “violences of biopolitical
incorporation” that are foundational to neoliberalism.79 If comedy, as Henri Bergson says,
always reveals “something mechanical encrusted on the living,” then what these parodies expose
is how the operations of a therapeutic “sovereignty machine” relies on white feminism’s strategic
elisions.80 “Living with cancer, Lorde wrote powerfully about self-care as resistance to
oppression. As I near thirty, I have begun to experience the prospect of visibly aging as a form of
oppression,” says McPartland’s narrator.81 The juxtaposition flags how self-care, however
illogically, gets forced into alignment with neoliberal discourse, which “collapses the language
of economic and individual freedom and is equal parts consumerist and liberal.”82 Its imagined
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practitioner is the white liberal feminist, who, by cloaking her consumerism in the language of
antiracist feminisms, asserts her status as a multicultural subject, eligible for the privileges of
global citizenship.83
“Why does ‘self-care’ piss me off so much?’ asks Melissa Broder in her comic riff on
the self-care listicle, “Stop Pressuring Me to Take Care of Myself.” “Maybe, because it’s been
co-opted into something to be sold, like so much that begins as a revolutionary act.”84 On Vice’s
website, the last two words (“revolutionary act”) contain a hyperlink to a Bitch interview about
Black feminist self-care, with a photo of Lorde as its header image. In Broder’s listicle, as well
as in the fictional monologues narrated by white liberal women, the parody distributes self-care
along a racialized binary: the serious “good” kind that is consistent with black feminist ideals of
the past, where the act of nurturing one’s well-being is part of the work of dismantling white
heteropatriarchy; and the laughable “bad” kind that exploits black feminism in order to sell
Goop-style snake oil to rich white women on the internet. As a formal strategy of
postmodernism, parody “rebels against essential beliefs of both traditional culture and literature”;
its effect is to assert the absurdity of universalizing notions of truth or meaning.85 But in order to
critique white feminism’s universalizing approach to intersectionality, self-care comedy tends to
essentialize black women – represented by Lorde, alone – as embodying an authentic and
overdetermined political agency.86
Rather than acknowledge the multiplicity of Lorde’s identifications as “a woman, a black
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lesbian feminist mother lover poet,” these parodies caricature Lorde as the virtuous other to the
white liberal, who mistakes her personal well-being for feminist consciousness.87 Even in the
comic essays that directly reference Lorde’s work, the focus is not how she theorizes the
personal within black feminist modes of care – how, for example, Lorde approaches her
difference from other racialized women of color that provides the grounds for “forming genuine
working coalitions built upon [its] recognition and creative use.”88 Instead, the humor relies on
Lorde as an affective placeholder, a metonym for black feminist gravity, such that Lorde’s
political seriousness – not her actual politics – provides an amusing contrast to the catalogue of
self-care failures that usually follow. The racialized binary between “good” and “bad” self-care
becomes the source of comedy, prompting us to roll our eyes at the heroic vulnerability of an
Alexandra, who registers the rise of fascist violence in terms of her own psychological response:
“…we could have never fathomed…the impact all of those things would have on our mental
health. If we don’t take care of ourselves we’ll crash harder than Target’s checkout system.”89
By presenting these appropriations as categorically white and bourgeois, these texts make
it easy to sidestep the discomfiting question of whether self-care also seems inherently funny –
funny enough to spawn an entire genre – because of an underexamined assumption that women
who want to feel good deserve to be mocked. In this sense, the heroic vulnerability of the (white)
liberal feminist invokes an ambivalent kind of laughter, provoked by what Gayatri Spivak calls
the double-bind. The double-bind is the experience of shuttling between positions that are both
co-constitutive of one another and irreconcilable, which also describes the process of subject
formation in the era of globalization; that is, as a discursive impossibility that requires “learning
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to live with contradictory instructions.”90 Comedy is, itself, a genre structured around this very
discursive impossibility, which Alenka Zupançic illustrates through the psychoanalytic corollary
to the double-bind: the Möbius strip.91
Zupançic takes up Lacan’s image of an insect that walks along the Möbius strip, who
knows that there is another side to its existence, but cannot grasp that there is in fact only one
surface.92 This is Lacan’s analogy for “nonwholeness,” the permanently missing link between the
body and its signifier; comedy, Zupançic says, emanates from this “leaky finitude,” by creating a
“surprising short circuit between the two sides” of the Möbius strip, where one reality intrudes
upon the other and the effect is absurd.93 In self-care comedy, the “mutually exclusive realities”
of feminist agency collide, rendering ridiculous the heroic vulnerability of the cis-het white
woman – her insistence that she has, by the grace of her queer and/or women of color feminist
predecessors, become inviolably whole, despite the fragility of her body-mind.94 These texts
parody how self-care’s commodification depends upon the double-bind of reproductive
heteronormativity, in order to sell wellness as the spoils of liberal feminism –what Catherine
Rottenberg calls a “reorienting of the liberal feminist field away from notions of freedom, equal
rights, and social justice and toward the importance of well-roundedness and well-being.”95 The
humor punctures the impossible loop between self-care as feminized affective labor devoted to
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the pursuit of wholeness, and self-care as unending attention to what one lacks.
Self-care, as an expression of feminist agency, reiterates the therapeutic promise that
produces sovereignty as a paradox. Its discursive impossibility makes comedy exigent for
understanding how self-care places competing demands on the figure of “psychological woman,”
Dana Becker’s counter to sociologist Philip Rieff’s “psychological man.”96 Rieff, a critic of the
“postwar psychologization of American culture,” decried how psychological man’s socialization
no longer required “the symbolism of social goals,” meaning that the democratic ideal of
communal purpose had shrunk to comprise only the self.97 Becker proposes that, given common
sense about women’s mode of being as “primarily relational,” therapeutic culture has shifted to
“expose women to social goals only as symbols,” one of these being the “toothless notion of
women’s psychological ‘empowerment’” that would prove fundamental to the genre of self-help
and, eventually, self-care.98 Becker locates the turn towards psychological empowerment within
the genealogy of “self-in-relation theory,” which, as a product of the 1970s feminist insurgence
against the patriarchal disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, emerged from the confluence of
feminist theory and feminist therapies.99 It proposed that women possessed relational capacities
that were central to their identities, challenging the hegemony of “male-modeled” individualism
and idealizing the mutual empathy and interdependence of the mother-daughter relationship, in a
move that would anticipate the philosophical turn towards feminist care ethics.100
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The problem, Becker argues, is that relational individualism, in seeking to undo a rigid
notion of the autonomous self, reinscribes it, producing psychological woman as a liberalpolitical paradox.101 It proposes that, through nurturing others, women access a form of nonhierarchal and non-competitive power: the power to influence others.102 While its centering of
caretaking and maternality remains a significant feminist intervention into therapeutic discourse,
relational individualism also rehearses the nineteenth-century “separate spheres” ideology of
womanly influence.103 Founded on biological essentialism and generalizations based on white
middle-class women’s experience, it ultimately cannot break away from the confines of liberal
subjectivity, such that “the old individualism continues to serve as the container for the ‘new’
relational self.”104
This persistent notion – that women’s difference manifests as psychic power – structures
liberal feminist forms of self-care, tying them to a long tradition of “the feminization of the
psychological” in the United States.105 Self-care comedy, in targeting the white liberal who
believes herself to be an activist, flags how psychic well-being has always already been a
condition of white cis-het womanhood in the U.S., while also indexing how self-care has become
a site for asserting that this personal power is indeed political. It underscores how self-care in the
present not only feminizes the psychological, but also invokes the psychological as feminist.
In other words, a woman attending to her own feelings of pain or deprivation gets cast as
an inherently feminist act – a formulation familiar to anyone exposed to the corporate feminist
brands of the wellness industries. Even when its illogicality is glaringly obvious, it is difficult to
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resist, given the tantalizing possibility that it could make one’s “hole in finitude,” the
disconcerting “leak” in the empirical description of one’s life, disappear.106 “Following a brief
break for lunch – a hand-picked selection of Hostess snack cakes and three cans of Mountain
Dew, I engage in what I call a Mindful MinuteTM,” says Monaghan’s narrator, as she summarizes
the routine that enables her to “fight the patriarchy.”107 Her version of feminist consciousness
relies on scarfing snacks as a distraction from the tedium of domesticity, which the narrator
sanctimoniously frames as a “healing practice”; she tries to brand this absurdity as self-care, as
part of an attempt to revive her defunct life-coaching business.108 “When the day is done and my
loved ones have finally shut up, it’s time to relax…Personally, I like to tuck ten sugar cubes in
my cheeks and lay on my bed until the urge to sob hysterically passes.”109 The monologue
articulates two excluding realities – the tranquil self-sufficiency of psychological woman and
the anxiety of an isolated mother, who is disinterested in exercising her relational capacities at
home – in the same frame, through what Zupançic calls “comic exaggeration.”110
Within the analogy of the Möbius strip, comic exaggeration is “a forced (yet again
somehow ‘illogically logical’)” acceleration that takes us “a few steps forward from the point on
which we were standing…[bringing] us to the other side of our point of departure before we even
realize it.”111 Where we end up is at an impossible bind between well-being and feminist agency,
particularly for those subjects who identify with what Berlant calls the “female complaint” of
bourgeois white womanhood.112 When heroic vulnerability satirizes the invocation of the
psychological as feminist, it also satirizes the “intimate publics” of women’s culture in the
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United States and their sentimental fantasy that “women live for love, and love is the gift that
keeps on taking.”113 In this “love affair with conventionality,” the conditions of patriarchal
oppression also serve as the conditions for the good life, an attachment to normalcy that produces
femininity as a genre of disappointment. Embedded in these intimate publics, Berlant says, “is a
white universal paternalism, sometimes dressed as maternalism”; it bemoans the broken promise
of heterosexual romance and love, while borrowing black pain “in order to find a language for
their own more privileged suffering at the hands of other women, men, and callous
institutions.”114 In these parodies, self-care structures an intimate public of therapeutic culture,
where women seek relief from the loneliness of conventional femininity by embodying it even
more fully, and legitimize their political inaction by citing black feminist methodologies of
vulnerability and care. “Audre Lorde once wrote, possibly on Facebook,” says Monaghan’s
narrator, “‘Caring for myself is not self-indulgence…’”115 What is laughable is not so much this
particular individual’s ignorance of black feminist history, but rather the fact this ignorance,
more broadly, produces the psyche as the realm where cis-het white women are naturally
sovereign.
The reference to Facebook is consistent with the role of social media in these parodies: as
the primary medium for self-care’s commodification as #selfcare, a hashtag that archives how
irreconcilable feminisms collide. It is almost impossible to disarticulate self-care in the present
from #selfcare, which circulates as an emblem of a feminized influencer culture, curating a fever
dream of sponsored content (#sponcon) for the wellness industries. Kisner wryly offers a list of
Instagram posts that capture the class aspirationalism of self-care as #sponcon:
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…an image by West Elm showing a kitten napping on one of the company’s quilts, an ad
for Schick Hydro Silk razors, and a link to an article on five-minute ‘self-care moves’
sponsored by eBay, with hyperlinks to essential oils and books of Mary Oliver poetry
available for purchase.116
This reflects the incoherence of what Kisner calls the “grand online #selfcare-as-politics
movement of 2016” that has been “powered by straight, affluent white women…apparently
feeling a new vulnerability in the wake of the election.”117 As a catalogue of pleasures both
absurdly diminutive and arbitrary, the list could reflect either the obliviousness endowed by
privilege, which makes it impossible to grasp the scale of the crisis at hand – or the devastating
lack of options for coping with the election of an avowed misogynist and white supremacist.
The inextricability of these readings is the double-bind of self-care comedy, as articulated
in Heather Loase’s New Yorker cartoon about the 2017 viral spread of #Me Too, the womanoriented movement to publicly document experiences of sexual harassment and assault online.118
“The Basic Witch Self-Care Guide for the Fall” melds the trope of the witch, a popular symbol
of feminist resistance to the Trump administration, with that of the “basic bitch”– “basic bitch”
being a slur for a young-ish white woman with unsophisticated tastes, eager to buy anything
mass-marketed to her demographic. Laose’s “basic witch” stirs a cauldron of pumpkin spice
lattes; dyes her hair “autumnal equinox ombre”; and snaps a photo of her “grammable cocktail,”
garnished with an eyeball and spider – all to the good, it seems, until the witch kicks back to
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“watch a horror movie,” which turns out to be Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court hearing. “Why
didn’t I just rent ‘Cannibal Holocaust?’” thinks the witch, wincing at the specter of Kavanaugh,
mouth monstrously agape as he bellows denials of having committed sexual assault.
The cartoon foregrounds social media as the site of identificatory processes of wounding,
what Wendy Brown describes as the politicized identity’s “resubjugation…through the
investment of its own pain,” alongside social media’s function as an intimate public, where
#selfcare’s avowals of femininity are a site of ritualized pleasure.119 For the Basic Witch, the
rituals of #selfcare are insufficient to the task of remediating the harms of rape culture because
they are too “grammable,” or appealing to an Instagram demographic – that is to say, too
feminine according to patriarchal norms. Psychic well-being proves to be a comically impossible
point of convergence, not only for the disappointments of liberal white femininity, but for those
of liberal white feminism itself.

#Selfcare is a problem for social media. “Late capitalism is like your love life: it looks
a lot less bleak through an Instagram filter,” says Penny, who finds the curated feeds of wellness
influencers and lifestyle bloggers to be dangerously seductive, a dreamscape of “ritual
consumption and affectless passion” that can seem like a real alternative to the “abusive logic” of
the world. #Selfcare parodies position the social media user as an iteration of psychological
woman, for whom the double binds of therapeutic culture and feminism overlap. The subject
who exercises choice becomes psychically whole, mind aligned with body; the problem is that
this pursuit of wholeness requires unending attention to what one lacks, through a public
performance of fragmentation that undermines the very sovereignty they seek. #Selfcare comedy
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points to how social media monetizes these impossible positions: by rehearsing the claim that
shuttling back and forth between them is, somehow, a feminist act.
Influencers, would-be influencers, and social networkers often mobilize their sexuality to
cover over the contradictions of #selfcare, directing our attention to the appeal of wellness by
eroticizing it. (As I write this, the first page of a #selfcare search on Instagram yields three
different posts of women wearing lingerie, one of whom is holding a bottle of small-batch
kombucha). Kisner wryly describes a “typical self-care image” that is like a #selfcare search
condensed to a single post, a chaotic assemblage of gender-sex and class signifiers that include a
woman sporting “an Aqua-Netted chignon, pageant makeup, and a black lacy bra, posing with a
bowl of sweet-potato noodles and a plastic mini-jug of ReaLemon juice.”120 By poking fun at
how #selfcare gets conflated with a universalizing wellness, one that circulates as an Instagram
aesthetic of white domesticity and cis-heterosexuality, the comedy reveals what holds together
these incoherent fantasies: the woman’s vulnerable body-mind.
What’s so funny about #selfcare as commoditized feminism? Does laughing at #selfcare
require us to ignore the labor that the hashtag archives – namely, that of women who monetize
their sexuality online in order to survive the precarity of the “playbor economy,” which turns
leisure into another mode of producing economic value?121 Or does something about #selfcare
itself, as a site where therapeutic ideology and (neo)liberal feminism collide, make this labor
funny?122 “[After] helping a client (my sister-in-law, Amber) select politically subversive
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Instagram filters,” says Monaghan’s narrator, “I like to stare soulfully out the window while
wearing a chunky knit sweater and clutching a mug of tea…as I honor all that is artisanal,
beautiful, and unusual in my life.”123 For Monaghan’s narrator, this means scrolling through
Twitter, then applying vanilla frosting like lip balm. The tedium of bourgeois domesticity,
combined with an unspecified political anxiety that emanates from merely being online, drives
her to the heterosexist cliché of overindulgence. By calling this a “self-care routine,” the narrator
tries to seek solace in #selfcare sociality: that is to say, she strives, ineffectually, to claim her
overindulgence as feminist praxis, which enables her to “fight the patriarchy, be present for [her]
family,” and build her career online as a life coach who “helps trapeze instructors develop their
personal brands.”124 This absurdity, like #selfcare parodies more broadly, mocks corporate
feminist rhetorics from a digital pessimist perspective that casts social media as profoundly
antisocial.
Digital pessimism posits that social media interaction is not merely impersonal, but rather
actively impedes relationality: as a mode of producing economic value through clicks, likes, and
comments, it deploys narcissism towards generating the illusion of intimacy.125 Greg Goldberg,
who takes a reparative view towards the pleasures of queer antisociality online, argues that “[the]
anxiety surrounding the transformation of leisure into work thus aims to reestablish a boundary
not between labor and leisure, but between responsible and irresponsible forms of
relationality.”126 The expression of this anxiety, Goldberg says, is its own technology of power,
discursively producing a governable subject who is properly socialized according to norms of
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community and collective responsibility.127 As a digitally pessimistic genre, #selfcare comedy
targets Instagram for aestheticizing the operations of the playbor economy. The app is designed
to both document the smartphone user’s life and to foreground that this premise is an obvious
fiction, where the influencer stages elaborate faux-snapshots of the good life through Instagram’s
“visual lexicon” of retro imperfection – its filters that “transform a picture taken today into a
faded 1970s Polaroid or grainy 1950s black-and-white snapshot.”128 The effect is deeply
nostalgic, but ahistorically so. This aesthetic makes Monaghan’s comic reference to the
“politically subversive Instagram filter” a contradiction in terms, along the same lines of
#selfcare as white liberal feminism.129 That is to say, Instagram’s palettes of analog photography
offer a sanitized representation of the medium’s countercultural past, while abstracting it from
any political context – and so offers an opportunity to translate neoliberalism’s structural
“disavowal of the ways in which race, gender, and sexuality… determine the uneven exposure to
precarity and violence across people and populations” into the visual language of corporate
branding.130
Ingrid Goes West, Hollywood’s first foray into the genre of Instagram comedy, makes
fun of the frivolous trappings of this particular disavowal, as embodied by “Instacelebrity”
Taylor Sloane (Elizabeth Olsen) and the illusions of intimacy she performs online.131 Taylor is
“Instafamous” for her savvily curated “@welltaylored,” a welter of West Coast aesthetics of
gentrification, where rugged natural landscapes and modernist interiors are inflected by the
fetishization of indigenous and working class material cultures. This includes postindustrial
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furniture draped with Diné-style weavings; an Airstream trailer parked at Joshua Tree; a
photogenic husband who makes terrible paintings of Internet memes; and Taylor herself, white,
conventionally attractive, and dressed like a bohemian socialite from the 1970s, the sartorial
version of a vintage Instagram filter.
Taylor is fluent in holistic wellness fads, as an L.A. hipster who approaches small talk by
suggesting that “we should go to the Integratron and get a sound bath” for its “healing” and
“regrounding” properties.132 What has really made her so successful as an entrepreneur, though,
is her skill at deploying heroic vulnerability. “Can I tell you a secret?” she says to Ingrid, the
film’s anti-heroine, who has developed an unsettling attachment to Taylor. Dropping her voice to
a confidential murmur, Taylor shares her dream of opening a boutique hotel where everything in
it is for sale, “like my Instagram, but in real life.” As if hungry for Ingrid’s validation, Taylor
shyly says that maybe it sounds like a “crazy idea” and asks Ingrid not tell Taylor’s husband,
who has been “weird about money” ever since Taylor started financially supporting them both.
The plan hardly seems so original as to merit such secrecy; what Taylor describes is, essentially,
a store. It is in its furtive, tender articulation that we grasp Taylor’s artfulness: her heroic
vulnerability blurs the line between her Instagram presence and her real life, a simulation of
intimacy at the access point of social media.
These access points between abstract systems of modernity and the general public are, as
Sianne Ngai puts it, “places of vulnerability” for the system, where the worker’s flesh-and-blood
presence reminds people of the fallibility of its operators (198).133 The worker’s job is to
counteract this fact by cultivating the customer’s trust in a friendly exchange that is not actual
friendship, a simulation of intimacy that shapes the increasing feminization of labor in the late
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capitalist workplace.134 Ingrid Goes West models heroic vulnerability as a form of this affective
labor, staging a version of intimacy that both promises and withholds proximity to the good life,
as embodied by the figure who glows with the effects of a luxuriant, moneyed wellness. It
demonstrates how Instagram formalizes digital pessimism’s anxiety about authentic relationality,
while rendering Taylor legible as an object of care – not only because she has access to the
resources that allow her to thrive, but also because, as a cis-het woman, her vulnerability is read
as desirable, not weak.
At least, it is read that way by Ingrid, an Instagram user who is equal parts lonely and
guileless, which the film frames as a dangerous combination. Because Ingrid genuinely believes
that she is sharing the lives of the influencers whom she follows online, she also thinks that
stalking them offline is an expression of friendship. The comedy lies in how excessively good
Ingrid is at using social media: that is to say, she takes its affective performances far too
seriously, and structures her entire life around her belief that the Instagram grid of images is a
portal into a relational field.135 It is, of course, but not to the degree of intimacy that Ingrid would
want – as when, for example, Taylor responds to Ingrid’s comment on a photo of avocado toast
with a plug for a restaurant (“Grateful Kitchen. They’re the BEST. Check it out the next time
you’re in L.A.”), and Ingrid takes this as evidence that she should move to L.A. and lie, steal,
and manipulate her way into Taylor’s inner circle.136 Because Ingrid cannot distinguish a
spontaneous expression of emotion from the affective labor of the influencer, she will later take
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Taylor’s feint at intimacy – her “secret” plan for a boutique hotel – as a sign of profound trust.
For Ingrid, this has the pull of the erotic.
The film invites us to laugh at how hard Ingrid falls for the triteness of influencer
aesthetics, as in the opening shots of a series of Instagram posts for a country club wedding,
which includes a group of guests doing sunrise salutations. “The couple that yogas together,
stays together,” the bride, Charlotte, coos in a syrupy voice-over.137 If not explicitly #selfcare,
this is the iconography of the creative class to whom #selfcare appeals, with its aspirational
markers that are just crunchy enough to be seamlessly integrated into corporate wellness culture.
Ingrid, meanwhile, is sitting in her car outside the reception, scrolling through her feed and
feverishly jabbing at her screen to “like” the photos. Later, we will learn that Ingrid had no
reason to expect an invitation; Charlotte was a mere acquaintance, who had written a condolence
note on Ingrid’s post about her mother’s death. Nevertheless, Ingrid snaps. Eyes bulging,
mascara streaming, she jumps out of the car, storms across the dance floor, and shouts, “Thanks
for inviting me, you fucking cunt!” as she pepper-sprays the bride in the face, point-blank.138
The melodrama of this assault is deflated by the slapstick of Ingrid running gracelessly
away, only to be a tackled by a guest. There is also a grotesque quality to Charlotte’s sobs in the
background, as though we are expected to find her humiliation funny, as well – as if we ought to
think that this woman got what was coming to her, just for being so conventionally appealing on
Instagram, so winningly banal a model of cis-heterosexuality. Indeed, just before Ingrid reaches
her victim, the camera lingers over the décor of the reception itself, its Instagram clichés of
mason jars and café lights, as if merely viewing this aesthetic of bourgeois femininity could
trigger a Bergsonian “anesthesia of the heart”– one that would allow us to view a woman in a
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wedding gown wailing in agony, and understand this to be the beginning of a comedy.139
Similarly, Taylor’s mastery of replicating this aesthetic, the skill that turns her private life into a
brand, will prove her irredeemable shallowness, for which, the film implies, she deserves at least
some of Ingrid’s harassment. Most damningly, Taylor repeats, word for word, the script about
her boutique hotel (“Can I tell you a secret?”) to a fashion blogger who has even more followers
than she does, a savvy marketing move that Ingrid registers as a betrayal.140 The allure of heroic
vulnerability lies in the promise that it is personal, a self-exposure that looks like a gesture of
care, even though the terms of its enunciation make reciprocity impossible.
The influencer’s performance is mesmerizing because it offers a tableau of labor and
commodity merging, where the curatorial work that casts the body-mind as an object of desire is
also what they are selling.141 In the case of #selfcare, this capitalist mirage involves a gendersexed fantasy of wellness, and in particular, psychic wellness. Megan Amram’s “Self-Care for
Men” satirizes this fantasy via the corporate practice of branding commodities female, by taking
the self-care listicle that presumes its reader to be a cis-het woman and flipping it across a gender
binary.142 In reassuring his audience of “firemen, X Games medalists, and Civil war reenactors”
that “self-care isn’t just for women anymore,” the narrator exposes his terror that this, in fact, is
exactly who self-care is for, and that engaging with it makes him one – unless he can link its soft,
nurturing practices to the violent imagery of white heteromasculinity, which he describes in the
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crude register of misogynistic online movements like Men’s Right’s Activism (MRA).143
Boutique bottled water becomes “SHARK PISS,” fortified to suit a man’s “hydrogen bomb”
metabolism; therapy becomes “T-HIM-APY,” a verbal wrestling match (“Punch your thimapist
over and over until your eyes are all Shark Pissed out!”), and makeup becomes “OUTSIDE
BLOOD,” designed to make the consumer look like he just won a fight.144
The anxiety here is that care is a kind of castration, for which the narrator
overcompensates by phallicizing even his “larger-than-average pores,” calling them a “man’s
holes” that require thick, sludgy makeup.145 This is #selfcare parody as the comedy of the
combover subject, another one of Berlant’s theorizations for how the crisis of sovereignty gets
performed through genres of aesthetic and affective expectations.146 The combover subject is
consumed by the “fantasy of self-ratifying control,” but still “[reveals] to the world some
consciousness of the fragility of [their] power” – a vulnerability that they aggressively strive to
conceal from others.147 Berlant calls this “humorlessness,” which is expressed through the rigid
insistence that one’s own version of a situation should rule all relational dynamics within it;
humorlessness becomes comic, Berlant says, when the spectator is pressed into affirming this
version of reality, “mixing the pleasure of encountering the awkward, slapstick, incongruous
experience of someone else’s pathos with the specter of a world-collapse that ropes the spectator
into it.”148 In “Self-Care for Men,” the narrator pushes “brands we men can use to feel strong,
healthy, and masculine” in order to insist that he has assembled himself as a “thing without
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holes,” as Berlant puts it; his humorless denial that any part of him is constituted as a lack – even
his pores! – stands in for the larger denial of the hole-y nature of psychic life.149
“We are all combover subjects” because one would have to fully opt out of liberal
personhood in order to escape the pressure to insist upon one’s own lack of a lack.150 For the
therapeutic subject, this is the double-bind that liberal feminism strains to manage through the
commodification of #selfcare. Self-care comedy reveals what makes this credible: the
categorization of cis-het womanhood as a pleasurable attention to one’s own feeling of lack or
insufficiency. When the humor has the flatness of caricature, as in the McSweeney’s and New
Yorker monologues, this figure is a cartoonish object of derision, as if in a Bakhtinian exercise of
parody as the carnivalesque, disrupting social hierarchies.151 The limitations of this critique align
with the limitations of the publications where they appear, which tend to be the mouthpieces of
the same liberal elite whom the parody targets. In this sense, the narrowness of this archive’s
interests – that is, its emphasis on the social media presence of white cis-het women, and its
erasure of #selfcare as an archive of queer and racialized modes of care –is not necessarily
because these pieces are launching trenchant critiques of white cis-heteronormativity, but rather
because their humor relies upon a version of womanhood that is foundational to common sense
about relationality and care.
Most of these texts invite us to laugh at the individuals who embody this version of
womanhood, rather than attend to the structures of power that push them into so humorless an
orientation towards their own well-being. But some also play with the abjection on the other side
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of this stance, where depression is the shadow of heroic vulnerability that it would disavow.
Ingrid, for example, is a film that, as part of the “picturesque-mental-illness genre,” has no idea
how to take psychic suffering seriously, and so vacillates between empathizing with the
profundity of Ingrid’s pain and spectacularizing it to comedic or melodramatic effect.152 Ingrid’s
obsession with influencers is a panacea for grief; before moving to L.A., Ingrid would scroll
through Taylor’s feed while sprawling on her late mother’s hospital bed, gathering dust in her
living room. But after she moves to L.A., the film shifts its attention from Ingrid’s loss to the
cringe comedy of the obsession alone, which leads her to seduce a friend, then manipulate him
into kidnapping Taylor’s brother. Eventually, all is exposed. “You are a very sad and pathetic
and sick person, and you need professional help,” Taylor says cuttingly; Ingrid reacts by
attempting suicide, which she live-streams on her Instagram stories – an action that
stratospherically increases her followers, which, to Ingrid, means that she has triumphed at
last.153
What launched this series of events was Ingrid’s belief that her treatment at a
rehabilitation center had cured her of her emotional instability. After violently crashing
Charlotte’s wedding, Ingrid had spent some time as an inpatient, where she did a few lotus poses
and claims to have “[learned] how to be present, to live in the moment.”154 The facility is
presented as comfortable, but plainly institutional, without the visual lushness of #selfcare
aesthetics; nevertheless, the culturally appropriative use of yoga and mindfulness discourse
signals its appeal to the #selfcare subject.155 #Selfcare, by affiliating care with a vaguely
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transcendent self, recasts it as cure: that is, as an ideology that orients the body-mind towards the
always-deferred horizon of the “normal” and “natural,” which produces difference as defect.156
What Ingrid actually needs is care in a mode that could acknowledge her depression and
accommodate her destabilizing pain; however, the performance of heroic vulnerability, both on
and off social media, forecloses the interdependence that would make this possible.
“Part of claiming disability is choosing this messy, imperfect work-in-progress called
interdependence,” Clare says.157 Though “White Western culture goes to extraordinary lengths to
deny…the utter reliance upon human upon human,” including conflating the need for care with a
“terrifying loss of privacy and dignity,” interdependent relationships are the source of all human
and nonhuman vitality: they literally make life possible.158 I am not suggesting that self-care
comedy, in satirizing heroic vulnerability, claims disability. Rather, it rehearses – and, as parody,
exaggerates – the collective “limits of our imagination” that devalue body-mind difference,
making it possible to sell wellness as a privilege of the non-disabled, and care as a solitary
practice of self-cultivation.159 The insufficiency of #selfcare relationality is clear, and yet, under
the conditions of the present, it remains difficult to resist; this tension, perhaps, is what makes
self-care so funny, over and above its conduciveness to comedy as a genre of the double-bind,
preoccupied with its own formal self-violation.
Lucy, the narrator of Melissa Broder’s novel The Pisces, believes that wellness boutiques
offer only the illusion of self-nurturance and care – but she patronizes them anyway, to distract
herself from her painful circumstances. “You could buy healing in a white jasmine pillar candle,”
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she says dryly. “…Capitalist magic.”160 Lucy is a doctoral candidate, stalled in her project about
feminine nothingness in Sappho’s work; her long-term depression seems to have inspired this
preoccupation with the void, and leads her to a series of self-injurious actions after her boyfriend
leaves her. Lucy accepts her sister Annika’s offer to recuperate at her home in gentrified Venice
Beach – a mansion paid for by Annika’s success as a wellness entrepreneur, selling
biodegradable yoga mats. In her group therapy for women in codependent relationships with
men, Lucy appraises her fellow clients as though they were another set of “New Age
tchotchkes”: that is, without mercy.161 “How had I ended up with these losers?” she asks herself.
“I hated the words they used: inner child, self-care, intimacy, self-love. We were Americans,
how much gentler could life be on us?”162 Lucy is not entirely wrong, though it is also clear that
much of her resentment emanates from her internalized misogyny. She spends each session
reflecting on why she finds each woman’s expressions of vulnerability so repulsive, and
resenting their advice that she practice self-care. “This seemed fucking annoying,” she says. “I
did not want to do any more connecting with myself. In fact I wanted to do less.”163
Lucy seeks intermittent relief from her pain through the distraction of dating apps. A
digital pessimist’s nightmare, Lucy uses Tinder to avoid the formation of “responsible forms of
relationality” online, as well as any sort of ethical orientation towards others; instead, she seeks
out unpleasant sexual encounters with callow men, in order to distract herself from the pain of
being alive.164 To prepare for each date, she returns to the boho-chic boutiques that sell the
trappings of #selfcare, more excited about the feminized rituals that precede the dates than the
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dates themselves. These scenes read as comic, not so much because they target the shallowness
of such rituals, but rather because those rituals work. “It was the velocity of buying something
that was the high, the potentiality of it” that Lucy seeks; buying an aromatherapy candle or
getting her hair dyed offers a brief flash of hope that “separated [her] from the flat expanse of the
rest of my life.”165
The humor lies in how #selfcare’s “hyper-individualist vision of psychic healing”
actually does alleviate the anxiety of late capitalism, albeit temporarily: the delusion is both
ridiculous and an end in itself.166 In a surreal turn, Lucy seems to be on the brink of escaping this
cycle when she falls in love with Theo, a young surfer who turns out to be an ancient merman.
Theo is gentle, sensitive, and abjectly worshipful of Lucy, to her delight (“Did it take a
mythological deformity to find a gorgeous abjectly man who was as needy as I was?”).167 Of
course, even a mythological version of cis-heteormasculinity cannot escape its tedious rubrics of
dominance and aggression, and it turns out that Theo’s greatest desire is for Lucy to consent to
letting him drown her in a final erotic climax. She refuses, but is tempted; drowning in his
embrace, she thinks, would be a plunge into annihilation that she finds seductive because, unlike
her depression, she would not experience it alone. Lucy experiences depression as a plunge into
antisociality that the promise of “therapeutic feminism” in the social media age cannot dispel –
and yet she finds herself pursuing its consolations, even though they are entailed upon an
impossible subject position.168 This position categorizes cis-het womanhood as a pleasurable
attention to one’s own pain, even – or especially – when the source of the pain is cisheteronormativity itself.
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The comedic archive that is the subject of this chapter does not acknowledge the actual
status of #selfcare as feminist praxis in the present, but rather indexes how it naturalizes cisheteronormativity and its “generational logics” of what psychic well-being looks like.169 It does
so by tracking a set of “clashing…affects” around how #selfcare is part of the “repackaging of
the psychological,” which has long been a form of compensatory power for women in the
U.S..170 The therapeutic culture of the U.S. has always already “[applauded] relationality as a
feminine attribute,” justifying women’s lack of political power with the claim that their true and
greater influence lies in managing emotions and relationships, which cis-heterosexual men
cannot competently navigate.171 “You know how sometimes you might think about your dad or
your son Carter and feel like your chest is tight and like you might cry?” says the narrator of
“Self-Care for Men.”172 “Those are just brain dookies, or ‘feelings,’ piling up in your chesttesticle, or ‘heart.’” Heroic vulnerability gets endlessly reproduced in the channels of social
media as a feminized attribute because it is immediately legible as such; in the reversals of
#selfcare comedy, heroic vulnerability gets transferred to the category of cis-het masculinity, and
– mortifyingly; awkwardly – collapses it.
For example, in Ingrid Goes West, the server at a health-conscious LA café cheerily asks
Ingrid, “What’s your biggest emotional wound?”173 When she looks taken aback, he explains
that this is their “question of the day,” pointing to a chalkboard that would ordinarily list a lunch
special. “Mine’s actually my relationship with my dad,” he says, a clarification that only
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intensifies the excruciating awkwardness of their encounter.174 The humorless comedy of the
scene pivots on a “confusion about what and where sovereignty is,” arising from a
“condisjuncture…where an ambition to be causal without interference meets a radical insecurity
about being lonely.”175 What we glimpse is the loneliness of a particular gender-sexed psyche,
where the articulation of psychological distress demonstrates the woman’s status as a flexible
subject and renders the man grotesque, grasping for intimacy on the wrong terms.
The flip side of therapeutic heteronormativity is the woman who feels alienated by the
affective relations of #selfcare, as in Broder’s comic essay, “Stop Pressuring Me to Take Care of
Myself.”176 Rather than parody the frivolity of wellness websites, Broder cites a list of fairly
pragmatic tips from them; the comedy lies in how bluntly she articulates why each one will
inevitably fail to improve her life, mocking her own failure to pull off the sociality of relational
individualism. “17. Call your mom just so say hi. / For me, self-care is about not calling my
mom…19. Get to know yourself intimately. / If I go any further inward, I’ll be in a coma.”177
Broder, a poet, novelist, and cultural critic, first gained Twitter fame through her dark,
epigrammatic observations @sosadtoday about depression and the coping mechanisms that are
laughably inadequate to her despair (“will this green juice distract me from the fact that I’m
going to die”).178 The same persona narrates “Stop Pressuring Me,” relentlessly rewriting each
cheery instruction for self-nurturance into a description of the abjection that renders such an
activity impossible. For tip #1, “Use a planner or calendar to intentionally schedule ‘me time,’”
Broder explains, “I’m a loner. Most of my life is ‘me time.’ If I get any more ‘me time,’ I will
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likely become feral and forget how to speak.”179 Mocking one’s own antisociality engenders
another kind of relationality, founded on a shared understanding of what’s so funny about feeling
illegible as an object of care.

Self-care is a problem, but only if we accept these terms of psychic legibility as the
frame for a “grievable life.”180 For Lorde, feeling illegible is not antithetical to wellness, as it is
for the liberal-political subject. Rather, she imagines a form of psychic well-being so capacious
that it contains the experience of what, in “The Crack and Composure of Words,” I have called
“psychic negation.” As I argue in that chapter, the multivalent form of The Cancer Journals, in
which the allusive, ruminative journal entries interrupt Lorde’s formal styles of composure,
practices the aesthetic of “language crazure.” In part, this means that the text traces the psychic
shattering that, for Lorde, is endemic to living with breast cancer as a “Black lesbian feminist
poet” in 1979, when most recovery plans advocated for reconstructive surgery in order to remain
attractive to men, and Lorde’s fear of mortal peril overlapped with the isolation of having no
models for surviving the crisis of illness from her particular subject position.181 But writing in the
mode of “language crazure” also means honoring the generative potential of breakage, where the
void of psychic negation is constitutive of the quotidian – as much so as the sociality of the
feminist community whose love and care sustain Lorde throughout her recovery. This reflects the
double-edged vulnerability of Lorde’s subject position, as one who, along with all others deemed
expendable by the machinations of global capitalism, “were never meant to survive. Not as
human beings.”182 Psychic well-being, from Lorde’s Black feminist perspective, entails living
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with the justified fear of that vulnerability and its attendant risks “of visibility, of the harsh light
of scrutiny and perhaps judgment, of pain, of death,” while finding creative ways to theorize it as
the grounds for being in community with others. 183
This is wellness that cannot double as an attribute of the flexible subject of late
capitalism; nor it is it compatible with the composure and self-possession that liberalism would
claim as evidence of feminist progress. For Lorde, to be “mentally healthy” means to be
imbricated with the pain of others, which is the only way to form collectives across the
differences of race, gender, sexuality, and disability.184 This is “vulnerability as a lived
experience and diagnostic tool,” Oliviero says, which “what we would now call queer women of
color feminists have long recognized.”185 From this perspective, intersectionality is a “theory in
the flesh,” as Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe Moraga write, where the “the physical realities of our
lives – our skin color, the land or concrete we grew up on, our sexual longings – all fuse to create
a politic born out of necessity.”186 In Lorde’s own “politic born out of necessity,” the physical
and psychic realities of breast cancer cannot be disarticulated from the effects of white
heteropatriarchy; not can her existence as a post-mastectomy woman be separated from her
multifarious identifications as “a black lesbian feminist mother lover poet.”187 This renders selfcare as a mode of resistance to “giving [oneself] over like a sacrificial offering to the furious
single-minded concentration upon cure,” cure being the ideology that forecloses uncertainty as
the grounds for flourishing.188 In enacting what Moya Bailey theorizes as a “Black feminist
disability framework,” Lorde foregrounds the materiality of the body, in order to fortify herself
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for the work of “believing, working for what has not yet been while living fully in the present
now.”189
The temporality of black feminist care is tethered to the body-mind’s future, but this
future does not take cure, where “medical intervention [returns] body-minds deemed abnormal to
their natural states of being,” as its horizon.190 Rather, the futurity of the “what has not yet been”
carries forward the vulnerabilities of the present into a world where they no longer signify one’s
susceptibility to injury, but still persist as a resource for the “capacity for joy” that Lorde calls
the erotic.191 Self-care as self-preservation enacts “what has not yet been” in isolated and solitary
moments, which are charged with the hope that this practice will become so ongoing that it will
appear less as an act, and more as a state of being. It is an “act of political warfare” because for
wellness to become the norm for minoritized body-minds, the institutionalized structures of
white supremacy will need to be torn down; in this context, it functions “as a preface
to…activism” (442).192 By contrast, when self-care enacts a double-bind for the liberal subject –
whether in the context of therapeutic culture, feminism, or social media – the futurity of black
feminist self-care falls away. This is what self-care comedy so often parodies: the heroically
vulnerable subject who dwells in the temporal loop of individualism, which the audience’s
laughter snaps “like an elastic band,” jolting us into the particularities of the present.193
When self-care comedy pulls off this performance, it invokes “feminist laughter” that can
“make something more real, to magnify it, and to reduce something’s power or hold over you,
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simultaneously.”194 Though Lorde’s work is not parodic, she does write with humor that skewers
patriarchal logics of care and self. For example, in The Cancer Journals, Lorde has a moment of
communion with her brother-in-law Henry’s sister, “Li’l Sister,” who had undergone a
mastectomy years before, when breast cancer had been even more taboo a subject. For the first
time, Li’l Sister speaks freely about “nurses, exercises… black women’s tendency to
keloid…prostheses,” at which point Henry grimaces and says, “Can’t y’all talk about something
else now? Ya kinda upsettin’ my stomach.”195 Lorde dryly notes the women’s deadpan response:
“Li’l Sister and I just looked at him for a moment, and then returned to our conversation.”196
What is there to do but ignore a man’s squeamishness at Black women’s survival strategies, and
to laugh, perhaps, at his frank expression of disgust at how their enfleshed politics must dispatch
fantasies of their invulnerability, whether as caretakers or objects of desire that require nothing –
that is to say, to laugh at the relief of “captur[ing] with words a logic that is often reproduced by
not being put into words”?197 In the hospital, when another post-mastectomy patient had tried to
cheer Lorde up, she mentioned that her adult children want her to come home; Lorde tells the
reader, in a wry aside, “I knew immediately they must be sons.”198 To poke fun at the individual
who is unschooled in care as a mode of interdependence, who is so deeply acculturated to the
idea of women as natural caretakers that they cannot also apprehend women’s vulnerability, is to
unsettle that subject’s position as normative. Feminist laughter gestures towards a future where it
is not so.
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What’s so funny about self-care? Those moments when the gaps between our world and
the one to come appear more absurd than tragic, leaving room to laugh at the inadequacy of what
gets summoned to serve as a substitute for living well: the kale smoothie; the skin cream; the
bowl of spiralized vegetables, cradled by a half-naked woman. These objects glow in an
Instagram feed with the promise of something more than what the precarious present can
provide, beyond the categorization of cis-het womanhood as a pleasurable attention to pain, and
the accompanying disavowals of queerness, racialization, and disability that fuel its circulation as
#selfcare. Of course, such rituals or indulgences do not qualify as feminist just because they are
marketed as psychologically beneficial; and yet, to insist that they are by performing heroic
vulnerability – perhaps drawing on the lexicon of black feminist politics to do so – does seem,
however fleetingly, to resolve the impossible demands placed on the individual who wants to
feel well. Self-care comedy reveals the irreconcilable realities of a therapeutic double-bind:
namely, how psychic well-being gets claimed as the spoils of liberal feminism, which, in turn,
gets enlisted in “neoliberalism’s erasure of the connections between the violence of the past and
those of the present.”199 The problem with self-care is that most of us could really use it, but
when we seek it as a place of refuge from the pain of others, we end up all alone.
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Chapter 3. Autotheorizing the DSM

“I am performing the role of a panicky woman,” says Jackie Orr in Panic Diaries: A
Genealogy of Panic Disorder, an interdisciplinary study of panic – panic as individual terror and
collective paranoia; as medicalized symptom and technosocial construction – and its effects as a
technology of psychosocial regulation in the twentieth-century United States.1 “[I am] trying to
get access, as a participant observer, to the sick role as it plays out in the social and psychic
fields of a corporate-sponsored clinical drug trial.”2 This is how Orr describes the experience of
being interviewed at the Anxiety Research Unit at Massachusetts General Hospital, where she
had volunteered for the Upjohn Company’s research study comparing the effects of alprazolam
(Xanax) to that of imipramine (Tofranil) and a placebo. In order to qualify for the trial, Orr tells
us, she could not disclose to her interviewer, “Dr. M.,” that she planned to participate as an
undercover sociologist – conducting research for the chapter, “Panic Xanax,” in which this
anecdote appears.
“Panic Xanax” tells the story of UpJohn’s global promotions of Xanax as a treatment for
panic disorder, a diagnosis that, according to Orr, was partially constructed after the drug’s
formulation, in order to reverse-engineer a condition that Xanax could treat.3 This taxonomic
method would influence the concurrent publication of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of
Mental Disorders III, a field-defining revision that removed the DSM-II’s theoretical
explanations for the workings of the psyche, and replaced them with the systematized definitions
that would comprise the DSM-IV and DSM-5, as well.4 Orr, volunteering to participate in the
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UpJohn trial over a decade later, intends to use her personal narrative as a point of entry into this
history of psychiatry’s medicalization, as articulated through literary genre. That is, she writes
through and about her own interpellation into medical protocols, particularly those shaped by
DSM’s restructuring from a collection of narrative-based theories to what is now essentially a
giant index, “designed to dovetail with the daily concerns of the business of medicine.”5 But
first, Orr must convince Dr. M of her eligibility for the trial, which requires her to pretend to be
actively suffering from panic attacks – even though, in reality, she had been successfully
managing their symptoms for two years, following a diagnosis of panic disorder. In this sense, it
is a straightforward statement of fact that Orr’s interview was a performance, in which she
artfully recounted her own prior episodes of insomnia, anxiety, and dizzy spells as if they
remained omnipresent in her daily life.
But the present continuous tense (“I am performing”) signals that Orr is doing more than
recounting her past subterfuge – that is, her impersonation of a patient and concealment of her
status as a scholar of psychiatric discourse, for whom the Upjohn clinical questionnaire doubled
as an object of study. When Orr tells us that “Inside every pill there’s a story, and I’m here to try
to imagine how best to tell this one,” she also draws our attention to the performative mode of
Panic Diaries itself, which I understand to be a work of autotheory – a genre that, in combining
the “two highly embattled terms” of autobiography and theory, resists categorization as either
memoir or scholarship.6 The uptick of critical interest in autotheory postdates the 2015
publication of Maggie Nelson’s The Argonauts and often takes Nelson’s hybrid “antiautobiography” – in which Nelson rewrites the traditional marriage plot, conjoining a narrative
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about her experience with “sodomitical maternity” and her spouse’s medical transition with
philosophical meditations on art criticism and critical theory – as “the genre’s north star.”7 But
more recent lines of thinking aim to look beyond The Argonauts as an exemplar of the genre,
including Nelson herself, who has emphasized that she did not invent this mode of textual
performance or even the term “autotheory,” which, as she says in an interview with Micha
McCrary, “I flat out stole…from Paul Preciado’s amazing Testo Junkie.”8 Both books, as Robyn
Wiegman notes, explore “gender’s queer compositions” and often appear together in critical
conversations that tie autotheory’s genealogy to transgender studies, given their mutual
investments in “modes of address [that] rupture” generic and disciplinary norms.9 At the same
time, in their radically different approaches to the relation between autobiographical writing and
academic criticism, Nelson and Preciado’s writings also demonstrate the necessity of examining
the autotheoretical impulse beyond the “standardizing taxonomy of a new genre,” and of
considering how it travels outside the texts that are frequently cited as its paradigms.10
Because this chapter explores autotheory as a mode of writing against the disciplinary
force of the DSM – and, more specifically, as a means of claiming authorial agency by writing
about the gendered and racialized dimensions of lived experience that elude the DSM’s
diagnostic codes – I follow the example of critics who have framed autotheory as a continuation
of “second wave feminism’s commitment to putting ‘flesh’ on the universalist pretensions of
established theoretical traditions.”11 Lauren Fournier identifies autotheory as a practice that,
although it currently “foreground[s] criticality alongside the personal in ways that are being
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received as new,” belongs to the genealogy of Western feminist performance and conceptual art
from the 1960s onward, which makes use of the artist’s body as a medium for intervening in the
representational politics of gender, sexuality, and race.12 As such, autotheory has proved
especially useful for artists, writers and scholars engaged with the insights of queer feminist
affect theory, particularly those centered on illness, trauma, and the delegitimization of gendered
pain.13 In asking how literary form and genre bring feminist concerns to bear on this conceptual
terrain, this chapter extends the concerns of the previous one, “What’s So Funny about SelfCare?”, which examines how self-care comedy mocks a version of wellness that circulates via a
“grammable” aesthetic of white heterosexual domesticity, and that exploits women’s
vulnerability as a cover for its corruption of radical feminist politics. The question of how
autotheory, as a multifarious, genre-bending form, might rewrite the relation between feminist
subjectivity and psychic pain resonates with this dissertation’s first chapter, as well – though
“The Crack and Composure of Words” is primarily interested in how Lorde rewrites the
conventions of memoir, in order to represent the writing process as a space for imagining
wellness as a Black feminist praxis.
In attending to autotheory as a feminist aesthetic practice in which “one’s embodied
experiences become the material through which one theorizes and…theory becomes the
discourse through which one’s lived experience is refracted,” this chapter continues to explore
how breaking the “affective contract” of genre can afford opportunities for critiquing hegemonic
ideals of health and wellness.14 “Autotheorizing the DSM” does so by identifying the diagnostic
logics that are often embedded in critical or aesthetic judgments about what constitutes good
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writing, or to what genre that writing belongs. “Panic Xanax,” for example, moves with anarchic
energy between the autobiographical and the theoretical as it explores Orr’s own interpellation
into the “technosocial construction” of panic, which, Orr suggests, is best understand as an
iteration of the gender-sexed category of the hysteric. As such, the text swerves between the
institutional histories embedded within the DSM’s diagnostic criteria and the passages from Orr’s
“panic diaries” about her participation in the UpJohn study, which often shift into dreamlike
evocations of the hallucinatory or alienating effects of panic (“This hurts. I awake barely slept
and search for a place in the waking noise and sleepy rush to connect with feeling for you –
crash”).15 Autotheory, as a form of life writing – that is, as a performative narrative invested in
“enacting or constructing the life” through the act of writing, rather than in describing that life’s
a priori existence – permits Orr to write from within the “epistemological dizziness and
ontological trembling” of the DSM-III’s methodology, dramatizing how it feels to be made into
its subject.16
In this chapter, I ask how this autotheoretical approach can create a “counter-discourse”
to diagnostic logics, especially those that disallow mental disability, distress, or madness as the
grounds for autobiographical writing.17 Of course, madness has nearly always been associated
with literary genius in the Western literary tradition, with some scholars tracing this tendency
back to the classical Greek tradition that imagined possession as divine inspiration and poets as
seers.18 Perhaps the most persistent of these figurations has been the Romantic ideal of the mad
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poet who struggles against the conformity of sanity, which has arguably shaped the
postmodernist literary trope of imitating schizophrenia in prose – or, rather, the fragmentary,
chaotic patterns of thought that are popularly misrepresented as schizophrenic, through what
Elizabeth Donaldson has identified as “the psychiatric gaze.”19 But the genre of twentieth and
twenty-first century disability memoir, often circulated as a kind of reportage from the front lines
of subalternity, has a history of pathologizing disability in a different key: namely, in the liberalindividualist mode of “reif[ying] the dominant script of disability as an individual tragedy (and
potential source of triumph when ‘overcome’).”20 Margaret Price observes that, although
“resistant theories of autobiography” are a growing field in disability studies, they have not yet
extensively examined memoirs of mental disability – and, when they have, they have often
focused on canonical writers who are “(conventionally) articulate,” and whose narrative
authority rests on the rationality and coherence of their prose, which marks them as exceptional
among mad or unwell subjects.21 For Price, the transgressive power of autobiography about
mental disability and distress lies elsewhere, in texts that “refigur[e] the rational” itself and so
resist their own appropriation into narratives that shore up conventional dynamics of power.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I read Lorde’s dream of “language crazure” as a
metaphor for the writer who “refigur[es] the rational,” though not towards DSM autotheory’s
purpose of performing a narrative of mental disability and difference that eludes the “psychiatric
gaze.”22 In her telling of the dream, Lorde regards herself as split into multiple subjects: the
seasoned student, deeply engaged with the work of “giving a name” to her linguistic materials;
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the new student, exhilarated to begin this work for the first time; and the “shadowy teacher”
whose role is to show Lorde “how to change [her] whole life.”23 This third and final chapter,
“Autotheorizing the DSM,” focuses on two texts that take up this interest in authorship as an
attachment to anti-coherence, explored and expressed through form: Orr’s “Panic Xanax” and Eli
Clare’s Brilliant Imperfection: Grappling with Cure, a hybrid text of memoir, critical analysis,
and prose poetry that pursues the ideology of cure through its contradictory configurations. From
his own standpoint as a disability justice activist, Clare recognizes how ableism produces
personhood as an instrument of domination, weaponized against humans, animals, and the
habitats they share: “We treat so many body-minds as if they matter only in service to our
own.”24 The work of writing this book, Clare tells us, required him to “[sift] through [his] own
experiences with the DSM’s codes of “mental retardation, cerebral palsy, schizophrenia, and
gender identity disorder,” which continually led him back to the irreducible tension between
cure’s promises to “follow the lead of our body-mind yearnings” and cure’s violent attachments
to the eradication of difference.25 Though Orr’s and Clare’s texts are stylistically dissimilar and
demonstrate very different stances towards the politics of mental disability and illness, I read
them both as DSM autotheory, texts that (1) conjoin life-writing with a “more ‘distanced’
criticality” towards the experience of psychiatric diagnosis; and (2) direct the genre’s selfreflexivity towards the act of writing this experience, through the use of what I call counterdiagnostic metaphor.26
I refer directly here to Margaret Price’s notion of the “counter-diagnostic move,” a
defining feature of autobiographical narratives that “rebel against familiar scripts of disability as
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an individualized, medicalized phenomenon and instead engage in acts of resistance against
oppressive discourses.”27 While resistant theories of autobiography have grown increasingly
prominent in the field of disability studies, they have, Price says, largely overlooked mental
disabilities; to address this gap requires “refigur[ing] key assumptions of autobiographical
discourse, including rationality, coherence, truth, and independence.”28 In Price’s theorization,
the counter-diagnostic text contests psychiatric diagnosis as “the undermining of cognitive and
epistemic authority,” as Merri Lisa Johnson puts it, but does not protest this marginalization on
its own terms.29 Instead, the narrator “claim[s] authority not in spite of, but through and because
of, their mental disabilities,” using language to “subvert the diagnostic urge to ‘explain’ an
irrational mind.”30 Price reads the transgressive use of pronouns as one such counter-diagnostic
move, where the incoherence of the narrating “I” is strategic: a mode of resisting the medicalized
notion of accuracy that, in conventional disability autobiography, places body-mind difference
“on display to be consumed.”31
My own interest lies in autotheory’s potential to “subvert the diagnostic urge” through a
metatextual attention to its own form – specifically, through metaphor about writing psychiatric
diagnosis as a “performative feminist practice.”32 The recent burst of critical attention to
autotheory has chronicled how the term sometimes serves as a catchall for any autobiographical
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writing with the sheen of the avant-garde. This raises the question of its actual distinctiveness
from “life writing” or “personal criticism,” Nancy K. Miller’s term for a range of critical writing
practices that entail “a deliberate move toward self-figuration.”33 In many aspects, both terms do
aptly describe Orr and Clare’s approaches to writing from within and against the disciplinary
force of psychiatric diagnosis, particularly since, for Miller, “personal criticism” reveals the
personal to be theory’s material, and moves across institutionalized hierarchies to create new
forms of critical fluency.34 What I find useful about “autotheory” is its additional association
with collage-like or fragmentary prose forms, where the “narrative desire takes shape in episodic
terms” as a “performative assemblage,” rather than “as a commitment to a knowing
destination.”35 The counter-diagnostic move of reworking the principles of rationality is built
into this anti-teleological structure.
In this chapter, I focus on how each text enacts this move through a central metaphor:
Orr’s ekphrastic descriptions of a Joan Miró painting in the lobby of Mass General, which invoke
the turbulent process of writing her “panic diary” entries; and the mosaic that Clare finds on a
community center facade in Chicago, which he presents as a metaphor for how he assembled the
“fragments and slivers that make up” Brilliant Imperfection.36 I suggest that these metaphors, by
referencing the genre-bending contexts in which they appear, resist common sense about
academic and creative writing paradigms as formalizations of the liberal subject’s mind at work.
Instead, they aestheticize the experience of subjectivity as a fractal state of being, which eludes
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summary at the moment one tries to write it, and is therefore inapprehensible by the “predictive
power” of the DSM’s diagnostic categories.37
“Every place I began turned into a hundred new beginnings,” says Clare, as he explains
why he feels compelled to describe his book as a mosaic, its unpredictable patterns proliferating
beyond his authorial control. In “Introduction: Writing a Mosaic,” he explained that his original
plan for the book had been a tightly organized set of essays about cure, a “simple, well-laid-out
collage.”38 Instead, he would spend over a decade working across genre, writing “prose poems,
diatribes, provocations, personal stories,” to craft something that exceeds even the dynamism of
“collage’s” heterogeneous elements – a “swirling, multibranched pattern of histories, ideas, and
feelings.”39 In Clare’s telling, the nature of the subject matter dictated this process in ways that
he could not predict, disabusing him of the notion that he could exert authorial control over the
material and corral it into a streamlined form. Instead, its fragmentary form “came to [him],”
“took shape,” and “emerged” as he began to apprehend the staggering scope of how cure, as the
ideology that makes diagnosis legible, exerts its disciplinary force along axes of race, gender,
sexuality, and, of course, disability:
…[cure] kept appearing in less obvious places: ex-gay conversion therapy, weight loss
surgery, and skin lightening creams marketed to dark-skinned women of color. I heard its
echo in ads for products claiming to remove women’s facial hair and felt its
reverberations in the medical technology some transgender people use to reshape our
gendered and sexed body-minds.40
Cure’s influence, Clare suggests, extends far beyond the walls of the medical institution, such
that it not only structures discourses of pathologization, but also cannot be disarticulated from
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those that affirm difference. He confronts it not only in his “fury about eugenic practices” and
“the destruction of the tallgrass prairie,” but also in his interactions with disability activists who
“challenged [his] fierce anti-cure politics” and pushed him to acknowledge the irresolvable
contradictions of cure’s ties to healing or life-saving therapies.41
To write an account of cure therefore requires creating an intersectional framework,
where any individual’s story about disability or chronic illness not only traces its imbrication
with countless others, but also accounts for how mutually constitutive oppressions have shaped
their trajectories differently. The text needs to be able to acknowledge the multifarious
orientations of each example – as in the above passage, where Clare simultaneously encounters
cure as a technology for the remediation of defects that are only perceived as such within antiqueer, fatphobic, and misogynoir worldviews, and as a tool for transgender people access to the
embodied experiences that they desire. It demands a form that can sustain this tension between
cure’s therapeutic properties and its weaponization, as in the many archival histories of
hospitalization, incarceration, and medical discrimination that Clare records throughout the book.
It requires him to write a mosaic, a metaphor that compares prose to a fine arts form that is both
visual and sculptural, and that Clare renders in italicized, indented paragraphs that, like the
mosaic’s shards, interrupt his narrative account with glimpses of multisensory, cross-generic
encounters.42
The introduction, “Writing a Mosaic,” emphasizes the arbitrariness of such encounters:
Clare is “meandering” through a neighborhood that he declines to name, mentioning only that it
is “working-class,” when he “happen[s] upon'' the mosaic by an unnamed artist, splayed across a

41
42

Ibid., xv.
Ibid., xv-xxi.

129

community center’s wall.43 The moment resonates with Brilliant Imperfection’s ethos as a whole,
not only in underscoring Clare’s investments in outsider art and the marginalized perspectives
that inform it, but also in its embrace of happenstance. Sara Ahmed suggests that happenstance
presents an openness to possibility that does not adhere to the future-oriented temporality of
happiness; instead, it embraces, in Jean-Luc Nancy’s description, the choice to abstain from
seeking mastery over “the fractual combinatory of events that make up the world.”44 This logic
pervades Clare’s method for assembling archival materials and personal histories, a method that
subverts the future-oriented timeline of cure – which, like Ahmed’s formulation of happiness, is
aligned with the sexist, heteronormative ideals of reproductive futurism, and casts disability as a
failure to embody them.45 Instead, Clare crafts an alinear web of stories about the vitality and
complexity of body-mind difference. For example, the text moves from a rant about the
documentary Christopher Reeve: Hope in Motion as pro-cure propaganda, in which Clare
unpacks the cruelties of ableism’s intersections with white entitlement; to a recollection of when
Clare, as a visiting activist-writer, was ranting about the same film at a podium and happens to
glimpse his friend P. in the audience, whose story about undergoing surgery, chemo, and
radiation for cancer quells Clare’s desire to rant about cure at all – an internal contradiction that
remains productively unresolved.
Of course, this performance of happenstance is itself a fiction, and Clare does not deny
his ethical responsibility as the author who orchestrates it on the page. But in its rich variegation
that resists reduction to a single image or design, the mosaic serves as a metaphor for the process
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of writing a book that, though profoundly personal, enacts an intersectional orientation by
resisting the privileging of any singular theory, and instead traces the knowledge formations
founded upon “collective understandings and stubborn survivals” that persist despite the
contradictory workings of power.46 The riotous colors of the mosaic, Clare says, “catch [him];
purple, lavender, yellow, orange dance together”; true to the book’s aesthetic valuation of bodymind difference, Clare does not prioritize its visual pleasures, but rather moves closer to
appreciate its many textures, “smooth, jagged, rounded, reflective…no two pieces the same size
and shape.” Moving closer, he can “trail [his] fingers along the mosaic, feeling bumps and
ridges”; when he steps back to view it from the curb, he notices a “woman’s face, a boy in a
handstand, feet akimbo,” which suggests that the mosaic might be a work of representational art.
But Clare refrains from further summary of its composition, modeling the purpose of this
introduction: not to outline the organizing principles of his book about cure, as is the convention
for scholarly monographs that engage, as his project does, the insights of disability studies,
critical race theory, gender and sexuality studies, and environmental justice studies. Instead, the
opening metaphor communicates how the book’s exigency lies, in part, in the “fractured
wholeness” of its own form.47
It is this “fractured wholeness” that ties together Orr’s and Clare’s texts, making them
legible as autotheory: that is, as texts that break down the distinction between theoretical and
personal writing, via the “I” that self-reflexively observes its own movements between these
genres. Joan Retallack’s notion of a “poetics of the swerve'' offers an apt description of this
autotheoretical impulse, which Retallack associates with a certain kind of essay – “neither poetry
nor philosophy but a mix of logics, dialogics, intuition, revulsion, wonder,” which, in her
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transhistorical archive, includes the work of Epicurus, Montaigne, John Cage, and Gertrude
Stein.48 The poetics of the swerve performs “the constancy of the unexpected – source of terror,
humor, hope,” as part of its “constructive preoccupation with unpredictable forms of change” –
an exigent mode of thinking through the interrelatedness of cultures in the age of globalization.49
To understand political or cultural agency in the present, Retallack argues, requires looking
beyond simplistic relations of cause and effect, and developing new “geometries of attention”
modeled on the “fractal geometry of coastlines, with their ecologically dynamic, infinite
detail.”50
A fractal is a curve or a figure, mathematically conceived such that “any small part of it,
enlarged, has the same statistical character as the original”; it characterizes many patterns in
natural formations that appear, at first glance, irregular.51 A complex, ongoing negotiation
between regularity and chance, the fractal unfolds according to its own internal principles, while
departing from them with the lawlessness of something alive. Retallack repeatedly returns to the
fractal structure of the coastline, not precisely as an analogy for a literary performance, but rather
as a model of the principles that produce both: the coastline, as a “site of mutually transformative
exchange between different kinds of complex dynamical systems,” operates much like language
“as it exists in the active mediation between neural network and world ecosystems.” 52 The
Poethical Wager is not a neurohumanities project, but this passing reference to a neural network
is significant nonetheless: Retallack is interested in how the mind meets the text in an unstable
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zone of encounter, composing a fractal system where the reader’s “own imagination cognition”
is another one of the “scalar repetitions and variations” that constitute a work of art.53
The social construction of “imagination cognition” itself is an object of interest for DSM
autotheory, which attends to how diagnosis shapes internal and external perceptions of the
mind’s capabilities, while performing how disidentifying with diagnosis can be the grounds for
creativity. “Later, she writes it all down,” says Orr, referring to herself from the alienation of the
third person; this follows an interview with Dr. M. that had sought to categorize her “baseline
experience” of panic, which seems to have discomposed Orr in both the personal and literary
sense. “…What she wore, what he wore, the color of her blood, the contents of her dreams.”54
Orr then leafs through the DSM-III on the research assistant’s desk and, after reading the entry
for histrionic personality disorder, which associates the individual’s penchant for the dramatic
with a disinterest in intellectual achievement, she adds a resistant postscript: “Carefully,
dramatically, she writes it all down, recording the entangled textures of her field.”55 As a selfreflexive genre, DSM autotheory attends less to the reader’s imaginative cognition than the
writer’s, which it deliberately, theatrically performs as a fractal – that is, as a “complex, patternbounded, noncompressible, non-paraphraseable unpredictability,” which resists the DSM’s
reduction of subjectivity to a set of rigidly predictable narratives.56 By reading DSM autotheory’s
structure as fractal, I suggest that, in its examinations of the writer’s mind’s interactions with
their own text, it remains committed to the fragment – the image that recurs throughout
scholarship about autotheory as a genre that is distinct from life writing or personal criticism.57
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As an irregular, but self-replicating entity, the fractal also invokes the generative force of
the text’s non-linearity, which is key when writing about (mental) disability: to refer to such a
text only as “fragmentary” risks the implication that its ethos is a broken one, failing to sustain a
complete thought. But if we approach, for example, Clare’s mosaic as a metaphor for the fractal
form of Brilliant Imperfection, a “swirling, multibranch pattern of histories, ideas, and feeling”
that takes him “somewhere [he] never envisioned” – the project’s own internal forces
determining how it unfolds, as Clare chronicles the multiple trajectories it requires – we might
better understand how that form allows him to refigure brokenness itself.58
“All my life, I’ve rebelled against the endless assumptions that my body-mind is broken.
I’ve resisted,” Clare tells us. “I’ve ranted” against the ideology of cure that devalues disabled and
injured body-minds, casting them as the weak, vulnerable others to an impregnable wholeness.59
“Occasionally, I’ve tried redefining wholeness to include that which is collapsed, crushed, or
shattered…But however much I refuse and, in those refusals, tell an important truth, I also have
to say: I am also profoundly broken.” 60 This declaration is woven into a passage subtitled
“Feeling Broken,” which looks like a mosaic of fractal patterns on the page, the shards of text
separated by white space and marked, like Retallack’s coastline, by undulations both rhythmic
and irregular. As if lapped by waves, the text alternates between left-justified reflections on the
violent effects of childhood sexual abuse on Clare’s adult life (“I could quibble over words and
call myself damaged. But the starker, blunter broken calls to me”); indented, italicized claims
about how the ideology of cure erases the realities of trauma (“Cure promises wholeness even as
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the world pokes and prods, reverberating beneath our skin, a broken world given rise to broken
selves”); and a right-justified account of Clare’s evocative dream about examining a pottery
bowl, once shattered and now “pieced back together,” so that light filters through its cracks.61
These passages vary in length, rippling across the page in a pattern that is not repetitive, but
recognizably recursive. They enact what the counter-diagnostic metaphor of the mosaic
promises: a literary account of diagnosis that attends to the shard of experience in itself, refusing
to assimilate it into a more coherent composition that could erase the complex, contradictory
ways of “knowing, understanding, and living with disability and chronic illness” that are “rooted
in the nonnegotiable value of body-mind difference.”62 This is what Clare calls “brilliant
imperfection,” which, in the mosaic, “swirl[s] between [his] words,” at times as a “river of deep
red,” at others as the “spirals and stars, concentric circles of blue” that only appear when he steps
back to the curb and “[his] angle changed.”63 Within this “new geometry of attention,” to riff on
Retallack’s phrasing, Clare can observe the proliferating, morphing patterns that exceed the
binaries of normal and abnormal; natural and unnatural; whole and broken.64
“…I’m curious,” Clare says. “…what might happen if were to accept, claim, embrace
our brokenness?”65 The difficulty with doing so lies, in part, with the medical industrial
complex’s warped binary of binary and “fixed,” which, Clare suggests, is why many disabled
children are subjected to dozens of non-consensual surgeries meant to remove signs of physical
difference, with little thought given to the potential consequences of painful or chronic
complications.66 Clare recounts narrowly escaping this fate himself after a childhood diagnosis
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of cerebral palsy, for the perverse reason that his working-class parents could not afford regular
health care.67 Compounding the difficulty of “claim[ing]…brokenness,” he says, is the
pervasiveness of shame, a feeling of “inconsolable wrongness.”68 Despite lessons learned from
anti-racist, queer and trans, and disability movements that have “claimed self-love as an act of
resistance,” this shame is so entrenched in Western culture’s affective economies that it is
intensely difficult, if not impossible, to unlearn.69
Though Clare alludes to his personal history of such activism, in Brilliant Imperfection,
he also turns to literary modes of unlearning shame: by aestheticizing what gets stigmatized as
“brokenness” and casting it as a generative force. With musicality and verve, he catalogues “our
tics, tremors, stutters, seizures, knots, scars, pain, quirks” and, in a tone of robust appreciation,
honors “missing teeth and the smarts that stretch food stamps to the end of the month…big
bellies and wide hips…the flash of hands signing American Sign Language and typing on
assistive communication devices… dark skin and kinky hair.”70 In the sub-section “Survival
Notes,” Clare references his own earlier account of hearing voices and struggling with suicidal
ideations (“Feeling Broken”), but shifts to address himself in the second person, composing a todo list for living that has the cadence of prose poetry:
When the voices start roaring in my head, flashbacks thundering, self splitting from self,
let me remember to eat miso spread thick on whole-wheat toast. Sit with my dog on the
kitchen floor at three in the morning…Listen to my feet, literally listen to heels tapping
concrete, crunching gravel.71
As Clare tenderly offers himself reminders for how to tether himself to the world, he makes no
claims towards how he will combat or eradicate the voices themselves: they are one of the
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conditions of his existence, a presence he will occasionally need to “[ride]…out until they no
longer grip me.”72 Instead, he promises that when they do recur, he will “Remember to make
deals with friends: agree not to wander, not to horde alcohol and muscle relaxants…Agree to
stay alive.”73 For Clare, such acknowledgments of vulnerability make interdependence
conceivable as a life-affirming force, which sustains ecosystems and human communities alike –
especially in the case of disability justice-oriented communities.74 Or at least it sustains such
communities when the participants can dispatch with the white Western cultural norms that cast
relying on others as “a terrifying loss of privacy and dignity,” rather than as a source of vitality
for all living things.75
At the same time, Clare staunchly refuses to idealize feelings of brokenness, or to claim
that with sufficient accommodation, their painful effects would disappear. “Don’t be fooled,”
Clare tells us, after relating how, as a child, he survived “unspeakable” torture by a “cell of
perpetrators,” which included his father, in the woods near his home: by dissociating enough to
observe the shattering of his body-mind, and fantasizing that his sense of self could travel into
the trees, the rocks, the Milk way. “[It] wasn’t beautiful, even as I spin pretty images. I simply
stayed alive.”76 Within the textual mosaic of “Feeling Broken”, the aestheticization of traumatic
injury is neither redemptive nor recuperative, though it does occasionally illuminate moments of
pleasure that persist alongside its effects – like the light that shines through the “intricate
patterns” of the bowl in his dream, “a spider web of fractures, cracks, seams.”77 What writing in
this autotheroetical mode offers Clare is a form that allows him to trace his own fluctuating
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relationship to the “irrevocable fracturing” of abuse over time, which oscillates between
gratitude that the “triggers and hallucinations don’t grab me in their vice grip nearly as often as
they used to” and awareness that the “voices will again scream in my head…commanding me to
kill myself, self-loathing carved into my synapses.”78 When untethered from the promise of cure,
the narrative of psychic distress takes on a counter-diagnostic function: not to explain, predict, or
display body-mind difference, but rather to shape itself around the constant, dynamic state of
change that actually constitutes the body-mind’s interactions with the world.
As part of a project that autotheorizes the DSM, Clare’s meditations on brokenness use
this fractal form to “[foreground] criticality alongside the personal”: his experiences of hearing
voices – which, he tells us, brought him close to a diagnosis of schizophrenia – unfold alongside
his critical analysis of the hegemony of “intelligence” as a marker of personhood, analysis that
cites disability studies scholarship about the DSM as a technology of regulation.79 This is
consistent with how Clare’s text “instantiate[s] the theory” that it takes up, particularly its
reenactments of archival histories.80 In “Carrie Buck I: Yearning,” Clare writes in a fictive
autobiographical mode, inspired by a photograph of Carrie Buck that he unearths in the
University of Albany’s Eugenics archive.81 The Supreme Court ruled against Buck in 1927 (Buck
v. Bell), upholding the Sterilization Act that had sanctioned her incarceration and forced
sterilization at the State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded in Lynchburg, Virginia. Clare,
out of his longing for a “history that leans into Carrie’s voice,” ventriloquizes her on the page,
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imagining “how she might tell this story,” down to the Southern regionalisms; her voice, he says,
“reaches [him] steady, blunt, unwavering.”82
Clare narrates Buck’s fury and grief at her mother’s institutionalization, her sister’s, and
her own, which was a direct consequence of her foster parents’ nephew having raped and
impregnated her: “Anyway, when I was locked up, my baby girl had just been born. Vivian was
her name…That damn place. Food was bad, beds worse…If I never scrub another fifty-gallon
kettle, ladle out rancid broth, it’ll be too soon.”83 Shifting back to his own authorial voice, Clare
imagines the eugenists who built a case against Carrie’s family “nodding and smiling” as they
waited for the Supreme Court to legalize the state-mandated sterilization of “feebleminded”
women – at that time, a diagnosis used to violently strip working-class and women of color of
reproductive autonomy, as well as to protect rapists by incarcerating their victims.84 By
narrativizing the virulent cruelty of Buck’s abuse, the passage invokes Clare’s theorization of
psychiatric diagnosis across the entire text – a theorization that is aligned with the work of “antiDSM feminists,” as Johnson refers to them, whose scholarship frames the history and practice of
psychiatry as a disciplinary regime of pathologization.85 Through his invention of Carrie’s
autobiographical reflections, Clare conjures the affective world of this regime, in which medical
discourse perpetuates the intergenerational traumas of white patriarchy.
At the same time, Clare continually reminds us of the ambivalence that characterizes his
thinking about psychiatric diagnosis, even as he rages against the medical model that codifies
mental difference as symptoms. This model, Clare argues, upholds “intelligence” as a marker of
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personhood, which permits the dehumanization of marginalized people as “stupid” or “crazy,”
and serves as an instrument of ableism, racism, sexism, classism, homophobia, and
xenophobia.86 At the same time, he recognizes that, under the current conditions of the U.S.
healthcare system, the DSM’s taxonomy grants access to life-saving or life-affirming resources.
In Clare’s case, that includes his experience of seeking out the hormone replacement therapies
and chest replacement surgery that satisfied his “unshakeable desire” to transition.87 Resignedly,
Clare acknowledges that it is nearly impossible to opt out of the DSM’s hegemony, particularly if
one is invested in alleviating the suffering of others in the short term. He cites, for example, the
influence of trans activists on the working groups who created the DSM-V, and the success of
their campaign to replace Gender Identity Disorder, which pathologized transness and implicitly
linked it to sexual predation, with Gender Dysphoria, which focuses on individuals whose gender
identity causes them distress.88 But even as Clare acknowledges value of this work, he also
declares that for trans activists to “resist the pathology foisted on us” is insufficient, that he
“want[s] us to reach farther: to imagine dismantling the DSM itself, discarding the concepts of
disorder and defect, and developing other ways of accessing medical technology beyond white
Western diagnosis.”89 The DSM is “made up,” Clare says, as fictive as the definitions of
personhood that dehumanize any departure from the normative.90 As a result, it licenses, as he
suggests in another fractal passage (“Great Turmoil”) the brutalization of nonhuman lives: the
use of pigs to study the impact of radiation on human skin, or the eradication of rivers and forests
in the service of industrialization.91
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The self-reflexive quality of autotheory flags not only its own status as a performance,
but also that of its own objects of study; for Clare, this offers a way to foreground the literariness
of the DSM as a text to be read, rather than the crystallization of an ontological truth. Autotheory,
Kyle Frisina argues, not only exemplifies the feminist claim that “theory and politics are intimate
and embodied,” but as a performative genre, establishes a “theater of relational possibility” that
both addresses an audience and invites them to critically reflect about their own subject
positions.92 In the passage “Schizophrenia,” that theater looks like a river of text: Clare’s account
of when he “came close to schizophrenia but managed to escape” winds down the page in the
shape of a stream, visually echoing the metaphor of “brilliant imperfection” as a river that
“winds through [the] mosaic.” The white space that separates the poetic, personal, and critical
passages also ripples around metatextual asides to the reader, which describe how Clare seeks to
locate his own experience within the raced and gendered histories that the empirical claims of the
DSM would occlude.93 “I tell this story through a thick veil of shame,” he says.
I tell it remembering that at different times and in different times and culture, visions and
voice have had different meanings, entirely separate from the diagnosis of schizophrenia
and all the accompanying fear, hatred, and stereotypes…I tell this story searching for
ways not to shrink it down to my personal account of pain and survival…I tell it insisting
on the racialized and gendered history of schizophrenia, how psychiatrists, judges, and
prison wardens have wielded that diagnosis to lock up Black men…I tell it, keenly aware
of homelessness, imprisonment, long-term institutionalization, surveillance…of the social
and material consequences arising from the naming [of schizophrenia].94
The incantatory “I tell it” is repeated with a difference each time; though not a metaphor, its
fractal quality echoes that of the mosaic, evoking the multiplicity and dynamism of Clare’s own
literary and critical relation to diagnosis. By invoking the reader’s presence, it establishes the
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process of writing “brilliant imperfection” as a relational exercise, an invitation to writer and
reader to rethink their respective stances towards diagnosis’s individualist narrative.
For Clare, what makes such an individualist narrative not only exclusionary, but also
dangerous is that, even when its brutally linear plotline is a fiction, legal and medical institutions
have the power to make its events come true. Clare does credit his two voluntary commitments
to a psych ward with helping him survive an episode when “voices filled [his] head”: being
trapped there prevented him from repeating an attempt to consume a fatal amount of alcohol and
sleeping pills, or from “bolting into the below-freezing winter nights.”95 But to survive the ward,
he says, he also needed to “keep [his] queerness hidden” and rely on white privilege’s
protections – and when he acceded to the ward psychiatrist’s urgings and tried an antipsychotic,
he “immediately felt worse…self floating along the ceiling, body-mind ready to collapse.”96
Despite the pain and disappointment of having been failed by medical protocols, what Clare
emphasizes above all is his relief at having avoided being interpellated by the DSM’s taxonomies
and forced into a permanent relationship with the diagnosis of schizophrenia. By virtue of the
DSM’s false claims to scientific objectivity, schizophrenia, Clare suggests, appears to be
ahistorical, when it fact the category has been weaponized as an instrument of anti-Black
violence and used to legitimize the surveillance and imprisonment of people who are sick, ill, or
disabled. Its clinical abstraction allows it to “become a prophesy, a justification, a means of
social control.”97
The counter-diagnostic move, in Price’s theorization of it, turns incoherence “to strategic
advantage” by deliberately writing from the position of a “disorganized I” that ranges across “a
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palimpsest of genres, voices, and perspectives.” 98 In Clare’s passage “Schizophrenia,” this move
undoes the ahistorcism of the DSM’s diagnostic codes, and figures the writing process as a
recursive movement across multiple temporal scales. The fractal, fracturing interruption of “I tell
it” – like the fractal, fracturing mosaic of Brilliant Imperfection as a whole – directs this strategic
incoherence towards the temporality of Clare’s entire project, calling attention to how and why it
seeks to “[upend] the medical model by replacing the future-oriented temporality of cure with the
slower temporalities of the chronic.”99 This is how Cynthia Barounis describes the “antinormative time” of Alison Bechdel’s graphic novel Are You My Mother, which, Barounis argues,
aestheticizes Bechdel’s experiences with obsessive-compulsive disorder and depression as part
of a “crip-feminist literary style” that honors creative interdependence and dismisses creative
self-sufficiency as a patriarchal myth.100 According to Barounis, Bechdel uses metaphor to
portray her “obsessive” artistic style as part of a “model of creative interdependence that
reframes mental distress not as a spectacular break from reason,” but rather as an ongoing
process of negotiating its effects.101 This reading sympathizes with disability scholars’ suspicion
of “illness-as-metaphor” – an entirely justified suspicion, Barounis notes, given how Western
literature has traditionally relied on it in order to figure disability as a “prosthesis” – while also
pursuing a genealogy of metaphor that neither erases nor appropriates disabled experience, but
rather acknowledges its role in artistic and cultural production.102
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I suggest that Clare and Orr’s autotheoretical texts use metaphor to similar ends, though
neither aestheticizes the phenomena associated with mental disability and/or illness, as Bechdel
does through her representation of artistic obsession. (This is also how Price reads the counterdiagnostic move in Susanne Antonetta’s A Mind Apart: Travels in a Neurodiverse World, which
uses the disorganized I as a defining characteristic of her “bipolar book,” in which the I
proliferates into the “we” of multiple selfhood).103 Instead, these texts use metaphor to figure the
anti-normative temporalities of chronic conditions, while drawing on autotheory’s self-reflexive
“method of using the body’s experience to develop knowledge” to suggest that these
temporalities also govern the writer’s composition of their own text.104 They do so by engaging
the “metatheoretical tendencies” that, Fournier argues, are “indebted” to poststructuralist
genealogies of experimental feminist art.105
Put another way, Clare takes up autotheory as a feminist aesthetic practice – one that has
proved particularly useful for identifying how certain varieties of illness, pain, and trauma are
feminized, and consequently delegitimized – and uses it to figure the temporalities of psychic
distress and mental disability as incoherent, or, as Price puts it, “anti-coherent.”106 At least, they
would appear anti-coherent within the form of the DSM, which “creates definition through the
particulars of hierarchy and subordination,” and partitions most categories of diagnosis into the
predictive subheadings “Prevalence, Development and Course, Risk and Prognostic Factors,
Comorbidity.”107 In this artificial imposition of uniformity, the DSM does not, as Julia Miele
Rodas notes, resemble fictional narrative, which is shaped by the untidy, organic forces of affect
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and desire.108 Nevertheless, each entry does have an imagined subject whose pathology develops
along a future-oriented trajectory, the direction of which depends upon their adherence to the
protocols of psychiatric treatment: deeper into mental illness and its social and material
ramifications, which the DSM’s clinical language obscures; or towards therapeutic intervention
and the horizon of cure. In “Schizophrenia” and “Feeling Broken,” Clare riffs on the counterdiagnostic metaphor of the mosaic to opt out of these timelines of character development, and
instead engage a version of “chronicity” – a concept that Barounis identifies as having “recently
emerged within queer and crip writing,” and that links the “durational, recurrent, and ongoing”
symptoms of certain illnesses to other articulations of anti-normative time.”109 For Clare, having
“narrowly escaped schizophrenia,” he has also escaped the futures that, he suggests, are
inextricably bound up with the promise of its cure: surveillance; being involuntarily committed;
or continuing to take the antipsychotic drugs with “side effects no one bothered to explain,”
which, in his case, failed to deliver a reprieve from hallucinations and suicidal ideations.110
Loosed from the DSM’s teleology, these fractal passages’ movements between memoir,
archival research, and scholarship perform the ongoingness of the chronic, which, as Elizabeth
Freeman writes, “correlates with a certain shapelessness in time,” and seems to “belie narrative
altogether.”111 This requires beginning again and again (“I tell it…”) and presents the craft of
writing as a way to imagine the temporality of mental distress otherwise: as a narrative
composed of many points of departure, which demarcates the diffuse patterns of embodied
knowledge that unfold outward, untethered to cure’s horizon. Like Retallack’s fractal poethics,
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autotheory’s anti-teleological form charts a “constructive preoccupation with…change,” which is
also how Clare characterizes the experience of being with others in queer and/or disability
communities: that is, as time marked not by progress, but rather by acts of care and pleasure that
respond to ever-fluctuating needs and desires.112 “I’m at a crip dance,” he tells us, where dancers
lean on one another’s waists and wood and wheels, and move to the beat with their tongues,
eyes, and sip-and-puff wheelchairs. “…We slide in and through pain, shimmy and strut…We
dance into tremors and spasms, through anxiety, inside hallucinations. We take breaks…We
dance all night.”113 The anecdote is framed by italicized claims about the interdependence of
ecosystems (“Leaves to stones, earthworms to grizzly bears…life is connected to life”), detached
from the alinear story of the dance – foregrounding how, through the time-bending form of his
prose, Clare rewrites the cultural narratives that presume the achievement of autonomy to be the
first necessary step towards flourishing.114
These texts, by bringing a fractal aesthetic to bear on the experience of diagnosis, resist
common sense about writing as a liberal humanist project, where its aesthetic value indexes the
author’s self-possession. In the terms of therapeutic culture, possessive individualism is entailed
on freedom from psychological “disorder,” the concept that makes “white Western medical
diagnosis” possible.115 These assumptions are foundational to what I understand to be the
Western ideology of mental health, where the evidence of a “fixed, core self, imagined to be
located in the mind” demonstrates an individual’s fitness as a liberal-political subject.116 The
most powerful category of that evidence is “rhetoricity,” Catherine Prendergast’s term for the
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ability to be understood and therefore be received as human; this conflation of lucid, rational
modes of communication with personhood is so pervasive a norm that, as Cynthia LewieckiWilson observes, the legal disempowerment and social stigmatization of people with psychiatric
and cognitive disabilities often unfolds “through their invalidation as rhetors.”117 Or, as Price
puts it: “To lack rhetoricity is to lack all basic freedoms and rights, including the freedom to
express ourselves and the right to be listened to.”118 For these scholars, working at the
intersection of disability studies and composition and rhetoric theory, rhetoric is “not simply the
words we speak or write or sign,” but rather a set of discursive formations that determine
whether a person can “make sense” according to Enlightenment ideals of reason and
rationality.119 These ideals, Price argues, have profoundly shaped the rise of academic discourse
in the United States, such that ableism is built into its theories and pedagogies – even, she
suggests, in critical pedagogy that “often extols the potential of emotion to decenter the
autonomous (rational) subject” of the composition classroom, but fails to grapple with its
fundamental presumption that this subject is able-minded and processes emotion in neurotypical
ways.120
DSM autotheory brings these insights to bear on the category of literature itself: it uses
the citational practices of academic prose to subvert the divisions between scholarly and creative
work, while writing against the medical model of disability that casts both as genres of
rhetoricity. As such, it bears some affinity to the literary-intellectual tradition of “illiberal
humanisms,” Kandice Chuh’s term for intellectual and creative work that disidentifies from
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bourgeois liberalism and seeks to “[emancipate] the human” from its grasp – the “human” being
the overdetermined “figure of Man” that was the ideal of Enlightenment rationality, which
legitimated the onto-epistemologies of racial capitalism and, as Sylvia Wynter argues, continues
to inform our ideas of literary criticism in the present.121 The subjugated knowledges of illiberal
humanisms refigure the human otherwise, through the “illiberal humanist aesthetics” that
generate difference “as part of the naturalized visceral experience of the world.”122
DSM autotheory shares this investment in illuminating the entangled, relational
ontologies of the human that cannot be contained by the academy’s disciplinary divisions,
particularly those that link writing to rationality. That said, as a genre, autotheory is not
inherently oriented towards the antiracist politics of “humanism in an illiberal key.”123 While
Clare’s text presents psychiatric diagnosis as part of a white settler episteme, unpacking how its
logics have been used to justify the violent institutionalization of Black people and the genocidal
destruction of Indigenous lands, Orr’s neglects to acknowledge the DSM’s history as an
instrumentalization of racism at all; instead, “Panic Xanax” engages strictly with the gendersexed protocols of panic as a variation on hysteria.124 Despite this, I suggest that both texts
demonstrate how autotheory, as a genre that reworks theory’s status as “a discourse embedded in
academic institutions that might be seen as inaccessible…to particular bodies,” upends the liberal
ideology of mental health that is embedded in tropes about writing in the context of higher
education.125
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I am thinking, in particular, about tropes like “I’m a teacher, not a therapist,” a
declaration that is likely familiar to anyone who has taught college composition in the U.S., and
“Writing isn’t therapy,” which may be equally familiar to anyone who has taught or studied
creative writing in the academy. In Mad at School, Price documents how habitually the former
statement appears in pedagogical literature by writing teachers. The very frequency of its
avowal, Price says, indicates “the level of anxiety that attends our efforts to keep the
teaching/therapy divide intact.”126 There are structural reasons for this anxiety, among them the
fact that administrators regularly remind professors of their obligation to refer students to the
university health center – an injunction that may help students gain access to crucial forms of
care, but is also shadowed by the threat of professional or legal retribution.127 That said, this
anxiety also reflects the reality that academic discourse “operates not just to omit, but to abhor
mental disability”: the liberal humanist ideal of academe as a “bastion of reason” renders
impossible the valuation of rhetors who do not communicate according to its exclusionary terms
of rationality and sense-making.128
Its corollary, “Writing isn’t therapy,” is usually directed at the writer of creative
nonfiction, memoir, or autobiographical fiction, and often levied in spaces where writing is
understood as emphatically not academic – even when, as in creative writing programs, those
spaces are part of the degree-granting institutions. As a pedagogical chestnut, it admonishes the
novice that their traumatic experiences are not inherently compelling, such that recounting their
emotional aftermath does not qualify as art without the intervention of craft. This is also a trope
of critical reception, as most famously articulated by Michiko Kakutani in her 1997 review of
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Survival Stories: Memoirs of Crisis: “The current memoir craze has fostered the belief that
confession is therapeutic, that therapy is redemptive and that redemption equals art, and it has
encouraged the delusion that…the exposed life is the same thing as an examined one.”129 The
premise of this dismissal – that the revelation of feeling, as an end to itself, is pointless solipsism
– feels dated in the wake of the affective turn, which takes seriously the circulation of emotion as
what registers and produces the political, and is similarly out of sync with the trade publishing
industry’s embrace of the nonfictional trauma narrative as a highbrow form. In the literary
marketplace of writing workshops and retreats, one readily finds spaces that honor the
therapeutic potential of writing – not the clinical activity of journaling, but writing intended for
publication – as well as articles and essays arguing for the literary value of that model.130
Still, even in arraying themselves against Kakutani’s claim, many of these arguments
implicitly validate it. In “Writing Memoir and Writing for Therapy: An Inquiry on the Functions
of Reflection,” Tara DaPra recalls her unease on the first day of her literary nonfiction workshop,
which the instructor began by informing the students that “This class is not therapy.”131 This
pronouncement fills DaPra with self-doubt: she had long found it psychologically beneficial to
write about pain and loss; did this mean, then, that her writing did not actually fulfill her literary
ambitions, but was “something lesser?” No, she decides: creative nonfiction, by definition,
involves the task of psychological introspection, and “both good writing and good therapy
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require a narrative to be ordered and assembled…What my instructor really meant to say is that
it’s important to revise.”132 The rough draft, craggy with the material that has not yet been
smoothed into its unassailable form, is a private document for that which is the proper domain of
therapy: the experience of psychic distress or psychiatric disability rendered in a form too
unmediated to be interesting. This presumes the therapeutic encounter to be a redemptive act of
confession, devoid of the aesthetic sensibility that renders a text literary.
These tropes index how, in the context of U.S. higher education, common sense about
what qualifies as “good” academic and creative writing often pivots on the marginalization of
mental distress and disability – the evidence of which must either be expelled from the text for it
to become sufficiently rational, or else transmuted into a form that qualifies it as art. I understand
this to be a question about feminist aesthetics because these tropes also feminize the failure to
write well, mapping a therapeutic orientation onto the gendered hierarchy of reason and emotion
that is endemic to Western philosophy and literature.133 Psychiatric discourse validates the
academic writer who demonstrates that “[their] rational mind is their instrument” or the creative
writer who, perhaps after “working with a therapist,” learns to “order the emotion” on the page,
separating these gendered modes of writing according to diagnostic logics.134 This is not only a
medical model at work, ascribing a Western ideal of mental health to the category of the literary,
but also a therapeutic one that is invested in the liberal ideal of self-cultivation: through the
willful exertion of agency, one can write oneself into literature, leaving behind the prose of a
“radically unhealed mind.”135 Because “I’m a teacher, not a therapist” and “Writing isn’t
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therapy” communicate this through the deployment of “negative metaphor,” we can approach
them as part of the rhetorical tradition that uses figurative language to stigmatize disability and
shore up a hegemonic ideal of wellness. In this case, that ideal belongs to a therapeutic ideology,
which establishes psychic stability as one of liberal subjectivity’s conditions. 136
In the chapter “What’s So Funny about Self-Care,” I explore how this ideology creates a
double-bind for the feminist subject, which liberal feminism attempts to reconcile through the
strategic elision of difference – in some cases, by paying obeisance to Lorde’s theorization of
wellness, while disavowing how its terms of analysis centered race, sexuality, and disability.
“Writing isn’t therapy” similarly frames writing as an activity of the therapeutic subject, who
asserts their sovereignty by disciplining their emotions into rhetoric and banishing mental
disability to the therapist’s office. Because this setting has historically been coded white, female,
and bourgeois, its invocation here engenders a “cruelly optimistic” relation between privileged
narratives of feminine suffering and the consolidation of patriarchal power that is authorship.137
Meanwhile, “I’m a teacher, not a therapist” flags how the mandate to perform emotional labor in
academia, often described in primarily gendered terms, is, in the writing classroom, complicated
by the intersection of ableism with racist and patriarchal norms. The instructor pressed into an
inappropriately therapeutic role is often more likely to be a woman or person of color, and/or in
the precarious position of being untenured.138 Their refusal to take on this additional work –
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which often goes unrecognized in hiring and promotion decisions – may also constitute a refusal
to endorse the unjust distribution of labor in the academy, which attenuates the personal and
professional well-being of minoritized faculty. At the same time, the terms of the dismissal –
teacher; not therapist – implies that written evidence of mental distress, depending on its degree
of intensity, cannot be aesthetically or intellectually significant work. DSM autotheory takes up
that written evidence as an object of literary and critical interest, and so invites us to consider
how the disciplines of creative and academic writing might be freed from these pedagogical
double-binds.
This reading depends, of course, on who is declaring their resistance to therapeutic
writing and/or teaching, as well as whom they address. If we imagine that speaker to be the
minoritized instructor who has been tasked – too many times and without recompense – to
provide pastoral care for others in a professional environment that erodes their own physical and
mental well-being, then we might grasp how the pressure to provide a therapeutic environment
might force them to disavow the necessity of one. Put another way, we might grasp how
structural inequities could leave feminist discourse susceptible to a “discursive dependency” on
mental unwellness or disability.139 Feminist disability studies has, in part, emerged in order to
identify and critique how this dependency emerges through figurative language, as in Elizabeth
Donaldson’s influential analysis of Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar’s “madwoman in the attic”
as a metaphor that glamorizes madness-as-rebellion and so “indirectly diminishes the lived
experience of many people disabled by mental illness.”140 If feminism, following the second
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wave practice of feminist therapy as consciousness-raising, has been preoccupied with the
fundamentally literary problem of how to read pain without being circumscribed by the “site of
subordination,” then these disability metaphors reveal how this problem entails another: how to
read, and write, mental distress and disability without being circumscribed by the “curative
imaginaries” of prose genres.141
Counter-diagnostic metaphor addresses this by subverting the tradition of corporal
metaphor, the formal link between these problems. Corporeal metaphor, in which political
abstractions are illustrated as forms of embodiment, pervades Western literature because it
“offers narrative the one thing it cannot possess – an anchor in materiality.”142 Within the liberal
tradition, these metaphors regularly ascribe political failure or corruption to the disabled body, as
when, for example, a physical impairment gets equated with the immobilizing effects of
monarchical power.143 These narrative prostheses reveal how the disavowals of liberal humanism
are embedded in its own language and imagery, where purportedly universal ideals of freedom or
equality are naturalized as the properties of non-disabled body-minds. One of the projects of
feminist disability studies has been to identify and critique the ways in which discourses of
feminist liberation rely on this ableist lexicon, even – or especially – when arguing for the
category of the human to be re-oriented around racial and/or gender difference. In what Sami
Shalk calls “indirect ableism,” as a corollary to the “indirect sexism” that was an object of third
wave feminist critique, feminist writers and scholars anchor the material effects of patriarchy in
metaphors that “[conflate] disability with stigma or stuckness.”144 By representing feminist
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resistance as an aspiration towards ablebodiedness – where liberation is imagined as normative
forms of mobility, sight, or speech – this rhetoric “construes disability in opposition to the
feminist subject.”145
For example, Shalk observes, in bell hooks’ The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity, and
Love, hooks argues that men are socialized to “become and remain emotional cripples”;
similarly, she says, Tania Modleski uses the “mute body” to describe the status of the woman
whose marginalization prevents her from participating in public discourse.146 Shalk ties this
rhetoric to a genealogy of feminist thought that includes Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Margaret
Sanger, who reacted to the characterization of women as essentially “weak” or “feebleminded”
by distancing themselves from nonwhite, working class, and disabled women, and affirming the
eugenicist view that the members of this class ought indeed to be monitored, controlled, and,
eventually, eliminated. 147 Of course, as Shalk’s essay affirms, hooks is a profoundly influential
Black feminist scholar and antiracist activist whose life’s work repudiates this and all white
supremacist movements. The point is that these ableist tropes are so deeply entrenched in
feminist discourse that even hooks can call for an intersectional revolution against the Western
ideology of domination, without questioning how her own use of corporeal metaphors might
reproduce that ideology’s terms.148 Shalk argues that hooks, by framing patriarchal masculinity
as defined by “acts of psychic self-mutilation” that are “emotionally crippling,” participates in a
long tradition of flattening the multivalent experiences of impairment in order to shore up
feminism as a kind of salvation, endowed with the power to heal.149 This casts disability as “a
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negative, anti-relational state of injury…that ought to be healed by the appropriate social
institutions” and “a wounded state that must be resisted by individuals themselves through sheer
will.”150
I read this as yet another iteration of the irresolvable tension within the feminist project
of, in hooks’ words, taking up the self as the “starting point for politicization” through the
therapeutic activity of consciousness-raising. 151 The risk, from hooks’ perspective, is that
personal self-exploration could become an end in itself, rather than part of the process of
identifying patriarchy’s psychological harms and using them as fodder for revolutionary change.
In the 1970s, during the woman’s movement turn towards feminist therapy – the development of
which I discuss in this dissertation’s introduction and first chapter, “The Crack and Composure
of Words” – the notion of feminist subjectivity as bound up in collective psychic suffering
challenged the dichotomization of private and public, while also providing a foundation for, as
therapist Miriam Greenspan put it, “understanding empowerment as a social and not simply
individual psychological process.”152 However, in the decades to follow, feminist therapy would
become yet another product in “the ever-expanding multi-million dollar new
age/recovery/therapy/healing industry” – and the notion of women’s empowerment would often
function, in Dana Becker’s phrase, as the “slippery symbolic bridge” between the aspirations of
liberal individualism (self-actualization) and those of feminist activism (structural change).153
Such symbolic bridges are often the focus of critiques of therapeutic culture – particularly
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defined by what Catherine Rottenberg describes as “a reorienting of the liberal feminist
discursive field away from notions of freedom, equal rights, and social justice and toward the
importance of well-roundedness and well-being.”154 From this view, sovereignty is entailed upon
the psychic management of one’s mental health in public, a project that does not typically
depend on medical intervention, but rather on activities that could also be read as pleasurable
pursuits – the practice of rituals or the purchase of commodities sold as self-care, for example, or
the choice to seek therapy as a form of self-cultivation. Throughout this chapter, as well as in this
dissertation as a whole, I try to consider where and how these critiques of therapeutic culture
might intersect with the concerns of feminist psychiatric disability studies, which “challenges
ablenormative feminist scholars to take mental illness seriously” by striving to elucidate how
racial, sexual, and gender difference invalidates diagnosis for some and forces them upon
others.155
The ethos of feminist psychiatric disability studies, grounded in the lived experience of
the subject interpellated by diagnosis, leads to very different lines of inquiry than that of cultural
criticism about therapeutic culture in the U.S. – especially those that interrogate wellness as the
spoils of neoliberalism and ask whether the language of psychological evaluation shields
individuals from recognizing their own relative privilege, thus producing a political culture
defined by narcissism and apathy.156 This question can be difficult to ask without implicitly
relying on a medical taxonomy of mental distress and disability – one that divides individual’s
psychological states into those that are debilitating and/or authentic enough to merit a diagnosis,
and those that fail to meet such a standard. Such a taxonomy would be incompatible with
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feminist psychiatric disability studies’ “flexible, aleatory relationship to medical knowledge,”
which is opposed to the “usual progress narrative of medicine codified by” the authoritarian
power of the DSM itself.157 This narrative has been used to “[create] racial differences in
psychopathology rather than [reflect] them”; represent “lesbian, bi, bisexual, and trans identities
and diseased”; and sort body-mind difference according to “a predetermined rubric of disease
and failure…so obviously controlling and repressive that the observation need scarcely be
made.”158 DSM autotheory, as I have suggested throughout this chapter, is in the interesting
position of being thematically aligned with these latter concerns, while also using its form to
critique therapeutic culture and its dominant version of sovereignty. Rather than make a case for
how its creator “meet[s] the tests of liberal subjectivity” – the text’s rhetoricity proof of their
“autonomy, intention, the essential stability of something called intelligence linked to a core
self” – it figures the writer as invested in another project altogether, outside the teleologies of
liberal individualism.159
Through its use of self-reflexive metaphor, DSM autotheory invites us to attend to
inventiveness and rigor of creating a form that can chart a “constructive preoccupation with
unpredictable forms of change, adapting Retallack’s poetics of the swerve to the subject matter
of mental unwellness. As such, it centers the contingencies of chronic conditions, like Clare’s
episodes of hearing voices and seeing visions or, in Orr’s case, panic attacks, as the grounds for
creativity. This is not say that DSM autotheory relishes these experiences, which can be painful
or terrifying, as juicy writing material; as Clare says, “When it became clear that I had to deal
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with this damage or end up dead, all I wanted was to be cured.”160 Nor does it propose that the
creative process redeems them or casts them in a desirable light. Rather, it explores how these
contingencies are, as Freeman says, “simply time-ish,” iterating “personality itself as ‘repeating
being,’” and frames this “repeating being” as an authorial mode – one that rejects writing as a
map of the teleology of “progressive enlightenment through…individuated self-consciousness,”
including the performance of self-actualization that gets called mental health.161
“This is a self-chosen theater in which I recount my panic stories in public,” says Orr, a
pronouncement that could refer to “Panic Xanax” itself, as a chapter within a sociological study
published by a university press, or to her memoiristic “patient diary” scrawled with passages
about the blur of memories and fantasies that, by turns stirring, traumatizing, or darkly hilarious,
surfaces throughout the drug trial.162 By linking the image of the theater to both modes of
composition, the metaphor foregrounds the ambiguity of Orr’s position as the autotheorist of her
own panic, who performs her subjectivation within the systems of classification that would
invalidate her as a rhetor. In “Panic Xanax,” as in Brilliant Imperfection, it is impossible to
determine whether the author demonstrates a successful therapeutic relation to the writing
process – that is, whether the author has overcome their psychic dis/order, such that their
rhetoric establishes them as “the rational subject of academic discourse”; or whether they have
mastered their own traumatic or distressing experience and rendered it legible within traditional
literary genres.163 Instead, they deliberately break with this therapeutic teleology and frame the
act of writing itself as what disrupts it.

160

Clare, Brilliant Imperfection, 159.
Freeman, “Hopeless Cases,” 338. Chuh, The Difference Aesthetics Makes, 75.
162
Orr, “Panic Xanax,” 221.
163
Price, Mad at School, 41.
161

159

It is challenging to summarize “Panic Xanax” because part of its purpose is to subvert the
principle of summary itself – or of any empirical account of a subjective experience, particularly
one that pivots on psychic distress or disorientation. As a “patient diarist,” Orr is tasked with
producing just such an account: Dr. M. asks her to rank, in a blue Upjohn-issued notebook, the
inscrutable sensations of each panic attack on “an absolute scale of 1 to 10,” a method adapted
from the DSM’s criteria for panic disorder.164 Orr complies, though she never tells us what she
actually puts on the forms (“I check the appropriate box”); instead, we glimpse dreamlike, even
lyrical excerpts from Orr’s alternative “panic diaries” that structure, as she says, “a confabulating
reenactment of history, a trauma in search of its missing event as I reconstruct the fantastic,
storied origins of a psychic disorder that, they told me, is caused by a few faulty circuits
inside.”165 Images of circuits, fuses, wires, and circuits abound in this chapter and the book as a
whole, which shares Jean Baudrillad’s fascination with a “hyperreal world of capitalism-goneelectric,” and takes as its point of departure Donna Haraway’s analysis of how Cold War terrors
shaped the science of cybernetics into a technology of “psychopower.”166
Psychopower is Orr’s term, which, she clarifies, is “not only a psychological correlate of
modern biopower,” but also includes the “cultural production of perception itself.”167 Deployed
to both manage panic and produce it, psychopower “actively re-fuses and confuses the
boundaries between the real and the unreal” in order to shore up the post-Cold War cybernetic
state, where “radio and television, jet planes and atomic bombs, computers and pills” appear as
both forms of mass media and techniques of crowd control.168 The absurdity of the little blue
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diary is plain: how could anyone mistake the “styleless style” of the contemporary DSM – all
narrativizing theories, psychoanalytic and otherwise, stripped away and replaced with bloodless
checklists of symptoms – for a literary form capable of apprehending the cybernetic brain, its
circuitry looped into panicky histories of gender, medicine, and trauma?169 Through counterdiagnostic metaphor, “Panic Xanax” offers a method for aestheticizing the panicked brain, as
figured by the print of Miró’s Women and Birds in Front of the Sun that hangs in the lobby of
Massachusetts General Hospital, the site of Upjohn’s research study. Like Clare’s mosaic, the
print figures Orr’s experience of body-mind difference, while also subverting the diagnostic gaze
that would try to lock these phenomena into a rigidly representational or predictive narrative.
The painting’s fractal character emerges not only through its abstraction, but also through how
its imagery shapeshifts each time that Orr returns to it, reworking her own relation to the
medicalized protocols that she experiences in the hospital’s Anxiety Research Unit.
Women and Birds in Front of the Sun is an illustrative example of Miró’s aesthetic,
composed of lines and geometric shapes that thrum with the emotive energy of abstraction, even
as their arrangement evokes a surrealist version of the title. “You stand before the sun not
blinking. Watching. We and the birds. We and the woman and the sun,” Orr begins, the
fragmentary syntax beginning to generate, fractal-like, its own internal patterns. As in her earlier
account of insomnia, the shift in pronouns foregrounds the ambiguity of Orr’s position: does she
address the painted figure or herself? Whom does the “we” gather into its shared perspective?170
“The figure of the woman is nothing but black edges outline. And white space, static on both
sides of her edges, inside and out.” 171 Orr, the writer, is indistinguishable from the reproduction
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of the abstracted woman; in figuring both as electrified text, the passage foreshadows how, after
riding the elevator up to the Anxiety Research Unit, Orr will be hooked up to an
electrocardiogram machine that literally entangles her in the “neural network” of panic.172 The
image resists further interpretation, other than to suggest that Orr’s imbrication within the “white
noise inside and out along her edges standing before her standing in front of the sun” exceeds
what the coherent I can signify alone, where the representation of her anxiety, in itself,
“remark[s] directly on the space between the narrator’s consciousness and the reader’s.”173
Orr returns to her impression of the print four more times, as if its rhetorical function
were to serve as a transition between the institutional histories of the DSM-III and Orr’s
memoiristic passages. In the former, Orr follows the money of the DSM-III and IV’s diagnostic
categories, revealing the market forces that led the 1974 DSM-III task force to focus on creating
“rubrics of validity” for the profession. Because the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Act had imposed
stringent standards for the efficacy of drug trials, the manufacturers of psychopharmaceutical
drugs –for example, Xanax – were constrained by “psychiatry’s inability to accurate count
mental disease or account for itself,” and had a vested interest in the field’s turn towards datadriven criteria. Given the lack of consensus around the causation or location of psychiatric
disorders, the DSM-III task force sought validity through the prototype model of classification.
Its taxonomy of symptoms and disorders serves “to emphasize, rather than obscure the
probabilistic nature of diagnostic categorization,” appearing, as David Sheehan says, “a kind of
latter day fortune telling system.”174
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Orr’s descriptions of the Miró print appear as lyrical interludes between these scholarly
theorizations of how the psychiatric profession grew deeply “wired into the financial and
technoscientific circuits” of the corporate pharmaceutical industry, and the diaristic passages that
attempt to capture her personal experience of being diagnosed within this disorienting system.175
At first glance, these passage dangle the possibility that the print could serve as a hermeneutic,
clarifying the connection between the text’s generic modes. But, in fact, the counter-diagnostic
metaphor of the Miró print works against the casual logic of transitions, and models instead what
autotheorizing panic requires: detachment from a liberal model of rationality as the ethos of
one’s own text.
It does so by conjuring the raced and gendered figure of the hysteric, whose absence, Orr
suggests, haunts the DSM-III, as well as all editions to follow. Hysteria is famously foundational
to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic paradigms: as a condition that mimicked “real” symptoms,
meaning symptoms typically associated with physiological disorders, it was profoundly
influential to theories of the psyche as both self-governed and unreadable to itself.176 According
to Orr, this same ambiguity made it a crucial “test for the psychiatric powers of standardized
diagnostic techniques” from the 1950s to the 1970s, when psychiatry was first making its then
“marginalized effort” to establish itself as a medical science.177 The DSM-III’s claims to
scientific validity are, as Orr puts it, “historically rehearsed on the hysteric’s stage, built on the
suggestive empirical evidence of hysteria’s ‘real’ existence”; yet, by the time of its publication,
hysteria has disappeared, its symptoms redistributed throughout multiple DSM-III categories.178
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Through this sleight of hand, the DSM-III also occludes how psychiatric diagnosis, as a
concept, historically emerges from a pathology that is always already co-constitutive with
“woman” as a category – specifically, white, middle-class womanhood, though these additional
signifiers are not the focus of Orr’s analysis.179 In her rendering of Miró’s painting, Orr
summons the hysterical woman’s embodiment to the sterile halls of Mass General, a chaotic
assemblage of dismembered parts that seethe with a disturbing sexual excess (“Her lips black
and red inside her stomach and closed down toward her vulva”), which shifts into a
untrammeled expression of creative, perhaps erotic, energies (At another time she is dancing a
black line in orbit tying herself up dancing somewhere between white moon curl and orange
circle sun…a black and curving line in solo and out, knotted in passing, in passage).180 This
creative energy oscillates with an alarmingly self-destructive force: the discombobulated figure
morphs into a blackbird, “beating wild”; rises perilously close to the sun, Icarus-like; seems to
intermittently catch fire; then mysteriously returns to an orderly composition, “a sketch of an
outline of her body surrounded and filled in by background.”181 Between these delirious
passages, Orr records another nightmare in her panic diary, in which a TV camera crew
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materializes in her house, ready to film her as she performs her own scripted dream. “That was
really funny,” says a crew member, “the part when you got afraid of the feminine.”182
By returning to Woman and Birds in Front of the Sun before each appointment with Dr.
M., Orr tries to exorcise this fear of the feminine, or at least to restore the specter of the
feminine’s powerful incoherence to this clinical space – a space where the practice of scientific
empiricism is funded and organized by a complex web of government, military, and corporate
interests.183 The Miró painting, displayed “on the philanthropically funded wall,” links this
disciplinary regime to the DSM’s abstraction of psychic terror from its own gender-sexed
histories.184 As a counter-diagnostic metaphor, it reminds us that these histories remain
imminent, despite the diagnostic urge to contain them within the orderly timelines of
symptomologies. …” The figure of the electrified, electrifying woman defies any system that
would deny the materiality of mental distress or disability, much like the terrifying visions of
incest and injury that surge into Orr’s consciousness, even as she strains to match her medical
examiners’ tone of professional neutrality: “She removes the fourth rubber strap [of the EKG
machine] from my left wrist. I ask, ‘Do you do this all day?’…Something down deep breaks and
I am wet all over. Dear Daddy I dream you naked in a loft Lower East Side New York.185
In evoking the material histories of panic, the Miró woman’s metamorphoses also reveal
the volatility of chronicity, which is illegible within the tidy narrative being established for Orr
upstairs in the Anxiety Research Unit: “PATIENT-THEORIST,” as she calls herself, is steadily
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improving, which Dr. M. attributes to the drug’s regulation of her brain’s misfirings.186 At no
point does Orr dismiss the efficacy of Xanax or express resistance to cure as an aspiration;
indeed, she transcribes an interview with a psychiatrist in which she eagerly seeks some evidence
of a “curative knowledge” that could potentially eradicate panic disorder altogether.187 This, of
course, is another point of difference between Orr and Clare, given the latter’s profound
skepticism about all medicalized discourse pertaining to the psyche; nevertheless, their counterdiagnostic metaphors both render the inadequacy of curative time abundantly plain. Orr’s
rendering of Woman and Birds – or, more precisely, of the mass-produced print, its image
proliferating, fractal-like, in uncountable locations – turns autotheory’s fractal incoherence
towards apprehending the multiple, dynamic scales of panic’s incarnations.
In so doing, the counter-diagnostic metaphor speaks to the exigency of autotheory as a
literary performance: that is, it comments upon academic criticism’s capacity to elucidate the
“impersonality of social forces and modern histories,” while also charting the personal as what
exceeds the coherent “I” of a traditional argument.188 As Orr imagines her own consciousness
melding with that of the Miró woman (“you stand before that sun not blinking and your eyes go
fire you shimmer with the heat”), emphasizing the anti-coherent quality of her own narration as it
hovers “between our selves, entre nous,” she also incorporates excerpts from Kathy Acker and
Toni Morrison’s writings into her own panic diaries.189 These moments foreground DSM
authority as a hybrid form that, through its autobiographical mode, “[closes] the gap between the
disembodied man of universal western reason and the reality of the unaccounted or purely
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subordinated living person,” while making use of its fluid citational practices to theorize psychic
disorder as a sociohistorical phenomenon, one that the DSM’s narratives of individual pathology
cannot contain.190 When Orr weaves a sexualized rant from Acker’s The Adult Life of Toulouse
Lautrec by Henri Toulouse Lautrec (“Fuck his round face and his blonde hair and his five feet
ten inches lean body…Fuck his screwed-up mouth and his skinny legs…fuck his sexual
uptightness fuck his sacredness fuck his egotism”) into her account of undressing for an
electrocardiogram “(Alone with Diana, I take off my shirt, my bra, myshoes, and my nylon
stockings…Feeling broken (but let’s not break up we say ) I am returned to my self barely and
alone…”), an endnote number the only indication that she has incorporated another writer’s
narrative into her own.191 The reader is briefly as disoriented as Orr before the Miró print: to
whom to these body parts belong? Whose personal history is attached to these terrifying visions,
and what reading practices compel us to ask that question at all – that is, to assume that a panic
diary would tell the story of a singular “I,” detached from the social and material networks that
make up psychopower’s regime?
The unboundedness of this fractal form is generative, but risky: it lends itself to
abstraction, such that the writer can readily render a shard of lived experience as if it were
separate from the interlocking oppressions that produced it. This happens on the very next page
of the panic diaries, when Orr incorporates Morrison’s language into her own text as seamlessly
as she does Acker’s. In particular, Orr reproduces the gutting scene in which Cholly Breedlove
rapes his young daughter Pecola; the unspeakable violence of this assault will, for Pecola,
overlap with the warping effects of white supremacy, which have made her own Blackness into a

Wiegman, “Introduction: Autotheory Theory,” 3.
Kathy Acker, The Adult Life of Toulouse Lautrec by Henri Toulouse Lautrec, in Portrait of an Eye: Three Novels
(New York: Grove Press, 1975), 280, quoted in Price, “Panic Xanax,” 234; Price, “Panic Xanax,” 235.
190
191

167

source of agonizing shame.192 Orr does cite Morrison in an endnote, but, true to autotheory’s
freewheeling approach to intertextuality, does not name her in the body of the text, so that the
casual reader could easily miss that the passage belongs to The Bluest Eye at all. This reader
would also miss how Morrison’s imagery evokes the inextricability of Pecola’s trauma from
brutal legacies of racism, misogyny, and poverty, and emphatically does not belong to Orr’s
hallucinatory catalogue of her own psychic injuries. As a “practice of the self that works to undo
it,” autotheory has the potential to imagine a narrator who subverts the ableist expectations of
rhetoricity.193 Unfortunately, this same quality makes it conducive to composing an “I” that
appears detached from its social context, or, in other words, to centering whiteness.
Despite this problematic, by writing against the grain of the DSM as a form of sensemaking, Orr also rewrites the liberal subject who is implicitly its object. Chuh reminds us of the
correlation between the conceptualization of bodies as “discrete and coherent” and the ways in
which “subjectivity is, within the regime of capitalist modernity, understood to be distinctively
sovereign” – a correlation that affirms racist, sexist, and ableist claims about difference.194 One
of the ways that “illiberal humanisms” resist this correlation is through the elaboration of an
aesthetic that disidentifies with the commensurate subject.195 By rendering these visual art
objects through multiple senses – Clare foregrounds his haptic experience of the mosaic, feeling
“the tiles’ rough edges, almost sharp” before he steps back to the curb to view its “ridges and
bumps”; Orr repeatedly figures Woman and Birds as concentrated “white noise,” static and
movement – these counter-diagnostic metaphors gesture towards displacing the “primacy of the
Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 128-9, quoted in Price, “Panic Xanax,”
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visual” as a liberal episteme.196 This episteme, as Chuh observes, has established the Western
European tradition of literature as a visual medium, where the dominant regime of
aestheticization presumes “racist onto-epistemology to speak the truth of being.”197
In some contexts, it also presumes an ableist onto-epistemology to speak this truth, on
which visual markers serve a biocredentializing function: that is, they establish whether an
impairment counts as a legitimate disability.198 Mental disability is often categorized as an
invisible impairment, and so has historically been undertheorized in scholarship that relied
exclusively on the social model of disability.199 That said, in the pedagogical tropes about writing
that I have examined in this chapter, one also finds the common sense assumption that literature
makes mental difference visual – as though the reader were a diagnostician, who could “see”
patterns of disordered or irrational thoughts on the page. Clare and Orr’s counter-diagnostic
metaphors challenge this assumption: they not only represent the aesthetic experience of the
incommensurate subject, but also structure each text’s theoretical approach to “[refiguring] the
rational” by “danc[ing] on generic truths” of academic discourse.200
As such, these metaphors also disidentify with the psychic norms of the commensurate
subject –that is, the psyche as a knowable entity, uncompromised by dysfunctional thoughts and
emotions, which makes the DSM’s claims to scientific objectivity legible.201 “Like other manuals
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and guidebooks, like dictionaries and encyclopedias and etiquette books and grammar texts…the
DSM manifests an extraordinary regularity,” says Rodas; a “disciplined body,” its regulatory
headings and subheadings “reimagin[e] the living untidiness of mental disorder within a
framework of verbal symmetry.”202 This rigidly systematized aesthetic is oriented towards a
hypothetical future, where validity becomes “a measure of “predictive power, the ability to name
not the thing but its future path.”203 The teleology of diagnosis runs parallel to that of bourgeois
liberal humanism, like its shadow; it looks towards a horizon where the diagnosed subject will
likely fail to “meet the tests of liberal subjectivity,” those displays of autonomy or intention that
are the hallmarks of possessive individualism.204 The counter-diagnostic metaphor intervenes by
rewriting aesthetic experience “from the grounds upon which a sense of self is fashioned to the
grounds upon which consciousness of otherness – of being other than the apparently inevitable
self – is evoked.”205 As part of autotheory’s “feminist aesthetic practice, it figures writing as a
medium that renders the probabilistic nature of embodiment, a way of “[beginning] between our
selves. Again,” that the DSM’s inflexible predictions cannot apprehend.206 There is a therapeutic
quality to this writing, but not in a curative sense, where evidence of the author’s controlled,
rational approach to craft is recruited as proof of their rhetoricity. Rather, like the tesserae
“swirling between [Clare’s] words,” the fractal dynamics of DSM autotheory locates the creative
process within the chronic rhythms of its own unfolding.207 The “fractured wholeness” of its
form conjures a place where one is free to think, imagine, and compose outside the paradigms of
well and unwell, rational and irrational, that become their own sources of suffering.
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